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I personally had no knowledge of actual open resistance.  The resistance I knew was a 
passive sort of resistance, and this was carried out by most people to perfection.  The 




—a Hungarian refugee interviewed in 1957
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On coming to power in 1948, the communist regime sought to transform Hungary 
into “a country of iron and steel.”  Industrialization and collectivization were made the 
order of the day; repressive police measures were necessary to force the project through.  
The effectiveness of this authoritarian regime has often been exaggerated by previous 
scholars.  Drawing on archival documents, the “popular” press, and numerous 
contemporaneous interviews, I find instead that the communist administration was 
disorganized and ineffective, lending itself to manipulation by its subjects at all levels of 
the labor hierarchy from technocrats to factory workers to peasants.  Its difficulties were 
further compounded by its clash with preexisting forms of social, economic, and cultural 
organization.  In the countryside, peasants continued both traditional practices of 
resistance, such as wood theft, and cultural practices that were banned by the regime, 
 ix
such as pig-killing.  Both of these forms of resistance persisted throughout the period; 
ironically, the products of these deviant practices were commodified as they found their 
way onto the black market.  The party-state likewise proved unable to eradicate theft 
from work, black-marketeering, and ‘cosmopolitan’ forms of cultural consumption such 
as listening and dancing to American jazz.   
However, not all elements of society opposed the state at every turn; the limited 
successes the regime enjoyed were also due to these underlying forms of social 
organization.  The patriarchal order that antedated communism carried through into the 
communist period, as is apparent in the regime’s prostitution policy.  Patriarchy’s 
persistent influence was also a key factor in the nominal success of the regime’s 
pronatalist policy in the early 1950s.  Similarly, the regime’s propaganda campaign 
against hooliganism resonated with a generational rift between the young generation 
coming of age under communism and its elders.    
Overall, though, most elements of society nursed numerous grievances against the 
authoritarian system.  Although there is no direct linkage between outright rebellion and 
pig-killing, black-marketeering, or most of the other forms of criminal behavior I 
describe herein, their cumulative effect was the erosion of whatever fragile legitimacy the 
regime enjoyed and the society-wide normalization of anti-regime activity.  In October 
1956, the vox populi finally got its opportunity to talk back. 
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The epigraph is an excerpt from an interview archived at the Columbia University 
Hungary Refugee Project, Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia Rare Books and 




Fifty years on, it might seem there is little left to say about the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956.  Scholarly and popular analyses turned up at regular intervals 
throughout the Cold War.1 Since 1989, the opening of the archives has enabled ever-
more-accurate recapitulations of the events of October and November of 1956.2  The 
main events of the revolution are well-documented: on 23 October 1956, student 
demonstrations rapidly snowballed into mass rebellion against the communist regime.  
Soviet troops intervened to restore order, and were beaten back by revolutionaries armed 
with little more than makeshift anti-tank weapons and desperate courage.  After the 
Hungarian Army came over to the side of the revolution, the embattled Soviets were 
forced to withdraw from the capital.  In November, the Red Army rolled back into 
Budapest.  The revolution was crushed.  Around 2500 Magyars were killed in the  
 
                                                 
1 Significant pre-1989 works on 1956 include Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces 
in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), Tibor Méray, Thirteen Days That 
Shook the Kremlin (New York: Praeger, 1959), Miklós Molnár, Budapest 1956: A History of the 
Hungarian Uprising (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), János Radványi, Hungary and the Superpowers: 
the 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), and Paul Zinner, 
Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).  All are competent summaries in 
light of the evidence available at the time.  Useful firsthand accounts written for a popular audience include 
Noel Barber’s A Handful of Ashes: A Personal Testament of the Battle of Budapest (London: Wingate, 
1957) and Leslie Bain, The Reluctant Satellites: An Eyewitness Report on East Europe and the Hungarian 
Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1960).  
2 The most recent English-language publications are László Eörsi, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956:  
Myths and Realities (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 2006), Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, 
Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, D.C.:  Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press, 2006), Joanna Granville, The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian 
Crisis of 1956 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2004), and György Litván, editor, The Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956:  Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London: Longman, 1996).  See also the 
valuable collection of documents edited by Csaba Békés, Macolm Byrne, and János M. Rainer, The 1956 
Hungarian Revolution:  A History in Documents (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).   
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fighting. 193,000 more, or roughly 2% of the population, fled the country in November 
and December.  Although the West and much of the rest of the world stridently 
condemned the Soviet invasion, there was no intervention: it was an election year in the 
USA, Britain and France were conducting their own imperialist action in the Suez, and in 
any case Hungary had long since been relegated to the Soviet sphere of authority. 
 Most scholars now concur on the basic goals and causes of the revolution.  The 
revolutionaries sought to abolish communism, but they did not wish to do away entirely 
with socialism.  Charles Gati has recently articulated this broad consensus: “Nagy and his 
cohort aspired to a third-road socialism reminiscent of the New Course, or the New 
Economic Policy of the 1920s in the USSR:  a forerunner to the Prague Spring of 1968 
and Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s perestroika.”3  The genesis of revolutionary sentiment is 
similarly a matter of little debate, as most accounts assert that the intelligentsia were the 
primary engine of revolt.  According to this conventional narrative, the writers and other 
intellectuals were deluded by the promise of building socialism until 1953, when Stalin’s 
death ushered in a wave of reform and revelation in Hungary.  As the depredations of the 
communist regime became widely known throughout society, the intelligentsia withdrew 
their support and sought instead to undermine the system.  By 1956, the regime was 
weakened enough that another change in the Kremlin weather—in this case, 
Khrushchev’s revelation of Stalin’s crimes in his sensational speech to the twentieth party 
congress—tipped the scales in favor of revolt. 
                                                 
3 Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 55, Litván, editor, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. 128.  This consensus 
has replaced an earlier predisposition to view the revolution as a spontaneous explosion of “the Hungarian 
nation” against its alien Communist oppressor—see, eg., Ferenc Váli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: 
Nationalism Versus Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 
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 The most glaring absence in the literature on 1956 is, simply put, the masses who 
actually made the revolution.  The bulk of the scholarship on 1956 suffers from a sort of 
historiographical tunnel vision, as the writers’ revolt and intellectual dissent—the point at 
which articulate resistance began, in mid-1953—is often taken for the beginning of the 
end of stalinist rule.  For the most part, popular dissatisfaction with the regime is rightly 
assumed but inadequately explained: “the people” emerge from the wings as a sort of 
deus ex machina, recite their lines on stage, and then are as swiftly shooed out of the 
limelight once their work is done.4  At the risk of stating the obvious: if there was no 
popular antipathy towards the regime, the intelligentsia would have found themselves 
hosting a revolution to which nobody showed up.  This was profoundly not the case.  
Already on the evening of 23 October, the mass demonstration in Lajos Kossuth square 
before the Parliament building had swelled to 200,000 people, or roughly one in ten 
inhabitants of Budapest.5  Similarly, the popular revolution lasted well after the actual 
shooting stopped, as the worker’s councils formed in October continued to lead strikes 
and demonstrations into early 1957.  In response, on 5 January 1957 the post-
revolutionary regime imposed the death penalty for refusing to return to work; a week 
later, accelerated criminal proceedings were introduced for strike instigators.6  This is not 
to suggest that the intelligentsia and the international context of the revolution were 
unimportant; they are necessarily a major part of the story.  The interesting question, 
however, is not what finally galvanized the intelligentsia to action, but rather why their 
                                                 
4 The one exception to this rule of thumb is Bill Lomax’s Hungary 1956 (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), 
with which I will deal at greater length in the Conclusion. 
5 Békés, editor, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. xxxvii. 
6 Békés, editor, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. xlviii. 
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scathing critique of the regime fell on such ready ears.  What were the sources of popular 
dissatisfaction with the communist regime?  What means of expressing and acting upon 
this dissatisfaction—of resistance, broadly defined—did ordinary Magyars have at their 
disposal?   
In mid-1957, one of the Hungarian émigrés was asked about the relationship 
between the communist regime and society.  He responded that  
 
One could succeed only in a proportionate degree with one’s ability to 
make oneself useful to the system. And the latter mainly used the low 
capabilities of human beings.  It taught everybody to lie, to spy, and 
slander.  These activities were relatively easy to perform—one could make 
a capital of practically everything:  if somebody lived well, then his wife 
or mother had hidden jewelry, if he frequented theatres, he was having a 
good time in a demonstrative sort of way, if he did not frequent theatres, 
then he was plugging his ears towards socialist culture, if he drank rum, he 
was an alcoholic, if he did not drink rum, he used other narcotics, if he 
went around with women, he was depraved, if he did not go around with 
women, he was homosexual, if he went around with one woman, he was 
still a homosexual but used her as an alibi.  In other words, one could 
figure out one’s fate mathematically.7 
   
His cynical explanation clearly elucidates the animosity felt towards the communist 
regime by many of its subjects.  It also reveals the commonly-held perception (both then 
and now) of the remarkable extent to which the state intruded upon the livelihoods and 
lives of its subjects, and its arbitrary punishment of even the slightest transgressions.  To 
some extent, this impression is accurate.  In pursuit of its goals of industrialization, 
collectivization, and social transformation, the Hungarian communist regime indeed ran 
roughshod over its subjects.   
                                                 
7 Columbia University Hungary Refugee Project, Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia Rare Books and 
Manuscript Library (hereafter ‘CUHRP’), Interview 100, Box 7, p. 59.  
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Crime and deviance were harshly punished in the interest of the common good (as 
defined by the state).  In the period 1948 to 1956, 1.7 million Magyars were investigated 
for crime ranging from theft to prostitution to hooliganism; over 930,000 of these 
investigations resulted in convictions.8   These are remarkable numbers for a country that 
numbered only 9.8 million in 1956; as early as 1953, “there can hardly have been a 
family in Hungary of which one or more members had not found itself in trouble with the 
police or state security organs.”9  To reduce these impersonal statistics to the level of 
individual cases, Communist Hungary was a state in which one could receive an eight-
year prison sentence for illegally slaughtering pigs, a five-year sentence for embezzling 
funds amounting to less than half an unskilled worker’s monthly salary, or a two-year 
sentence simply for making a caustic anti-regime remark while standing in a breadline.10  
No strike during this period lasted more than three hours.  Other public disturbances and 
overt expressions of anti-regime sentiment were rare occurrences, and also swiftly 
crushed by the forces of law and order.11  On the face of it, then, the communist regime 
seems to have successfully terrorized society into submission. 
However, as we shift focus to the everyday lives of Magyars during this time, 
cracks appear in this authoritarian edifice. To take just two specific examples:  one man,  
                                                 
8 Statisztikai Évkönyv [Statistical Yearbook] 1949-55, 1957, 1960, (Budapest: Központi Statisztikai 
Hivatal, 1957, 1959, 1961), pp. 355-358, 343-346, and 357-363, respectively.  
9 Ignác Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, (Budapest: Corvina/Osiris 1999).  
10 Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Országos Leveltár, or MOL) M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 17 ő.e., p. 
123, MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 5 ő.e., p. 134, and MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e. (2), p. 69a, 
respectively.  All translations from Hungarian are my own unless otherwise noted. 
11 Mark Pittaway, “Control and Consent in Eastern Europe’s Workers’ States, 1945-1989: Some 
Reflections on Totalitarianism, Social Organization, and Social Control,” in Social Control in Europe, 
1800-2000, edited by Clive Emsley, Eric Johnson, and Pieter Spierenberg (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2004), p. 346. 
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an émigré after the 1956 revolution, recounted how he had been labeled “politically 
unreliable” by the regime in 1949, but (after switching jobs six times in the next three 
years, and wiping his official record clean twice in the process) eventually landed a job in 
the Central Statistical Office handling classified data.12  Another émigré had previously 
been caught trying to flee Hungary into Austria in 1955 just after his eighteenth birthday.  
He was sentenced to eight months in jail, but released after serving only four months; his 
criminal record did not preclude his landing a job with a military geological survey team 
shortly after his release.  He attempted to flee Hungary again in September 1956, but was 
again captured; this time he was released after a three-day stay in jail without being 
charged.  (His third try, after the 1956 revolution, was a success.)13  These cases suggest 
a much less thoroughgoing repression: a much less total terror.  
Indeed, as we peel back the oversimplified notion of a ‘totalitarian’ communist 
state, a strange fruit is revealed.  In place of a monolithic and omniscient party-state, we 
find one that was consistently plagued by inadequate planning, interdepartmental 
confusion, and deliberate manipulation by its agents as well as its subjects.  In place of an 
atomized and pliable populace we find one that regularly transgressed the boundaries of 
the permissible.  More specifically, in contravention of rigorous production plans and 
imposed workplace discipline we find subtle office and shop floor machinations.  In 
opposition to the state’s drive to centralize and control all economic activity we find a 
thriving black market.  In blatant defiance of the regime’s attempt to regulate production 
and exchange in the countryside we find widespread practices of peasant resistance, such 
                                                 
12 CUHRP, Interview 109, Box 7, pp. 26-27.   
13 CUHRP, Interview 404, Box 13, pp. 3-4, 9. 
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as wood theft and illegal pig-killing. In response to the party-state’s attempt to control 
women’s reproduction we find a complex network of underground abortion procurers and 
providers.  Lastly, in reaction to communism’s monochrome cultural offerings we 
discover an entire underworld of deviant leisure, of which hooliganism was only the most 
visible manifestation.  A much more complex communism emerges from the 
investigation of everyday crime and popular resistance: one in which political control did 
not translate into social, cultural, or economic mastery, one in which a significant degree 
of personal autonomy and agency were possible, and one that—as it attempted to control 
every aspect of life, but did so in a heavy-handed, misdirected, and ultimately ineffective 
manner—was haunted at every turn by the specter of resistance.     
   Communism14 in Hungary, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, has been subjected to 
a protracted postmortem since its collapse in 1989.  Although the autopsy is far from 
complete, our understanding of communist Hungary has benefited immensely from the 
assiduous work of many scholars, the (as-yet-incomplete) opening of the archives, and 
the deployment of new analytic paradigms, most notably those related to gender and 
cultural studies.15  These are welcome developments.  For much of the Cold War, many 
                                                 
14 Of course, communism in the strict Marxist sense never came to fruition in Hungary, nor anywhere else 
for that matter.  In the interest of semantic simplicity, I will use ‘communist’ to denote the specific aspects 
of the Soviet and Eastern European regimes, and ‘socialist’ to denote the broader aspects of Marxist theory.  
I also use ‘stalinism’ rather than ‘Stalinism’ deliberately, in order to stress its systemic aspects rather than 
the personal characteristics of the dictator himself.   
15 In just the last three years, publications in English include László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War 1945-
1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2004), Martin Mevius, Agents of Moscow:  The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist 
Patriotism, 1941-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), and a bumper crop of books on the 1956 
Revolution—see footnote 2, above.  On gender, see especially Lynne Haney, Inventing the Needy: Gender 
and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Éva Fodor, 
Working Difference: Women’s Working Lives in Hungary and Austria, 1945-1995 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003) and Andrea Pető, Women in Hungarian Politics 1945-1951 (Boulder: East 
European Monographs, 2003).  On culture, see Istvan Rév, Retroactive Justice: A Prehistory of 
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scholars conceptualized the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European progeny as ‘totalitarian’ systems.16  According to this paradigm, as aptly 
summed up by Ivan Berend, the state “determines every aspect of life from the political, 
to the economic, to the cultural; from public to private, from the way of thinking to the 
way of expression, in an entirely state-owned and state-run society.”17 In short, the state 
was omniscient and omnipotent, and resistance futile: the history of communism thus 
boils down to little more than the intentions and machinations of ideologues and 
apparatchiks.  The ‘revisionist’ stance emerged in Soviet historiography in the 1970s as a 
corrective to this oversimplified causal model.  Revisionists, chief among them Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, held that we must look beyond the top-down explanation offered by 
totalitarianism to the broader social and cultural forces at work.18  The problem with 
rewriting the history of communism from the ground up, however, was that social and 
cultural forces replaced ideology and politics as the primary causal agents.  As Michael 
David-Fox notes, “Defining themselves in opposition to the monocausal reductionism of 
the previous generation, revisionists of the 1970s and 1980s invented a reductionist 
                                                                                                                                                 
Postcommunism (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2005) and Tibor Valuch, “A Cultural and Social 
History of Hungary, 1948-1990,” in A Cultural History of Hungary in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries, edited by László Kósa (Budapest: Corvina, 2000). The literature in Hungarian is simply too 
voluminous to begin to recapitulate here; see the bibliography for those sources I rely on most. 
16 Although the term was first coined in the 1920s as a descriptor for Mussolini’s regime, ‘totalitarianism’ 
as an analytic paradigm was first formulated by Hannah Arendt in her The Origins of Totalitarianism (New 
York: Harcourt & Brace, 1951); her argument was taken up and elaborated on by subsequent thinkers, most 
notably Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).  For the Soviet Union, the oeuvres of Adam Ulam and 
Robert Conquest are most representative of the totalitarian stance: see, e.g, Ulam, The New Face of Soviet 
Totalitarianism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), and Conquest, The Great Terror (New 
York: Macmillan, 1968).  See also Abbot Gleason, Totalitarianism : The Inner History of the Cold War 
(New York : Oxford University Press, 1995), on the evolution of this paradigm.      
17 Ivan Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 53.  
 8
‘primacy’ of their own, the interpretive stress on ‘social forces’ from below.”19  Even 
today, some scholars persist in going to these extremes.   In this regard Eastern European 
historiography lags behind its Soviet cousin to some extent, as unqualified totalitarian 
arguments are still not uncommon.   Historians are not invulnerable to popular sentiment, 
and in Eastern Europe the notion of complete Soviet dominance serves an additional 
exculpatory function for whatever complicity, or even ‘collaboration’—the dirtiest word 
imaginable in the post-1989 context—was practiced by the party-states’ subjects in their 
daily struggle to get by.20 
However, much recent scholarship—in a “post-revisionist” vein, for lack of a 
better term—focuses instead on the “limits of dictatorship”21 in communist states.  This 
is a workable and productive approach: a flexible synthesis that avoids reifying either the 
state or society, and seeks instead to dissect the complex and subtle machinations of 
power, agency, and resistance in these authoritarian states.  Many former revisionists now 
approach the field in this fashion; likewise, some former totalitarianists have discarded 
the more blatant failings of the classic, “thick” formulation in favor of a more nuanced, 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
19 Michael David-Fox, “On the Primacy of Ideology: Soviet Revisionists and Holocaust Deniers (in 
Response to Martin Malia),” Kritika, Volume 5, Number 1 (Winter 2004), p. 83. 
20 Perhaps the best example of this “popular” totalitarianism is the House of Terror in Budapest, 
constructed in 2002.  Therein, the vast differences between Nazism and Communism are elided in favor of 
a polemic multi-media narrative of the half-century-long oppression of the Hungarian people by outside 
agents.  Ironically, the museum itself demonstrates a remarkably authoritarian visual aesthetic—especially 
the entry hall, which is a dead ringer for Mario Sironi’s “Gallery of Fasci” in Mussolini’s 1932 exhibition 
of the Fascist Revolution.  Rév, Retroactive Justice, pp. 277-302.  See also Mark Pittaway, “The ‘House of 
Terror’ and Hungary’s Politics of Memory,” Austrian Studies Newsletter, Vol.15, No.1, pp.16-17, Winter 
2003.  The museum’s website is available at http://www.terrorhaza.hu/index2.html (viewed 1 December 
2007).    
21 On the “limits of dictatorship,” see Konrad Jarausch, editor, Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a 
Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), and Mark Pittaway, “Control and 
Consent in Eastern Europe’s Workers’ States.” 
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“thin” reading.22   Thus, for the case of East Germany, Corey Ross has found that rather 
than a monolithic party-state, “unreliable local functionaries, petty corruption, informal 
‘arrangements,’ and internal contradictions” were the norm; rather than quiescent 
subjects whipped into submission, their denizens were “ordinary people trying to utilize 
various regime policies to their own advantage, not so much resisting or complying (to 
use the conventional dichotomy) as extracting what they could from the 
circumstances.”23  Similarly-nuanced accounts of everyday life and popular resistance 
under communism have surfaced in the historiography of the other Eastern European 
states.24  The same trend is apparent in the Hungarian case.  We now know, for instance, 
that even during the most oppressive period of communist rule—from 1948 to 1953—a 
skilled working-class elite often managed to thwart the designs of the managers and 
planners, the Catholic Church continued to minister to its flock, and Hungarian women 
managed to retain some control over their reproduction despite the regime’s abortion 
                                                 
22 Some of the better examples of post-revisionist Soviet scholarship include the more recent works of 
Sheila Fitzpatrick, such as Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After 
Collectivization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), and Lynne Viola, editor, Contending With Stalinism: Soviet Power 
and Popular Resistance in the 1930s (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 2002).  The best example of a more 
nuanced, “thin” totalitarianism—in which both the differences between the Nazi and Soviet systems, and 
the inefficiencies of the state system are acknowledged—is Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, especially 
pp. 53-55.  
23 Corey Ross, Constructing Stalinism at the Grass-Roots: The Transformation of East Germany, 1945-
1965 (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 2000), pp. 3-4. 
24 See, e.g., Melissa Bokovoy, Peasants and Communists: Politics and Ideology in the Yugoslav 
Countryside, 1941-1953 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding 
Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), Gail Kligman, The 
Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998), Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of 
Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland  (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1994), and Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in 
Modern Bulgaria (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
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ban.25  In short, despite the regime’s overarching attempt to control every aspect of life 
and labor, significant opportunities for autonomy, agency, and even resistance were 
possible. 
Resistance is a problematic category of analysis.  Motivations and intentions are 
often opaque; subjectivity and bias cloud both contemporaneous interpretations of events 
and their subsequent recapitulations by historians.  In recent years, as Hollander and 
Einwohner note, a remarkably broad range of behaviors—ranging from strikes and 
demonstrations to hairstyles and sartorial choices—have been construed as resistance by 
various scholars.26  Most are willing to accept that demonstrations, strikes, and the like 
constitute a form of resistance, as these acts openly articulate or at least demonstrate 
specific grievances against the governing structure.  For the most part, the literature on 
resistance in communist Eastern Europe hews to this minimalist definition of resistance, 
focusing on the “flashpoints” of rebellion to communist rule (i.e. Hungary 1956, 
Czechoslovakia 1968, Solidarity in Poland in 1980-81).27  These were indeed important 
episodes, and those in which anti-regime sentiment was most openly articulated—but 
they were also only the most obvious cases of resistance.  Moreover, these defiant acts  
                                                 
25 On these points see Pittaway, “Az állami ellenõrzés társadalmi korlátainak újraértékelése: az ipari 
dolgozók és a szocialista diktatúra Magyarországon, 1948-1953,” in Munkástörténet – 
Munkásantropológia, edited by Sándor Horváth, László Pethő, and Eszter Zsofía Tóth (Budapest: Napvilág 
Kiadó, 2003), Jason Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty:  Church Institutions and Electoral 
Continuity in Hungary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Andrea Pető, “Women’s 
Rights in Hungary: The Abortion Trials of 1952-53,” Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXIX, Nos. 1-2 
(2002).   
26 Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachael L. Einwohner, “Conceptualizing Resistance,” Sociological Forum, 
Volume 19, Number 4 (December 2004), pp. 534, 543.  
27 See, e.g., Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe, editors, Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: 
Challenges to Communist Rule (Oxford: Berg, 2006), and Grzegorz Ekiert, The State against Society: 
Political Crises and their Aftermath in East Central Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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did not occur in a vacuum.  They were rather the visible tip of a submerged mass of 
resentments and animosities. In order to fully recapitulate the varied forms of agency 
Eastern Europeans had at their disposal—and, incidentally, in order also to fully explain 
these flashpoint events—we must adopt a broader definition of resistance.           
In contrast to the minimalist approach outlined above, many scholars have instead 
argued that resistance permeates the entire social field.  Michel de Certeau argues that the 
apparent powerlessness of denizens of modern societies masks a broad range of tactics—
“clever tricks of the ‘weak’ within the order of the ‘strong,’ an art of putting one over on 
the adversary on his own turf, hunter’s tricks, maneuverable, polymorph mobilities, 
jubilant, poetic, and warlike discoveries”—and “these ‘ways of operating’ constitute the 
immeasurable practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by 
techniques of social reproduction.”28 Although this explanation rightly privileges 
individual agency, it fails to address the possibility of collective action; it also begs the 
question of what actually constitutes resistance.   A more specific formulation is provided 
by James C. Scott, who argues that “the weapons of the weak”—non-confrontational and 
subtle acts such as theft, sabotage, dissimulation, and so forth—are regularly utilized by 
peasants, slaves, and other marginalized or subject populations.  These covert practices 
have certain advantages in common:  “They require little or no coordination or planning; 
they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a 
form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with 
                                                 
28 Michel de Certeau (Steven Rendall, translator), The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p. 40, xiv. 
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authority.”29  Most importantly, for our purposes, these weapons of the weak are not 
mobilized solely for personal benefit or as coping mechanisms.  In the absence of the 
opportunity to openly express grievances, they constitute a means of not only resistance 
but infrapolitics: political activity by means other than politics-as-usual.30  A more 
inclusive definition of resistance opens up a much broader range of behavior for inquiry 
and interpretation.  However, it also raises the danger of reading too much into the 
historical record: of seeing resistance where in fact there was none.   
In any case, resistance is invariably contingent upon its immediate social and 
political context.  Whatever its intent, the recognition of any given act as resistance 
depends on its transgression of an established law or social norm.  In liberal-democratic 
regimes, both society and the state dictate what ought and what ought not be done.  As 
long as a healthy civil society persists, it acts as a check on whatever authoritarian 
tendencies might arise in the government.  In authoritarian regimes, the voice of “the 
people” is muted: the state is the key arbiter of what constitutes crime or deviance.  In 
communist regimes, as Lynne Viola argues for the USSR, “The state … was a vital actor 
in the definition, discovery, or obfuscation of resistant behaviors; what it chose to label as 
resistance and in what context reveals much about official motivations and relations of 
domination.”31  The question then becomes: what did crime look like in this police state? 
                                                 
29 Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985), p. xvi. 
30 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), pp. 198-201.  
31 Lynne Viola, “Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s: Soliloquy of a Devil’s Advocate,” in Viola, 
editor, Contending With Stalinism, p. 34.  
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In liberal-democratic regimes, crime and deviance are often conceptualized as the 
product of a consensual agreement among the members of that society: legal and 
normative codes that condemn those acts and behaviors that threaten the body social as a 
whole.  This is a pleasant fiction.32  According to Michel Foucault,  
 
certainly the ‘crimes’ and ‘offences’ on which judgement is passed are 
juridical objects defined by the code, but judgement is also passed on the 
passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of 
environment or heredity; acts of aggression are punished, so also, through 
them, is aggressivity; rape, but at the same time perversions; murders, but 
also drives and desires…. it is these shadows lurking behind the case itself 
that are judged and punished.”33 
 
   
While these deeper passions are at some irreducible level inherent in the human 
condition, the point at which any given behavior becomes a menace to society is 
invariably a social, political, cultural, and legal construct.  Although liberal-democratic 
legal systems do ensure a basic degree of personal sovereignty and protection for all their 
subjects, they also operate at the behest and in the best interests of governments, social 
and economic elites, and other powerful actors and interest groups.  These vested 
interests play a key role in defining what constitutes criminal behavior.  The label of 
‘deviant’ is reserved for those who violate social norms—but these norms are likewise 
defined by economic, patriarchal, ethnic, and generational elites whose ideologies and 
interests do not represent any sort of society-wide consensus.  The net result is that 
“crime and deviance are doubly socially constructed, as practical or behavioral responses 
                                                 
32 Colin Sumner, “Crime, Deviance, and Society,” and Dario Melossi, “Theories of Social Control and the 
State between American and European Shores,” in The Blackwell Companion to Criminology, edited by 
Sumner (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
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to social conditions and as social censures reflecting the emotions, ideologies, and values 
of powerful social groups.”34  Criminal law and social constructions of deviance function 
as means of social control; the former reiterates and reinscribes the latter even as it 
disciplines the actual criminal.   
The nature of this discipline has changed over time.  In the early modern period, 
public torture and execution served to illustrate “the dissymmetry between the subject 
who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his 
strength;” the gory display was not so much one of justice served as it was a stark 
representation of “the physical strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body of 
his adversary [the condemned] and mastering it.”35  It was also an ineffective means of 
social control.  Execution days assumed a carnivalesque atmosphere—work stopped, bars 
and taverns were crowded, fights broke out—in which suppressed animosities and social 
tensions could explode into violence, and popular sentiment could even modulate into 
resentment against the sovereign.36  In the transition to modernity, a whole new corpus of 
technologies of social control—more diffuse but also more pervasive, and certainly no 
less powerful—sprang up.  Rather than being concentrated solely in the body of the 
condemned, power became instrumentalized via the organization and control of public 
and private spaces, panoptic surveillance, and the establishment of a ‘carceral 
archipelago’ of not only prisons and reform institutions but also barracks, factories, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Michel Foucault (Alan Sheridan, translator), Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Vintage, 1995), p. 17. 
34 Sumner, “Crime, Deviance, and Society,” p. 9. 
35 Foucault, Discipline and Punish¸ pp. 49, 298. 
36 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 65.  Le Roy Ladurie’s Carnival in Romans:  Mayhem and Massacre 
in a French City (New York: George Brasiller, 1979) remains the best case study of how a carnival 
atmosphere could touch the match to the buried powder keg of social tensions and antipathies.   
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schools.  By means of these regulating bodies, the modern state perpetually seeks to 
regulate the bodies of its subjects: as discipline permeates the social field, outright 
punishment is only intermittently necessary.  For modern liberal-democratic regimes, 
criminal codes are the most directly instrumental means of social control: the social 
construction of deviance, a necessary secondary component.   
What, then, of crime and deviance in the party-states of Eastern Europe during the 
second half of the twentieth century?  To date, most historians have interpreted crime 
statistics in communist Hungary and other repressive regimes as straightforward indices 
of political repression.37 This is only partially accurate.  The legal administration in 
communist Hungary clearly distinguished between political crimes such as weapons-
hoarding and conspiracy on the one hand, and such common offenses as factory theft, 
“crimes against the public supply,” and so on.  The vast majority of offenses committed 
between 1948 and 1956 were for crimes of this latter type.  However, this is not to state 
that these “common” crimes were entirely apolitical. Despite their relatively innocuous 
nature, as they were committed en masse, on a regular basis, and with no sign of 
decreasing, they came to pose an oblique threat to the regime’s authority.  In a state that 
seeks to control every aspect of life, every transgression becomes a potential threat to its 
pretension to totalitarian control.  However, the communist regime in Hungary sought not 
only to dominate the entire social field but also to transform it in accordance with its 
Marxist variant of high-modernist ideology. 
 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, p. 273, Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 49. 
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The profound and intrusive effects of communism in these “closed” states often 
mask the continuities between them and their “open” counterparts in the West.  Albeit 
divided by the Iron Curtain, societies both East and West shared a key point in common: 
both were subject to intrusive intervention by the state in the name of modernity.  As 
Scott argues, modernist projects have two elements in common everywhere they occur:  
the imposition of ‘legibility’ and an interventionist, high-modernist ideology.  Legibility 
consists of the administrative ordering of populations and social space:  “The utopian, 
immanent, and continually-frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, 
disorderly, constantly-changing social reality beneath it to something more closely 
resembling the administrative grid of its observations.”38   This deracinative process is 
supplemented by a high-modernist ideology, “best conceived as a strong, one might even 
say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress, 
the expansion of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, above all, the 
rational design of social order commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural 
laws.”39  These two elements are common to schemes to transform the human condition 
in both communist and liberal-democratic systems.  To take but two examples, parallels 
between the two are apparent in convergent practices of internal surveillance in the early  
 
                                                 
38 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:  How Certain Schemes to Reform the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1998), p. 82.  Foucault concurs:  “The first of the great operations of 
discipline is … the constitution of ‘tableaux vivants,’ which transform the confused, useless, or dangerous 
multitudes into ordered multiplicities.”  Discipline and Punish, p. 148. 
39 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 4. 
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twentieth century, and convergent responses to domestic dissent in the 1960s.40  This 
potent high-modernist scheme can result in much good, in the form of public-works 
projects, welfare and insurance provision, and so forth; however, when coupled with an 
authoritarian regime and a prostrate civil society, the results are catastrophic.  To take just 
one example, the roughly-contemporaneous construction of the Hoover Dam in the USA 
and the White Sea Canal in the USSR in the 1930s were both massive public-works 
projects that dramatically transformed the physical landscape; however, the hardships 
incurred in the former case pale in comparison to the daily injuries and fatalities that 
characterized the latter.41  In both systems, however, a certain degree of conflict 
inevitably occurs in the course of the high-modernist project.  Forced off the land, rural 
populations find themselves living in cities, working in factories, and enmeshed in 
monetary economies.  While some segments of society benefit from the realignment of 
societal norms, expectations, and opportunities that occurs in this transformation, others 
stagnate, are supplanted, or find their prior status threatened. Societal tensions are created 
and exacerbated in this process.   This is the broader context of the imposition of 
communist rule in Hungary. 
Hungary was ripe for change after the war.  This Central European state had 
lagged behind its western cousins during the interwar period: exploitative noble 
latifundia dominated its agricultural production, industrialization was halting and 
incomplete, a small and conservative elite held sway over politics. Interwar efforts at land 
                                                 
40 Peter Holquist, “’Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-
European Context,” in The Journal of Modern History, Volume 69, Number 3 (September 1997), and 
Jeremi Suri, The Power of Protest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
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reform, developing industrial production, and expanding the franchise were halfhearted 
and inadequate.42  After the war, many Magyars were cognizant of the necessity of 
restructuring their nation along more egalitarian and modern lines.   Hungary also had to 
be rebuilt in a very literal sense, as the retreating German and advancing Russian armies 
had made Budapest and many other regions of Hungary into wastelands.  This was fertile 
soil for social experimentation:  a welfare state on the contemporaneous western 
European model, or even a more humanitarian and less exploitative socialism (or, for that 
matter, anything resembling the promise rather than the reality of communism), could 
have enjoyed mass support and legitimacy had it delivered on even a modicum of its 
promises.  This was not to be the case.  Modernity entered Hungary clad in the wolf’s 
clothing of communism.   
After consolidating one-party rule in 1948, the new regime embarked on an 
ambitious program of industrialization and collectivization.  Forced off their land, 
peasants entered Budapest and other urban centers in search of work; new industrial 
centers such as Sztálinváros (Stalintown) sprang up practically overnight.  Women and 
youths also swelled the ranks of the urban proletariat.  The criminal code was rewritten to 
include crimes against the socialist economy and the public supply; the State Security 
Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság, or ÁVH) and a network of party activists, “people’s 
educators” (népnevelők), and informers ferreted out wrongdoers and oversaw this 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 Moreover, the White Sea Canal never quite worked as planned.  Oleg Khlevniuk (Vadim Staklo, 
translator), The History of the Gulag (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 334-335. 
42 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), pp. 19-20, 82, 124-129, 138-144.  On interwar Hungarian politics, 
see C.A. Macartney, October Fifteenth:  A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1961). 
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intrusive regimentation of work, reproduction, and leisure time.   The result was the 
criminalization of a broad range of behavior that had previously been ignored by the 
police and courts, even as the lives and activities of these newly-communist subjects were 
more closely monitored.  The crime wave that swept Hungary in the 1950s was thus only 
partially due to the underlying social and economic tensions of modernization; it was also 
the result of new laws and heightened surveillance. 
The regime’s heavy-handed and oppressive strategies ensured that the popular 
resentment and blame for the hardships incurred in this modernizing process fell squarely 
at its doorstep.  Martin Mevius has recently made a strong case that communist rule in 
Hungary was perceived as an unwelcome and foreign imposition, driven home by a 
cohort of “agents of Moscow,” and resented by a majority of the population.43  My 
research suggests that this conclusion is accurate.  By criminalizing such a broad range of 
activity and behavior, the party-state essentially set itself in opposition to a wide segment 
of society.  It would be a mistake, however, to reduce this to a direct state-versus-society 
dichotomy as some scholars have in the past.44  The state, per se, is an abstraction; its 
omnipresence in communist societies masks the broad diversity of the differing (and 
often contradictory) goals of its component organizations and the interdepartmental 
confusion, tension, and competition that ensued.  Moreover, its agents were not 
automatons; their personal interests and social bonds affected their execution of their 
                                                 
43 Mevius, Agents of Moscow, especially pp. 267-268. The actual degree of support for communism in 
these states is a hotly-debated matter.  For the period in question it is likely that states such as Bulgaria and 
Romania, where the standard of living actually increased during the first years of communist rule, probably 
did not exhibit the same degree of animosity towards communism as did Poland or Hungary, where 
widespread poverty followed in the wake of the devastation wrought by the Red Army.  I discuss the issue 
of popular support for the Hungarian communist regime at greater length in Chapter 1.  
44 See especially Ekiert, The State Against Society. 
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orders.  Societies are likewise diverse and hierarchical bodies in which factions 
delineated by gender, class, or ethnicity are consistently warring for advantage.  These 
social identities are transient and dependent on context: members of the Party might 
frown on taking bribes but deal on the black market for the goods they need, working-
class youths might be good workers during the day and hooligans by night.  Thus 
deviants or resistors against one aspect of the communist project could find themselves 
supporters of others, and, where the regime’s goals jibed with underlying societal and 
cultural predispositions (as, for instance, with the criminalization of abortion—see 
Chapter 3), it did meet with some success.  For the most part, though, the communist 
administration’s heavy-handed brutality and intransigence drove most Hungarians—
including Party members and administration workers—into what were essentially lives of 
everyday crime; its relative inability to regulate its subject bodies enabled, exacerbated, 
and even encouraged these behaviors.  As a result, Communist control in Hungary was 
never fully consolidated, even in the late 1940s and early 1950s; from 1953 until the 
revolution in 1956, it was on thin ice indeed.  
 A note on sources: as one might expect, revolutions are not kind to archives.  As 
one refugee recalled, “During the revolution many cadre files got into the hands of the 
respective people…. I saw when cadre files were taken out to the street, poured down by 
gasoline and burned.”45  Attempts at destroying damning evidence were probably carried 
out by party officials, as the revolution got underway in October, and definitely by the 
revolutionaries until it collapsed in November.  These archives have not suffered only the 
                                                 
45 The cadre, or kader file, was the individualized record of one’s job, residence, criminal record, and any 
other distinguishing features.  CUHRP, Interview 115, Box 8, p. 35. 
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usual ravages of time and careless historians; they have been purged with deliberate 
intent by both state officials and revolutionaries.  As a result, the official record is marred 
by gaps and inconsistencies; we are often forced to extrapolate what was from what 
remains.46  The bulk of my archival evidence is drawn from the relatively-intact records 
of the administrative branches of the Communist Party47 and the Party- and Mass-
Organization Department, the organization in charge of monitoring relations between the 
Party and the rest of society.48  These archives are especially useful to the historian, as 
they include not only the internal documents of these regulating bodies but also their 
voluminous correspondence with various other organizations at all levels, from the 
central administrative offices down to district- and even county-level organizations. The 
Budapest Municipal Archive yielded many useful documents concerning the operations 
of the capital city’s police force and legal administration.49   In order to flesh out this 
administrative transcript with its public representation, I turned to the communist media.  
I relied primarily on four weekly or bi-weekly publications.  Esti Budapest (Budapest at 
Night) was the evening newspaper, which emphasized leisure and culture more than its 
daytime counterparts; Szinház és Mozi (Theatre and Film) was the trade publication for 
                                                 
46 To take just one example, the weekly report on illegal pig-killing I rely on in Chapter 2 (MOL M-KS-
276. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e., p. 156-211), was obviously one of a series, as evinced by fragmentary portions of two 
other weekly reports from the same period.  
47 These records are housed in the Hungarian National Archive (Magyar Országos Leveltár, or MOL) in 
fonds M-KS-276. f. 96, passim.  They are further subdivided into ministerial branches; I rely most heavily 
on the Legal Affairs (Igazságügy, abbreviated Iü) and Military (Fegyveres, or F) subdivisions, and also on 
the Health Affairs (Egeszségügy, or Eü) archives in Chapter 3. 
48 This mouthful is no more palatable in Hungarian:  Part- és-Tömegszervezet Osztály.  Its records are 
housed in MOL M-KS 276. f. 88, passim. 
49 Budapest Fővárosi Leveltárá (BFL). I also conducted research at the State Security Historical Archive 
(Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, or ÁBTL) and the Institute for the History of the 1956 
Revolution (1956-os Magyar Forradalom Történetének Dokumentációs és Kutatóintézete), as well as the 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DEPL).  A note to researchers: many of the documents in 
ÁBTL were formerly archived in the Történeti Hivatal, or Historical Office. 
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theater and film.  These two periodicals and Nők Lapja (Women’s Journal) were directed 
at the general public.  Magyar Rendőr (Hungarian Policeman) was directed at policemen, 
prosecutors, and other figures in the legal administration.  The first three reveal how the 
communist regime sought to market itself in the cultural sphere; the lattermost reveals the 
semipublic operations of the police system at work on an everyday basis.  Taken together, 
these administrative and public transcripts reveal both the intentions of the administration 
and the manner in which it portrayed them to the public.   
The “hidden transcript”—“the critique of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant,” or the record of how Magyars sought to elude or evade the regulating bodies 
tasked with their control—poses a more difficult question.50  The hidden transcript does 
creep through in the official sources, in the form of trial records, police reports, and so 
forth; however, it is filtered through the prism of official ideology and administrative 
bias.  Thus, in order to uncover the hidden transcript of everyday life in communist 
Hungary, I also drew on numerous personal accounts of life under communism.  They are 
at once my most interesting and most problematic sources.  They fall into two groups: a 
set of interviews conducted with Hungarians (most of them escapees) by Radio Free 
Europe during the period 1951-1956, and another set of interviews conducted with 1956 
émigrés by a Columbia University research team during the summer of 1957.51  The 
Radio Free Europe interviews, or “Items,” housed at the Open Society Archives at 
                                                 
50 As Scott notes, government and ruling elites also generate a ‘hidden transcript’ of sorts, i.e. top-secret 
documents and other behind-the-scenes machinations (Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. xii).  
Herein I will refer to this confidential record as the ‘administrative transcript’ to avoid confusion with the 
hidden transcript proper.   
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Central European University in Budapest, pose a number of interpretive challenges.  
They are in essence the stories told by those most fed up with the communist regime to 
those most willing to hear the worst about it.  They reflect the demographic distribution 
of refugees: most are young males from Budapest and the regions of Hungary closest to 
the Austrian border.  The interviewers did not consistently identify themselves as Radio 
Free Europe employees.  Worst of all, we know for a fact that at least some of these 
interviews were simply made up from scratch.52  These are serious but not terminal 
faults: the Items’ biases (on the part of both interviewer and interviewee) are readily 
apparent in most instances.  The Items’ contents were crosschecked with information 
derived from other sources, and editorial oversight seems to have been thorough.53 As a 
rule of thumb, I use only those Items that include biographical data on the informant.  I 
also indicate where the Items significantly diverge from what the rest of the 
historiographical record suggests.  The Columbia interviews are quite different:  they 
were collected in a rigorous manner, with due attention paid to ensuring a representative 
sample of age, occupation, and gender.  Their one major failing is that they are colored 
by the immediately-past experience of rebellion and flight.  Despite that, in conjunction 
with the Items, they allow the reconstruction of the hidden transcript of everyday 
resistance under communism.  I quote both of these sources at some length, as they 
                                                                                                                                                 
51 Open Society Archives, Central European University, HU-300-4-2, Master Evaluation Items (hereafter 
OSA/RFE Items), and Columbia University Hungary Refugee Project, Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia 
Rare Books and Manuscript Library (CUHRP), respectively.  The finding aid for the OSA/RFE Items is 
now available online at http://www.osa.ceu.hu/db/fa/300-1-2.htm (viewed 1 December 2007). 
52 Rév, Retroactive Justice, pp. 265-266.  
53 Pittaway, “The Education of Dissent: The Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary, 1951-1956,” Cold 
War History, Volume IV, Number 1 (October 2003), pp. 110-111.  Each Item was prefaced by an editorial 
summary which indicated the reliability of the source and drew connections to other Items as well as other 
sources of information that contradicted or supported the data therein. 
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provide an unique opportunity to hear the voices of individuals whose experiences are 
often left out of the historical record.  Also, for the informants in both these sets of 
interviews, and indeed for all the individuals I discuss herein, I use only their initials—or, 
in the cases where I discuss an individual at length, the first name and initial.  I do so 
because some of these informants, and certainly their families, are still alive; as one can 
imagine, they might not choose to enter the historiographical record in this manner. It is 
neither my responsibility nor my right to “out” them.  
 The following analysis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 presents a lengthy 
theoretical and statistical overview of communism, crime, and resistance in Hungary 
between 1948 and 1956.  The effect of stalinization in Hungary was to compress the 
effects of the high-modernist project—and all its corollary discontents—into a much-
abbreviated timespan.  Three distinct periods are apparent:  the peak of stalinist rule from 
1948 to mid-1953 was followed by Imre Nagy’s reformist New Course, which lasted 
until early 1955.  Afterwards, the brief recrudescence of stalinism after Nagy’s ouster 
lasted in weakened form until October 1956.  The New Course, generally written off as a 
halfhearted and ineffective effort at reform, emerges here as a key element in the 
weakening of the regime and the escalation of societal tension that culminated in 1956: a 
delayed-action Pandora’s box that, once opened, proved impossible to shut.  Both before 
and after 1953, however, the communist administration was far from monolithic or 
omniscient; rather, it was imposed in haphazard and ad hoc fashion, rendering it 
vulnerable to manipulation at a number of levels.  In the interstices of the system, the 
regime’s own workers adopted practices that subverted its goals.  It was likewise 
confounded on the margins, where it butted up against preexisting forms of social and 
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economic organization. Finally, the physical borders of the system, most notably the 
border with Austria, were not impermeable.  In each case, resistance accumulated: not in 
the sense of the coalescence of an united front against regime imperatives, but rather in 
the sense of poorly-conductive matter inhibiting an electrical charge. 
Peasant resistance is the topic of Chapter 2.  In the countryside, the ÁVH, police, 
and legal apparatus were conspicuous in their absence; here the interstitial machinations 
described in Chapter 1 were most apparent.  Undermanned and beleaguered, local 
authorities often eschewed oppression in favor of compromise and collaboration with 
their unruly subjects.  The countryside was also the site of the greatest clash between the 
state’s centralizing imperative and traditional modes of behavior.  The Magyar 
peasantry’s perennial desire to own and farm their own land had finally been realized in 
the postwar land reform; thereafter, they wanted little more than to be left alone by the 
state.  This was not to be the case.  Collectivization was carried out on the Soviet model, 
but with distinctly less verve; significant opportunities for evasion and resistance 
presented themselves at every turn.  I discuss two specific practices:  wood theft and 
illegal pig-killing (feketevágás).  The former was a perennial form of peasant resistance; 
it continued largely unabated, and may have even become more widespread, under 
communism.  Pig-killing, on the other hand, was not only legal before 1948; it was a 
major locus of peasant identity.  Peasants continued to slaughter their own pigs despite 
the regime’s sanction; some of them, like János S., were able to make a killing on the 
black market as a result.  In both cases—the one a traditional form of rural crime, the 
latter a newly-criminalized traditional element of rural life—the regime’s attempts to 
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control these criminal behaviors were not only ineffective; they exacerbated them, and 
drove the Magyar peasantry headlong into not only resistance but hypercapitalism.   
Chapter 3 deals with the gendered aspects of crime and deviance in communist 
Hungary.  The regime’s mobilization of women in its industrializing drive had two key 
effects.  First, the birth rate fell, as women curtailed their reproduction under the triple 
burden of work, housework, and political involvement.  Second, working and politically-
active women were perceived as a threat by patriarchal elements of society.  The 
persistence of partriarchy54 under communism explains both the regime’s failure to 
control prostitution and its nominal success in controlling women’s reproduction.  
Prostitution, regulated before World War II, was now criminalized by the party-state; as 
the brothels were closed, the regulation of women’s sexuality shifted to their workplaces 
and homes.  Prostitution persisted nonetheless, swiftly resuming the same role it had 
under the interwar regime.  On the other hand, the regime’s pronatalist campaign met 
with some success.  This patriarchal scheme was only partially successful, as an 
underground network of abortion providers and procurers continued to function 
throughout the period.  During the New Course, the birthrate did indeed rise, briefly—
with catastrophic effects in the strained and unprepared health care system.  However, 
this “success” in raw demographic terms was only possible because the regime’s drive to 
control reproduction jibed with underlying patriarchal norms.  In both cases, regime  
                                                 
54 I use this term to denote the processes by which masculine privilege consistently and often implicitly 
reasserts it authority over female-gendered members of society. As Éva Fodor notes, this basic process is 
common to most modern societies, but we must distinguish between the “processes through which such 
domination comes about and the degree to which patriarchal domination is realized.”   Éva Fodor, Working 
Difference, p. 21 (see also pp. 21-27).  
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policies were profoundly influenced by underlying and historic societal formations.  
Resistance, where it occurred—most notably in the form of women who chose abortion  
as a means to control their reproduction, and the doctors and other medical personnel 
who chose to assist them—occurred in opposition to both regime policy and the 
underlying substrate of patriarchy.            
Chapter 4 is devoted to the question of socialist culture, deviant leisure, and 
hooliganism.  For the most part, the siren song of new and ideologically-sound cultural 
offerings fell on deaf ears.  Hungarians sought refuge in their traditional Catholicism, 
which served as a locus of anti-regime identity and activity.  They also continued their 
long tradition of involvement in the broader European and American cultural spheres: 
reading western literature, following western fashion, and above all continuing to listen 
and dance to jazz just as they had throughout the interwar period.  This underground jazz 
scene persisted throughout the period despite recurrent attempts to eradicate it.  The bars 
and beer-gardens of Budapest also generated a more concrete manifestation of anti-
regime behavior, but also generational rebellion, in the form of the hooligan, or jampec.  
These unruly youths in flashy clothing eschewed the tame pleasures offered by the state 
in favor of dancing to American jazz.  They also roamed the streets in packs, and fought 
with each other and policemen.  Here, also, the regime was able to capitalize on 
underlying social tensions—generational, in this case—to generate some support for its 
anti-hooligan campaign. 
Four key themes recur throughout my narrative of everyday crime and popular 
resistance in communist Hungary.  First, the past weighed heavily on the present in 
communist Hungary.  While many scholars conceptualize communism as an abrupt break 
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with the past, I find significant continuities with the interwar period and even earlier 
periods.  Second, despite its apparent monolithic status, the party-state had great 
difficulty extending its authority beyond the immediate sphere of political control.   The 
unexpected consequences of the regime’s actions detracted from, and at times even 
militated directly against, its intentions.  Third, as a result, the system did not only permit 
resistance; it engendered and enabled it.  Resistance emerged not only as a result of the 
clash of statist authority with stubbornly-persistent social, economic, and cultural 
practices; in many cases, it surfaced as a result of weaknesses inherent in the system.  
Finally, in those cases where state policies were successful, this was often due to a 
symbiosis between regime policy and these underlying tendencies. 
In the Conclusion, I address the broader implications of my analysis of crime in 
communist Hungary for the study of communism, resistance, and crime in the other 
countries of Eastern Europe in the second half of the twentieth century.  Many elements 
of the Hungarian experience in the 1950s were replicated elsewhere throughout Eastern 
Europe.  In the final analysis, however, what sets Hungary apart is the conflagration of 
1956.   On the face of it, there is no direct link between the behaviors and acts I describe 
herein and the revolution proper: dealing on the black market, dancing to American jazz, 
or getting an abortion are, in terms of resistance, a far cry from throwing Molotov 
cocktails at Russian tanks.  However, taken together these quotidian acts eroded the 
regime’s control over society and whatever legitimacy it enjoyed. Anti-regime behavior 
became a commonplace, everyday occurrence, thereby lowering the bar for outright 
rebellion when circumstances made this possible.   After 1953, these everyday crimes 
resonated with the gradual articulation of an oppositional politics by the intelligentsia.  
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By the autumn of 1956, popular and elite dissatisfaction with the regime were in 
synchrony and had reached fever pitch.  The revolution was partially due to the 
mobilization of the intelligentsia and the shifting international context, as most scholars 
concur—but it was also one of “those rare moments of political electricity when, often 
for the first time in memory, the hidden transcript is spoken directly and publicly in the 































                                                 
55 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. xiii. 
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CHAPTER 1: STALINIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
 
In October 1951, Sándor H.’s luck finally ran out.56  Between March and June of 
that year he had run an elementary confidence scheme in Budapest and its environs:  he 
had applied for work at three different places, gotten whatever advance money or 
equipment he could, and then disappeared as soon as possible.  All told, this swindle 
netted him a paltry sum: some mining equipment he sold for 110 forints, and 240 forints 
in cash advances.  The unmarried 26-year old was arrested in Pest, tried in public before 
600 of his peers, and sentenced to five years in prison for embezzlement.  Justice—or 
what passed for it in the communist legal system—had been served.  At this basic level, 
Sándor H.’s experience at the hands of these authoritarian authorities is a case study in 
the swift, efficient, and merciless functioning of the communist police and legal 
adminsitration. 
The story is more complex.  Sándor H. had been in and out of jail since the mid-
1940s:  he had been arrested in 1946 for embezzling, in 1947 for speculation, in 1948 for 
theft, and, on four separate occasions between 1947 and 1949, for vagrancy as well. He 
was obviously the sort of recidivist petty criminal that was probably destined for trouble 
with the law in most any state; however, the particulars of his experience in communist 
Hungary are instructive.  Sándor H. had been repeatedly re-released into public life 
(probably due to prison overcrowding).  Although he was eventually caught (and the 
circumstances of his arrest are unclear; it was most likely a random identity check or 
denunciation rather than a manhunt that finally brought him down), he had been able to 
                                                 
56 The following account is based on his trial record in MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 5 ő.e., p. 134. 
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stay off the regime’s radar for the two years between his last incarceration and his most 
recent spate of crimes, and for a few months following. Moreover, he had not been 
required to provide his workbook—the official record of his job history, and supposedly a 
mandatory prerequisite for employment—at any of the job sites he applied for.  Pleading 
its loss, he had simply been given a new one on each occasion.  In short, the mere fact 
that Sándor H. was on the street, much less able to hoodwink his potential employers so 
easily, raises the possibility that the regime’s ability to control its workforce or monitor 
its deviants was severely limited.  We must also note the relative insignificance of his 
crimes; his transgressions probably cost the state less, in terms of lost funds and labor, 
than it did to process him through the legal system.  Most importantly, as I will argue in 
this chapter, it seems likely Sándor H. was simply less adept at manipulating the system 
than many, perhaps most, of his contemporaries:  as the one that didn’t get away, he may 
well have been the exception rather than the rule.      
On attaining power in 1948, the communist administration in Hungary embarked 
on an ambitious, high-modernist program to transform Hungary into “a country of iron 
and steel.”  The Soviet model of collectivized agriculture and mass industrialization was 
transplanted to Hungary wholesale even as the country rebuilt after the devastation 
caused by the Second World War.  The societal and economic tensions inherent to 
modernization, which other European societies had weathered over the course of 
generations, were compressed into less than a decade.  Stalinization was an unpopular 
scheme: whatever goodwill the communists had accumulated during the immediate 
postwar period and as a result of its few popular measures was wasted as the regime 
failed to deliver on its promises, living standards fell, and individual rights and freedoms 
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were severely curtailed.  The criminal code was rewritten along Soviet lines, ensuring 
especially harsh penalties for “class enemies,” political offenses, and crimes against the 
socialist economy.   
Oppression and resistance were not consistent throughout this period.  Three 
distinct periods are apparent: a phase of high stalinism from 1948 to early 1953, a brief 
period of reform communism from June 1953 to April 1955, and a brief resurgence of the 
hardline regime from then until the revolution in October 1956.  During this first period, 
the Hungarian Communist party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, or MDP) under the rule of 
Mátyás Rákosi (1892-1971) attempted to transform the Hungarian state to conform to the 
Soviet model established in the 1930s.  As a result, crime rates—in this case a reliable 
bellwether of both oppression and resistance—climb steadily throughout the period, 
peaking in early 1953.  Some evidence suggests that the degree of oppression in Hungary 
may well have been worse than anywhere else in Eastern Europe at the time.  
Destalinization set in almost immediately after Stalin’s death in March 1953; at the 
Kremlin’s bidding, Rákosi was replaced by Imre Nagy (1896-1958), who ushered in a 
short-lived attempt to reform the system.  Most scholars now concur that the New Course 
was largely ineffective; its tentative attempts at change were halfhearted, and they were 
readily thwarted by Rákosi and his fellow hardliners.  Although this is an accurate 
assessment of its results as judged by its intentions, its unintended consequences were 
much more significant.  A general amnesty resulted in the release of many Magyars from 
prisons and internment camps; the legal apparatus also scaled back the scope of its 
operations and dismissed a number of cases outright.  When Rákosi and the other 
hardliners came back into power in 1955, they were unable to reimpose the same degree 
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of control they had enjoyed prior to 1953; revolutionary sentiment swiftly mounted, 
culminating in the events of 23 October 1956.  Right up until the summer of 1956, open 
dissent remained a foolhardy and ineffective proposition; opportunities for covert 
activity, however, were legion.   
Resistance to the regime’s diktat surfaced in the interstices and on the margins 
and borders of the system.  The communist administration was a nightmare of unrealistic, 
perpetually-changing plans and a bloated bureaucracy; workers at all levels of the labor 
hierarchy worked around and undermined the communist program, for motives ranging 
from self-protection to profit.  These systemic, interstitial infrapolitics were 
complemented by resistance on the margins—that is, in those fields where the widening 
circumference of the party-state’s authority directly intruded on established spheres of 
social, cultural, and economic organization.  The party-state’s attempt to control factory 
production led to widespread theft even as its attempts to regulate the economy generated 
a thriving black market.  Lastly, despite the construction of watchtowers, barbed-wire 
fences, and minefields on the Austrian border, the Iron Curtain was far from 
impermeable.  Cross-border transfers of people, goods, and information made it 
impossible for the communist regime to entirely close off Hungary from the West.   
 
Communism and Crime 
 
 
Communism in Hungary was based on the system that evolved in the USSR in the 
course of the late 1920s and 1930s.  Its consequences were similarly severe and far-
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reaching.  The Soviet variant on modernization was similar to “civilization offensives”57 
elsewhere in the industrializing world: legibility was made the order of the day, and the 
high-modernist vision provided the direction and impetus of this scheme to transform the 
Russian condition.  The collectivization of individual farms into state enterprises was 
complemented by a massive expansion of industry; millions of peasants became workers, 
leaving their farms for urban lives and factory jobs in the epicenters of industrial 
production.  This project was at least partially successful: the Soviet Union made great 
progress towards overcoming a century of economic backwardness within a generation.  
It was, however, carried out with grievous disregard for the negative effects of social 
engineering and the human costs incurred in the process.   Millions died during 
collectivization, and hundreds of thousands more perished during the terror that followed. 
The creation of a police state was necessary to ramrod the unpopular project through. 
Surveillance and terror kept the Soviet populace in line, and labor camps and prisons 
were a ubiquitous feature of the closely-watched socialist landscape.58  The end result of 
the high-modernist scheme in the USSR was mixed: a profound success in creating a 
controlled, centralized, and legible state, and an equally profound failure to make it work 
as planned.59 This dystopic formula was transplanted to Eastern Europe after World War 
II, with similarly equivocal results. 
                                                 
57 As defined by Peter Spierenberg, a “civilization offensive” consists of “the more or less conscious 
efforts by powerful groups to change the norms and conduct of others in the direction of the former’s 
standards of civilized behavior.” Spierenberg, “Social Control and History: An Introduction,” in Social 
Control in Europe, edited by Clive Emsley, Eric Johnson, and Spierenberg (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 2004), p. 15. 
58 On these points see especially Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism, Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, and 
J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 
1932-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).   
59 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 217. 
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Communism was foreign to Hungary; modernity was not.  Hungary had lagged 
behind its western European cousins throughout the nineteenth century, but by the fin-de-
siècle was firmly on the road to industrialization and urbanization.  Modernity entered 
Central Europe largely via the transmission of ideas, technologies, and capital from the 
European core. A certain “politics of backwardness” ensued as these Central European 
states constantly sought to catch up to the English, American, and German industrial 
juggernauts. Hungary did manage to beat this rigged game to some extent.  By the turn of 
the twentieth century, unlike many of its Central European counterparts the Hungarian 
railroad industry was self-sufficient; the density of its railroad network ranked sixth in 
Europe.  By 1913, Budapest was the eighth largest city in Europe.  In addition to 
numerous metalworking, shipbuilding, and manufacturing enterprises, it boasted the 
largest flour milling industry in the world after the USA.60  This promising start was 
derailed during the interwar period.  After Béla Kun’s abortive communist revolution of 
1919, a conservative political regime led by Miklós Horthy (1868-1957) bought security 
and stability at the price of economic and political stagnation.  World War II leveled this 
elitist, conservative system, but its impact—and that of the subsequent brief period of 
nominal democracy and coalition rule from 1945 to 1948—established important 
precedents for the later stalinization of Hungary.   
The effects of World War II were severe.  Inspired by irredentist territorial 
ambitions, economic realities (as with most other Central European nations, Germany 
                                                 
60 Ivan Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2001), pp. 19-20, and Károly Vörös, “Birth of Budapest: Building a Metropolis, 1873-
1918,” in Budapest: A History from its Beginnings to 1998 (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1997), p. 
104.  
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was Hungary’s primary trade partner), and a generally Germanophile military and 
governing elite, the Horthy regime had seen in Hitler an useful ally against Hungary’s 
traditional foes, primarily Romania.  Initially, this proved to be the case:  Hungary 
regained a significant portion of the territory split off from the crown in 1920, almost 
doubling in size between 1938 and early 1941 as a result of the First and Second Vienna 
awards.61  This, however, was to be the only benefit of the Axis alliance.  Hungary’s 
207,000-strong Second Army was decimated at Voronezh in January 1943, and the Red 
Army rolled across the Carpathian basin in 1944.  Horthy’s fair-weather friendship with 
Hitler evaporated swiftly, and the indigenous Hungarian fascist party, the Arrow Cross, 
came to power in a German-backed coup in October 1944.  World War II left Hungary a 
wasteland in its wake.  Overall, between 420,000 and 450,000 Hungarians (and around 
500,000 Hungarian Jews) perished in the course of the war, while 600,000 more found 
themselves in captivity in the Soviet Union by the end of 1945.62  The siege of Budapest 
left over 70% of the city in ruins—roughly equal to the level of destruction visited upon 
Berlin in the last months of the war—and the Red Army’s brutal treatment of the 
population of Budapest also mirrored its behavior in the German capital.63  Industrial 
production in May 1945 was only 30% of the prewar level, and during the winter of 
                                                 
61 Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, p. 204. 
62 These numbers are based on the population of Hungary after the Second Vienna Award.  Romsics, 
Hungary in the Twentieth Century, p. 216.   
63 Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 70. See also Andrea Pető, “Átvonuló hadsereg, maradandó trauma—Az 
1945-os budapesti némi erőszak esetek emlékezete,” Törtenélmi Szemle, Vol. 41, Nos. 1-2 (1999). For a 
thorough contemporaneous account of Budapest in the aftermath of World War II, see József Kővágó, 
Budapest on the Threshold of Winter 1945-46: Report on General Conditions in the City (Budapest: 
Budapest Székesfőváros Házinyomdája, 1945).   
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1945-46, most Magyars lived on less than 1000 calories per day.64 Postwar inflation led 
to the worst hyperinflation in recorded history in 1946.  Prices increased by 12 percent 
hourly in the late spring, and by July the pengő had reached an exchange rate of 5 
quintillion (5030) to the dollar.65   
Many elements that would later figure largely in the communist system originated 
during the war and in the postwar period.  Grocery rationing was imposed in the waning 
months of the war.  Compulsory production quotas for farmers were introduced in 1946 
as the economy collapsed.66  Immediately after the war over 27,000 Magyars were tried 
for war crimes, 40,000 were interned in camps, and another 62,000 lost their jobs in an 
ominous precedent for the communist politicization of the legal system.67  Nor did this 
process cease at war’s end.  As László Karsai notes, “Between 1945 and 1948, the police 
arrested thousands of people for political reasons other than war crimes. These arrests 
were somewhat random.  Often, they occurred because of denunciations and even 
personal vendettas.”68  Magyars had been subjected to an interventionist state and 
politicized, seemingly random legal prosecutions well before the communists seized 
power.    
                                                 
64 Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, pp. 245-246, Kővagó, Budapest on the Threshold of 
Winter, p. 40.  
65 Ivan Berend, Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993, p. 6, Nigel Swain, Hungary: The Rise and Fall of 
Feasible Socialism (London: Verso, 1992), p. 36. 
66 Peter D. Bell, Peasants in Socialist Transition: Life in a Collectivized Hungarian Village (Berkeley: 
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67 László Karsai, “The People’s Courts and Revolutionary Justice in Hungary, 1945-46,” in The Politics of 
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The politics of the immediate postwar period affected the genesis of communist 
rule in two other important aspects, most notably land reform and the nationalization of 
industry.  Discontent with the Horthy regime during the interwar period had focused on 
its antidemocratic tendencies (mainly the stringent property qualifications for the 
franchise and the absence of secret balloting outside of urban areas—thus, for the 
majority of the population) and its unwillingness to seriously contemplate breaking up the 
noble estates. The catastrophic effects of the war were (rightly, to some extent69) blamed 
on this interwar conservative elite, which vanished from the political sphere practically 
overnight. In its wake the Smallholders’ Party, the Social Democrats, and other political 
parties attempted to capitalize on the popular demand for a more egalitarian political 
system and, above all, land reform. Given the ongoing occupation of the country by the 
Red Army, despite its poor showing in the 1945 elections the Communist Party (MKP)70 
retained control of all key ministerial posts throughout the period. For the most part, only 
those measures tolerated by the Party were carried out.  Biding its time, the Party came 
out in favor of land reform, despite its “regressive” character, as a means of winning over 
the peasantry to its cause.71 
Unlike land reform, the nationalization of industry was fully in accordance with 
socialist precepts.  It also enjoyed both precedent and, in the wake of the havoc wrought 
                                                 
69 There was also a marked degree of popular support for the war, and the Holocaust—in Hungary as 
everywhere else in Central Europe—would not have been possible without some degree of support, feigned 
ignorance, and/or apathy from ordinary Magyars.  These issues of collaboration and complicity are far too 
weighty to tackle here: see Deák, et. al., editors, The Politics of Retribution on the general issue of postwar 
trials throughout Europe, and Karsai, “The People’s Courts,” and Kenez, Hungary from the Nazis to the 
Soviets, pp. 141-149, on the Hungarian case.     
70 The Hungarian Communist Party (Magyar Kommunista Párt, or MKP) was renamed the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, or MDP) after its merger with the Social Democrats in 1948. 
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by World War II, popular support as well.  In the 1930s, the Hungarian economy had 
already been characterized by a high level of state intervention and manipulation.  This 
trend was only exacerbated during wartime.72  It was also not an unpopular measure:  As 
Tony Judt notes, “the idea that a well-planned economy meant a richer, fairer, and better-
regulated society was taken up by a very broad constituency,” in Hungary as throughout 
postwar Europe.  The late 1940s saw increased support for a planned economy by many 
factions in the established capitalist states of Western Europe as well; in this regard, the 
Hungarian Communist and Social Democratic parties made less strange bedfellows than 
the Social Democratic and newly-emergent Christian Democratic parties in many western 
European states.73  There were, therefore, no significant barriers to nationalization under 
the coalition government.  Mines and several major factories were taken over by the state 
as early as 1946.  In November of the next year, the banking system was also 
nationalized.  To return to the broader European context for comparison, even at this 
point Hungary was no more nationalized than France.  According to Nigel Swain, its 
initial version of the Three-Year Plan (1947-1949) “was scarcely more interventionist 
than France’s Monnet Plan.”  In this regard, much of the Communist Party’s dirty work 
had already been done by early 1948, when it abandoned the pretense of operating as a 
coalition partner and assumed direct control. All major enterprises were nationalized in 
                                                                                                                                                 
71 In this the MKP was no different from its colleagues throughout Eastern Europe—or, for that matter, the 
Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War.  I discuss land reform at greater length in Chapter 2. 
72 Andrew C. Janos, The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary 1825-1845 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1982), pp. 238-312, and Martha Lampland, The Object of Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), pp. 131-135. 
73 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), pp. 38, 67-77.  
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March of 1948, after which over 3/4 of all workers were employed by the state,74 and the 
stalinization of Hungary proceeded apace.   
In Hungary the programmatic characteristics of the plan were industrialization—
with an emphasis on heavy industry rather than consumer goods—and the 
collectivization of agriculture.  In material terms, this called for production targets that in 
retrospect seem absurdly high.  The First Five-Year Plan (1950-54) called for increasing 
industrial output by 204 percent by the end of the plan.  This goal was raised to a 
staggering 380 percent at the 1951 party congress.75  The workforce necessary for this 
headlong rush was to be drawn from the labor surplus resulting from the collectivization 
of agriculture and the mobilization of women, who entered the workforce in large 
numbers. Between 20 and 36% of the national income was channeled into industry during 
this period, a percentage roughly seven to nine times interwar levels.76  This process was 
to be accompanied by the widespread construction of culture houses, libraries, and 
crèches, and a massive expansion of the educational system specifically targeting 
working-class and peasant youth.   A number of mass organizations were created—chief 
among them the Democratic Association of Hungarian Women (Magyar Nök 
Demokratikus Szövetsége, or MNDSz) and the Association of Young Workers (Dolgozó 
Ifjúság Szövetsége, or DISz)77—to help the Communist Party (MDP) mobilize and 
organize the masses, to serve as “transmission belts” from the regime to its subjects.  On 
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paper, these measures were not ineffective.  According to official statistics, industrial 
output grew by 20% annually during this period.  Both pig iron and rolled steel 
production roughly doubled, while aluminum production tripled.78  Collective and state 
farms spread swiftly across the Hungarian countryside: 500 such farms in 1949 swelled 
to 5224 in early 1953, while the amount of land under state tillage increased from 54,912 
to 1,706,025 hectares in the same period.79  The actual success of the Plan is much more 
difficult to measure, as we shall see shortly; however, the social and demographic results 
of this pell-mell industrialization and collectivization were immediately apparent.   
Hungarians flooded to the cities to work in factories.  At least 150,000 peasants 
left the countryside for the cities in the period 1949 to 1953.  Over 300,000 artisans and 
small craftsmen, and 75,000 bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, were likewise forcibly 
channeled into new occupations.  More Magyars moved from the country to the city, and 
from agriculture into industry, during these five years than had done so during the entire 
interwar period.80  The bulk of these immigrants found themselves in Budapest, which 
grew from its postwar low of 900,000 to 1.9 million by 1956, primarily (79%) as a result 
of immigration from the countryside; the capital swelled in size to become the third 
largest city in Eastern Europe.81  They settled primarily in the working-class suburbs of 
Újpest and Angyalföld in the north, Kőbanya in the east, the VIIIth and IXth districts in 
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south Pest, and Csepel.82  Driven off the farms and out of smaller industrial schemes into 
huge factories, the new urbanites were forced into radically new modes of life and labor. 
In both the villages and the cities, the economic realities of life in communist 
Hungary left much to be desired.  Over-investment in heavy industry left scant surplus 
for the production of even the most basic staples of life: the rationing of flour, eggs, meat, 
and lard was reintroduced in late 1951.83  Many goods were entirely unavailable or could 
only be purchased on the black market.  Housing availability in Budapest lagged far 
behind demand.  650,000 new apartments would have been required to address the 
shortfall, but only 14,000 were built every year; moreover, according to a 1954 survey, 
fully 1/5 of the available housing was structurally unsound or in need of total renewal. 
Many apartments lacked water and electricity, as did entire villages well into the 1960s.84   
Above all, Magyars found themselves working longer hours for less money for goods that 
now cost more than they had before.  Although real wages had risen to 90% of their 1938 
level by 1949, they fell back down to 66% of that mark by 1952.  Clothing, shoes, and 
many other manufactured goods were prohibitively expensive: one young technician 
recounted how he and his friends would “build up,” or save for, a new coat or suit over 
the course of a year.85  This widespread poverty leveled the differences between 
occupations—in 1951, both skilled industrial workers and doctors made around 1800 
forints per month (unskilled workers in agriculture, roughly half that)—but, overall, by 
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early 1953 most Magyars were considerably worse off than they had been in 1948.86  In 
short, widespread social and economic dislocation and hardship were the handmaidens of 
stalinization in Hungary.     
Modernization and crime are inextricably linked; high-modernist schemes to 
rapidly transform societies, even more so.   As rural populations abandon the village for 
the city and the farm for the factory, they are subjected to new and unfamiliar modes of 
social, economic, and cultural interaction.  They become enmeshed in monetary 
economies, and most often in low-earning jobs: whereas they had previously been able to 
grow or trade for most goods, they are now forced to pay for much of what they need 
even as they are exposed to tempting new commodities.  They also abandon the 
predictability of rural life and the familial and interpersonal ties that served as both a 
sanction on antisocial behavior and a safety net in rough times.87  At the same time, the 
behavior of these transient populations is rendered more legible in the administration’s 
purview.  Criminal or deviant acts that would have previously gone unnoticed are much 
more likely to draw unwelcome attention from the state, whose regulatory gaze is shaped 
by the biases (patriarchal, class-based, ethnic, national, religious, and so on) of its 
planners, administrators, and monitors.88  As a result of all these factors, urbanization 
generally results in a spike in crime rates.  Crime and urbanization followed this pattern 
in England, France, and Germany in the nineteenth century, as did tsarist Russia up to the 
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eve of the revolution.89  Although Budapest and the other urban centers of Hungary had 
had previously weathered episodes of this type, nothing remotely like the demographic 
shift of the period 1948 to 1956 had ever occurred before.90  The regional distribution of 
crime in communist Hungary conforms to this model, as Budapest and the other heavily-
urbanized regions of Hungary had significantly higher crime rates than the rest of the 
country: in 1954, Budapest’s crime rate of 2637 per 100,000 people dwarfed the national 
average of 1738:100,000.91  Societal and economic tensions that had taken generations to 
diffuse elsewhere were compressed into a span of less than a decade.  This social and 
economic dislocation was further exacerbated by popular antipathy towards the regime.   
The degree of popular support for communism in Eastern Europe has long been a 
matter of some debate.  With the exception of Czechoslovakia, no state in this region had 
a native communist party of any significance during the interwar period, and during this 
time their relations with the Soviet state were for the most part not friendly.92   In 
Hungary, Béla Kun’s 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic had engendered much opposition, 
while Russian complicity in the suppression of the 1848 revolution had long been a 
source of national animosity.93  During World War II, Poland and Hungary especially 
had been subjected to murder, robbery, and rape in the wake of the Red Army.  To these 
recent and historic animosities we must add the aforementioned hardships incurred in the  
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course of stalinization.   On the other hand, there were a number of reasons one might 
support the communist project.  The political right had led the country to disaster in 
World War II.  The egalitarian and progressive promise of socialism genuinely appealed 
to idealists. Peasants, the working poor, and women enjoyed greater access to education 
and opportunity than was previously imaginable.  Others saw in the party the opportunity 
for protection, profit, or revenge.  The relatively-free election of 1945—in which the 
Party polled 17% of the total vote, roughly even with the Social Democrats and well 
behind the moderate-conservative Smallholders (57%)94—is probably the most accurate 
index available of communism’s popularity in the immediate postwar period.   
It squandered this support in short order.  Regime propaganda—which sought to 
co-opt Hungarian national sentiment for its own ends, and rewrite its history in 
accordance with the precepts of historical materialism—failed miserably.  As Mevius 
argues, “Sovietization of national symbols did not sell socialism but was regarded instead 
by many as an insult….  For all their national propaganda, the Hungarian communists 
were unconvincing patriots.”95  Although the Party rapidly ballooned in size—from a 
postwar low of 3000 members in late 1944 to 1.2 million in 194996—this did not 
necessarily indicate support for the communist project: joining the MDP or one of its 
subsidiary mass organizations was often necessary for admission to university, 
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promotion, or other benefits to be derived from the system.97  The members of these 
organizations often avoided paying their membership dues and dodged meetings. The 
DISz seems to have had particular trouble in this regard: in a representative case, the 
youth organization managed to sign up almost half of the young workers at the Gheorgiu 
Dej shipyard, but only 10% actually paid their dues.98  One DISz member—actually the 
secretary of the organization in his army unit—recalled that 
 
I did not do much as a secretary.  I called a meeting every month.  Mostly 
we told stories and joked, also we built a sport field which earned me quite 
a distinction I did not expect.  One day I was surprised to receive the 
distinction of a so-called “good secretary.”  The whole thing did not mean 
to me anything.99 
 
A group of students in the small town of Békéssámson even used their local DISz 
organization as a front for their printing of anti-regime pamphlets.100   Most refugees 
pegged the number of actual “true believers” in the party at 10% or less.101  One 1953 
escapee elaborated on the fragile nature of the support for communism: “if the members 
of the communist party heard that the Americans are coming, 50% would desert 
immediately.  25% would wait to see if the news were true, and only about 25% would 
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remain communists.”102  Another directly linked the MDP’s unpopularity to its failure on 
the economic front: “Should the Communist regime have meant material welfare, 50% of 
the population would have accepted it.  In the given circumstances about 97% of the 
population was anti-communist.”103  Those who benefited from some aspect of the 
communist project—high school and university students, for instance—did not become 
automatons as a result.  They still resented other aspects of the regime, and transgressed 
its prescriptions.  Benefiting from the expanded educational system did not stop students 
from circulating western literature and VOA pamphlets and cutting Russian classes.104 
One high school student related how he believed in the egalitarian promise of 
communism in the abstract, but hated the Russians and the Hungarian communist regime 
for their obvious failure to live up to Marx’s precepts.105  Widespread dissatisfaction with 
the regime and the aforementioned underlying societal and economic tensions were the 
main challenges confronted by the communist legal apparatus.   
After 1948, Hungarian law and criminological practice were brought into line 
with the Soviet model.  In the USSR, criminal law and its administration served a 
“nakedly instrumental” purpose as a political weapon to be wielded in the interests of the 
consolidation and exercise of the regime’s prerogatives.106    Communist criminology 
held that criminal behavior was either a result of bourgeois tendencies not yet eradicated 
by burgeoning class consciousness, or the direct result of ideological contamination from 
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the West.  Thus, crimes against the state or economy were prosecuted much more harshly 
than crimes against other persons; the severity of any given punishment depended in 
large measure on class origin, with kulaks and the deklasszalt (“de-classed,” or ex-
bourgeois) segments of society drawing the stiffest sentences.  Penalties ranged from stiff 
fines and internal exile to imprisonment and execution.  “In short, criminal law became 
an instrument of the class struggle.”107  This instrumentalization of law enforcement 
required large numbers of enforcers.  The staff of the ÁVH already numbered 28,000 by 
1950, while the total number of people employed by the Ministry of the Interior 
numbered almost 70,000 by 1955.108  Roughly 40,000 informers were also used by the 
state security administration.109  Not only the ÁVH but also the regular police were 
vetted for ideological reliability; likewise, the judges and lawyers of the prior legal 
administration were gradually replaced by more pliable and reliable legal personnel.    
Hungarians were not unaccustomed to living in a repressive and intrusive regime. 
The interwar state had demonstrated a marked disregard for the free press, civil rights, 
and other niceties of democratic rule.  However, the degree of repression during the early 
communist period was markedly more severe.110  Whereas the prison population before 
World War II averaged roughly 0.09% of the population, by 1952 this had risen fourfold, 
to 0.36%.  This number does not adequately represent the total number of people 
imprisoned, as those in internment camps were not included.  The overall total is 
unknown: the 45,000 total incarcerated (in camps and prisons) reported by Rákosi in 
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early 1953 seems low.111  Bearing these uncertainties in mind, the total incarcerated 
population at the peak of stalinist repression in Hungary was probably somewhere 
between 0.5% and 0.8%—a high percentage by either contemporary or modern 
standards.112   
Stalinist control measures efficiently crushed all open forms of dissent.  Riots, 
strikes, and demonstrations were broken up almost immediately after they started.113  The 
occasional reports of conspiracies and underground activity that leaked through the Iron 
Curtain throughout this period were rightly judged by their Western observers as “an 
expression of hope rather than of fact.”114  There is a sort of perverse one-upsmanship 
among scholars of Eastern Europe regarding which country suffered the most under 
communism, and Hungary is a contender for that dubious distinction.  According to 
László Borhi, the degree of repression in Hungary was so extreme that it exceeded even 
the Kremlin’s expectations: 
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The Hungarian Communists in their revolutionary zeal outdid Soviet 
expectations and persecuted more people than the Soviets thought 
desirable. …  Kiselev [the Soviet ambassador to Hungary] deplored many 
aspects of Rákosi’s policies, including political persecution and 
industrialization.  Rákosi would not listen even to Stalin.  Beria [the head 
of the Soviet NKVD] called the reign of terror in Hungary inadmissible 
and intolerable.115 
 
Judged by the public transcript, then, the legal apparatus was a smoothly-functioning 
instrument of the communist state during its heyday in the period 1948 to early 1953, and 
one possibly—although one hesitates to take Beria at face value—more authoritarian than 
its Soviet mentor.  It is important to note, however, that this level of oppression was not 
constant throughout the period.  Before turning to resistance, we must note the drastic 
effects of the New Course on crime in Hungary. 
Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 ushered in an era of change throughout Eastern 
Europe.  Rákosi and his cohort were summoned to Moscow, and after a brutal dressing-
down from Khrushchev, Malenkov, and others he was removed from the premiership and 
replaced by Imre Nagy.116   Nagy promptly set about reforming the system.  He throttled 
back the pace of industrialization, peasants were allowed to leave the collectives, small-
scale retail and production enterprises were decriminalized, and—most importantly for 
our purposes—the regime significantly backed off on prosecuting criminal behavior, 
even as it amnestied over 20,000 convicts.117  This was carried out in both the spirit of 
destalinization and also as a response to overcrowding in the prisons and internment 
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camps.  Nagy tried to bribe the peasants to stay in collective farms by increasing the 
maximum size of personal plots, but this failed miserably: 400 collective farms folded 
almost overnight, while the total area farmed and collective farm membership both 
dropped by a third.  He also engineered price cuts in most consumer articles and salary 
increases in most industries.   This resulted in significant gains for urban and factory 
populations: by the end of 1954, real wages had finally returned to their 1949 level.  
However, industrial production lagged behind the targets set by the Five-Year Plan: 
Nagy’s reforms did not deliver the goods.118  Stubborn resistance from the hardliners 
who remained in the administration and escalating Cold War tensions (West Germany 
joined NATO in October 1954; the Warsaw Pact was signed in May 1955) spelled the 
doom of this short-lived experiment.  Although the New Course only lasted until April 
1955, its effects on the criminal and legal apparatus—as seen in Chart 1.1—were drastic.   
Crime statistics can be notoriously unreliable indices of criminal behavior.  In 
general, they provide only a basic grasp of the activities of either criminals or their 
pursuers and punishers.  Many crimes go unreported, and detentions without charges filed 
are likewise uncounted.119  They are also subject to deliberate manipulation by vested 
interests.120  The available statistics for Hungary also do not include those persons taken 
directly into custody by the ÁVH, thereby bypassing the courts.  We must treat these  
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figures with some caution.  Generally speaking, however, crime rates fluctuate for one of 
three reasons: 
1. An actual change in the number of crimes committed, 
2. Official revision of what constitutes criminal behavior, and/or 
3. Structural changes in the detection and prosecution of criminal behavior. 
 
The precipitous decline in crime rates after early 1953 was contingent upon all three of 
these factors.  Magyars responded to Nagy’s less-oppressive regime by committing fewer 
crimes even as the legal apparatus scaled back the scope of its operations and became 
more selective about the cases it chose to pursue. For instance, arson cases had risen 
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steadily since the start of communist rule, peaking at 4856 cases in 1952; after the advent 
of the New Course, they drop off to 3493 cases in 1953, and 1569 cases in 1954.122  
Unless an increase in pyromania is somehow a corollary effect of stalinization, this must 
be interpreted as a decrease in the actual number of incidents of this type.  This absolute 
decline in criminal behavior was mirrored by a sharp drop in crimes such as 
embezzlement, crimes against the plan, the misuse of state funds, and the portmanteau 
category of “crimes against the public supply” (közellátás érdekét veszélyeztető 
bűncselekmény).  As one of the key instrumental purposes of the legal system was to 
regulate the economy—and, as we shall see in the next section, criminal behavior of this 
type was endemic throughout the period—we can safely assume that these falling rates 
resulted from a relaxation of the regime’s prosecution of these acts.  On the last point, it 
seems likely that the frenetic pace of stalinist oppression had taxed the investigators and 
courts almost to the breaking point, as both branches of the system immediately sloughed 
off as many cases as possible once the tempo was decreased.  In the second half of 1953, 
detectives investigated 32% fewer cases than they had in the same period the previous 
year.  The courts also began dismissing many more cases outright: whereas prior to the 
New Course only 18.7% of cases investigated were dropped before going to trial, 
afterwards this percentage rose dramatically, to 31.3%.123  The courts also severely 
curtailed the use of the penal sanction, as is apparent in Chart 1.2.     
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The total number of sentences in 1954 was less than half that in 1952.  Most of this 
change comes from the lower end of the criminal spectrum: minor crimes, which had 
previously earned sentences of six months or less, now went largely unpunished.  
Predictably, these trends were reversed when Rákosi came back into power in 1955.  
Although regime prosecutions did not return to their 1948-1952 levels, a 
significant increase is obvious across the board.  During the earlier stalinist period, the 
overcrowded state of the prisons and internment camps necessitated the suspension of a 
high proportion of prison sentences (i.e, 40% of all prison sentences in 1952).  This did 
not mean that these convicts got off scot-free: the vast majority of them had been 
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remanded in custody for some time before their trial, and many of them suffered 
additional penalties in the form of fines and “exclusion from public affairs” (közügyektől 
éltiltás), in essence a ban on holding any public office, for years afterwards.  The gap 
between suspensions and sentences served actually narrowed during the New Course (see 
Chart 1.3).  The return to stalinist policy in 1955 saw a marked increase in sentences but 
no corollary rise in suspensions, which bespeaks both the initial severity of the 
crackdown and the comparatively uncrowded state of the prisons at the outset of 
restalinization.  (On the other hand, fine suspensions remain roughly constant throughout 
the period). Again the legal apparatus seems to have overdone it, as by the end of 1955 
prison officials were once more complaining of overcrowded jails.125   
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In interpreting these figures, the historian confronts the same problem faced by 
the administrators of the communist legal administration: to what extent ought these data 
be construed as resistance?  Although the aggregation of data at this level is useful for 
identifying the broader trends afoot, it does not adequately reflect the individual context 
of any given criminal act; the intent of both the criminals and officials involved is 
opaque.  An assault on a local official could be a matter of personal animosity as readily 
as an attack on the state he or she represented; theft, an act born out of antipathy towards 
the regime or pure self-interest. Nor is it always possible to disaggregate these motives, 
as they often overlap: given a choice, one would presumably attack or rob the people and 
institutions one disliked the most.127  In this regard, the state’s practice of categorizing 
crimes into those committed against the state and economy versus those committed 
against other individuals allows some finer distinctions to be drawn.   
Crimes committed against the state drop off sharply during the New Course, 
while interpersonal crimes rise.  The former, for the most part, represents resistance; the 
latter, the irreducible residuum of criminal behavior in any society.  Arson, again, serves 
as a reliable initial bellwether.  In repressive regimes, cases of arson almost invariably 
represent a veiled attack on authority: on cooperative farm outbuildings, officials’ houses, 
and so forth.  The absolute drop in the incidences of arson indicates that this mode of 
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resistance fell off during the period.  The drop in the number of economic crimes is also 
instructive, as it only occurs in those crimes committed against state property and those 
broader offenses (e.g., speculation, counterfeiting) that affected the economy at large.  In 
contrast, interpersonal theft and burglary increase significantly during the New Course 
(by 14% and 16%, respectively); the number of robberies almost doubles, and murders 
increase by a third.  The most likely explanation for this spike is the release of many 
ordinary criminals in the general amnesty.128   
A possible corollary of this argument is that Magyars responded to heightened 
persecution with increased anti-state activity, and that the high crime rate for late 1952 
and early 1953 is not solely a function of increased repression.  Some evidence supports 
this conclusion. In Budapest, anti-state and economic crimes in the first half of 1952 
demonstrate a marked increase compared to the same period a year before—e.g., 
embezzlement almost doubled, factory theft almost quadrupled—even as interpersonal 
crimes remained roughly constant.129 Worker absenteeism at the Csepel Ironworks 
reached 688 workers per day in September 1950 and 1674 per day in February 1951; by 
early 1952, seven to nine percent of the workforce failed to show up on any given day.130  
In the countryside, János Rainer finds that “the summer of 1952 brought the first signs of 
mass rural resistance to the system of compulsory deliveries: threshers’ strikes, refusals 
to surrender quotas and even acts of violence occurred.  Sporadic resistance flared up 
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several times during the year.”131  By the end of the year there was “a critical shortage” 
of collections officers, as they stole away from their positions in the local administration 
to less dangerous occupations.132  Litván argues that “the overall result of Stalinization, 
with its mobilization and coercion, was that by 1953, Hungarian society was close to 
breaking point.”133  Although reform was probably impossible while Stalin lived, when it 
did occur it was in response to local conditions as well as Kremlin machinations.  
The longitudinal trend towards much lower crime rates, and towards a much 
lower variance between investigations, trials, and convictions, suggest at least one more 
conclusion: that throughout this period, the communist legal apparatus was in the process 
of reaching a workable symbiosis between its police and its courts.  The Soviet example 
is again instructive.  In the USSR, the court system did not spring into being fully-formed 
in 1917.  It, like the Soviet police, was only gradually molded into an efficient tool of the 
central administration over the course of the 1930s.134  The increasing uniformity of these 
indexes throughout the period suggests a similar trend for Hungary in the 1950s.  High 
investigation rates coupled with low conviction rates suggest a fundamental discord 
between the police and the courts: an over-enthusiasm on the part of the police and 
investigators (probably working under a quota, or at least pressure from their superiors) 
with which the courts and prisons simply could not keep pace. The gradual 
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homogenization of these trends in the late 1950s is the statistical footprint of a legal 
apparatus gradually reaching a workable symbiosis between its various elements.   
For the bulk of the period under consideration, however, the police and courts 
were not smoothly-meshing cogs in the legal machine.  As we turn from the big picture to 
what crime looked like “on the ground,” we find that the legal administration—like all of 
the communist system—was riddled with inconsistencies, contradictions, and 
contradictory elements.  This enabled widespread criminal and resistant behavior even as 
economic hardship and regime unpopularity encouraged it. 
 
Interstices, Margins, and Borders 
 
In order to work as intended, the communist system would have required a high 
degree of efficiency in the interactions between the various branches of the 
administration.  This was profoundly not the case.  Elements of the stalinist program—
chiefly the overplanned nature of the economy and the unpredictable personal motives of 
its personnel—militated directly against its success; poor interdepartmental interaction 
exacerbated these problems.  Many of the people who worked for the system did not 
blindly carry out the party-state’s program.  When they saw opportunities for personal 
profit or resistance, they seized them.  The fractured and disorderly nature of the system 
not only enabled resistance, it encouraged it.   
The centrally-planned economy suffered from two major faults: it was unable to 
compensate for the cumulative effects of over-planning, and it devolved into a “campaign 
economy” rather than the well-ordered system envisioned by its planners and managers.  
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The first point is relatively straightforward: the greater the degree of control desired over 
the economy, the greater the number of indicators—quantifiable measures such as output 
volume, cost per unit produced, and so forth—that must be disaggregated, reported and 
monitored.  In Hungary, enterprises had to meet 1500 specific indicators in 1951; this 
ballooned to 2900 by 1953.135   One indicator of the complexity of this task is that the 
state administration increased from 170,000 workers in 1949 to 280,000—or roughly one 
in four of all workers—by 1956.136  This high-modernist preoccupation with legibility 
did not make the fulfillment of the plan easier: planners were deluged with redundant and 
irrelevant facts and figures even as “companies became snowed under by an increasingly 
incomprehensible mass of detailed instructions.”137  This confusion between industry and 
administration was compounded by the simple fact that centralized planning cannot 
operate in a vacuum.  As Nigel Swain notes, “People fall sick; things break down; people 
make mistakes; winters are unexpectedly cold.  All these have knock-on effects which 
must be catered for.”  Over and above whatever actual sabotage might have occurred, the 
planners were forced to constantly revise the overall plan in light of these accidental and 
incidental occurrences.  In 1952, the five-year plan was altered 472 times; the yearly plan 
for 1952, 113 times.  Changes in these overarching plans forced the revision of all 
subsidiary plans to meet the new targets.  This fetishization of facts and figures is a 
hallmark of the rational and precise high-modernist vision—but carried to these extremes, 
it militated directly against its realization.  At the local level, the solution to the 
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disequilibrium induced by these incessant interventions was most often a brief and 
intense production “campaign,” in which local enterprises would rush to make up 
shortfalls. These campaigns, however, had their own “knock-on effects.”  As István Rév 
notes, “The result of the grain campaign is a critical shortage of fodder, the shortage of 
fodder will lead to the slaughtering of the animals, and the meat shortage comes next 
year.”138  Both of these entropic tendencies were neither the result of sabotage, as the 
communist press ardently proclaimed, nor were they caused solely by accidental or 
circumstantial obstacles. They were intrinsic to the system, and this cycle of 
disinformation and overcompensation led to a vicious downward spiral in the actual 
execution of the plan.   
This inevitability of systemic malfunction provided little solace for the managers 
and administrators who failed to live up to the unrealistic standards imposed by the 
system.  An extreme case is the trial of M.K., a collective farm director tried in October 
1951.  The collective farm he managed from January 1950 to mid-1951 failed miserably 
in meeting its production quotas: all told, the shortfall (as meticulously calculated by the 
administration) amounted to 145,650 forints’ worth of crops.  A scapegoat was necessary, 
and M.K. fit the bill.  Although he had joined the party in 1945, prior to that he had been 
a member of the Arrow Cross; his indictment laid special stress on the fact that during the 
war he had often been seen in the uniform of that discredited fascist organization.  He 
was sentenced to ten years in prison.139  Accountants suffered similar job insecurity. One 
mechanical engineer interviewed in 1957 recalled that his enterprise went through six 
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accountants in two years: some went to jail, some were allowed to resign if the 
discrepancies were minor enough, others simply disappeared before they could be called 
to account for their “crimes.”140  Much as in capitalist societies, the penalties for not 
meeting production targets were strict.  However, over-fulfilling the plan was also a 
dangerous tactic.  Managers who exceeded expectations would find their subsequent 
quotas raised—a trend that threatened catastrophe if continued over time.   
This bureaucratic confusion in industry was also apparent in the operations of the 
court system.  Local courts demonstrated only a passing knowledge of the 
administration’s sentencing standards, and reports from regional offices regularly 
demonstrate discrepancies between the sentences passed down and the expectations of 
the Ministry of Justice.  One 1951 report from Szeged,141 compiled in response to a 
request from the Ministry for a detailed assessment of the operations of the local courts, 
illustrates these disparities.  The local courts got it right some of the time: for instance, 
one sentence, involving a market vendor who was found carrying a loaded revolver (2 
years and 6 months in prison) was noted approvingly as “appropriately strict” 
(megfelelően súlyos) by the administrator compiling the report.  Likewise, a post office 
worker who had been caught listening in on a telephone conversation between the local 
party and ÁVH offices was assessed an “appropriate” four-year prison sentence.  For the 
most part, though, the sentences passed down by the local judges missed the mark. The 
sentences and fines passed down for dealing on the black market were consistently too  
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strict.   The courts did not consistently err on the side of caution, however: one kulak 
convicted of illegally slaughtering a pig received an “overly-lenient” sentence of three 
months in jail and a 1000-forint fine.  Another kulak—this one guilty of withholding over 
a ton of wheat and fodder from the state collector—received an “ostentatiously lenient” 
(kirivóan enyhe) sentence of 7 months in jail and a 1000-forint fine.  Finally, a man who 
was tried for smuggling two men across the border into Yugoslavia received a sentence 
of only 2 years and 6 months.  (Of his charges, one escaped successfully and the other 
was captured and sentenced to five years in prison.)  This sentence was clearly too lenient 
in the official’s eyes.  It is also one of the only sentences the report notes was later 
augmented by the Supreme Court, which tacked an additional two years onto the border 
guide’s sentence.142  A nationwide summary of crimes for 1950 demonstrated similar 
discrepancies.  In this latter case even the inquisitor sent out from Budapest got it wrong: 
one sentence, of a 60-forint fine for a kulak caught withholding 70 kilos of wheat, 
escaped his notice but was caught by the department head, who scrawled “lenient!” in the 
margin.143  From the standpoint of the central administration, the operations of the local 
courts left much to be desired.   
Although many of these local deviations from the mandated sentencing norms 
were probably due to simple misunderstanding, some were probably deliberate.  The 
motives behind this meddling, however, are unclear.  For the early period of stalinization 
in the USSR, Peter Solomon notes that Soviet judges were often able to practice a fair 
amount of discretion in their operations: “As long as careers were not at stake, many 
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judges in the USSR were ready to resist orders that violated their sense of fair play.”144  
One 1956 refugee, a prosecutor from Veszprém, made precisely this point in his 
interview:  
 
I would estimate that about 90% of the members of the court and the 
offices of the public prosecutor in Veszprém were no party members.  And 
these 90% helped the victims of the regime as much as they could.  In 
simple cases it was possible to make the files disappear.  This could not be 
done on a large scale, but useful legal council could be given to the 
prosecuted and this we did on a large scale. …I can hardly remember a 
day when someone did not come to my house asking for help and although 
it was illegal, noone [sic] left my house without receiving council.  This 
was nothing unique. My colleagues did the same.145 
 
Although such judges and prosecutors certainly existed, the track record of the Szeged 
courts—in which sentences were often more stringent than required by the guidelines set 
out by the Ministry of Justice—suggests that legal personnel were not always guided by 
such high-minded motives.146  Whether guided by personal motives and animosities or 
the desire to confound the law’s operation (or both), some officers of the court 
manipulated the system on a regular basis. 
 The same ambiguity is apparent in the behavior of the police.  A policeman 
interviewed after 1956 suggested a similar degree of empathy in the police force:        
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Policemen, being mainly from peasant origin or worker origin, 
sympathized very much with the people.  In most cases, except for severe 
real criminal cases, they tried to write the protocol in a lenient way at the 
time of the arrest.…  As far as criminal cases were concerned the police 
were reliable.  Whenever, however, they saw the degrading of the people 
by the regime, especially in cases of so-called social crimes, they tried to 
help the accused without accepting bribes.  For example, the police helped 
the peasants wherever it could.  In the cases where the peasants did not 
comply with the orders concerning forced delivery the police stood 
entirely at the peasants [sic] side.  Most of the policemen were peasant 
boys.147 
 
Other sources echo this assertion of sympathy on the part of the police.148  Other 
policemen simply wanted to milk the system for all it was worth.  One reported spending 
his evening shifts dozing and reading detective novels.149  Yet other assessments of the 
police were much less glowing:   
 
[The aim of the police] seems not the protection of the public, but to make 
as much money as they can.  You see them constantly challenging 
pedestrians to show their identifications—the inevitable outcome of such 
questioning being that the pedestrian pays a fee for some alleged 
offense.150 
 
Detectives also seem to have abused their position for profit by accepting bribes and 
inventing reasons for searching houses.151  The MDP was not well represented among 
policemen, accounting for only 30% of the force by one estimate.152  Whether motivated 
by self-interest, apathy, altruism, or antipathy towards the regime, many policemen—like 
the judges and prosecutors discussed above—used their authority to their advantage.   
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Every form of labor in this legibility-preoccupied regime inevitably generated 
some sort of paper trail.  The trick was to generate an official record of one’s 
performance that was good enough to avoid trouble and not so good that one’s superiors 
came to expect more on a regular basis.  Many capitalized on the mass confusion that 
characterized state planning for their own benefit.  One electrical engineer interviewed in 
1957 described his job in some detail: 
 
An example will show you how this whole system operated.  In the spring 
of 1954 the ministry decided that the flour mills should be electrified.  It 
was a very stupid idea right from the beginning, since the mills established 
by individual owners still used the cheapest power available in the 
vicinity.  Anyhow, our office received orders to prepare the plan for the 
electrification of 30 mills within one month.… I prepared a master plan 
and my draftsmen copied it ten times with insignificant alterations.  Then I 
prepared another master plan which was copied 10 times again.  Working 
rather easily I was able to prepare the 30 plans within a month and I 
finished them just before one of the great communist holidays, perhaps it 
was May 1 or so.  I got a prize and a money award for my work and 
during that month I fulfilled my norms for half a year or more.  Of course, 
the plans were very poor since they did not take into consideration the 
local conditions or the outlay of the mill.  But it did not matter either, 
because none of the mills were electrified by 1956…. What I liked in my 
job was that a good expert was not pressed to work hard.  He could idle all 
the way and still overfulfill his norms.153 
 
 
Despite his nonchalant attitude towards his job, this technocrat advanced steadily through 
the ranks of his enterprise—the National Planning Office itself.  He was made the head of 
his department in 1954, and remained in that position until his escape to the west in 1956.   
Although these dissimulative strategies generally only resulted in wastage or 
misinformation, at times they resulted in actual damage to equipment and materiel.  A 
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petroleum expert in the state oil enterprise recounted a similar story to the above, but he 
also demonstrated a greater cognizance of the repercussions of these practices: 
 
We had a much better time under Soviet ownership.  They paid better, and 
we could put much more over on them than their Hungarian successors…. 
If we fell behind in a particular period, we were not prepared to forego our 
bonus, but started to cook the stock records instead.  We would overstate 
the stock figures to an extent sufficient to make up for the short-fall of 
delivered production, and even if they came out to check, they could never 
prove that the stock was not there; wherever they sought it, the missing 
quantity was always supposed to have just been pumped into some other 
tank.  Having produced 90 and reported 106, we would then request x 
days stoppage for repairs and maintenance.  We would use x - n days for 
repairs and produce the missing 10 during the n days.  However, the 
trouble was that they would cut the permission for stoppage to a bare 
minimum, and as a result, it was the repairs and maintenance which 
suffered, as the time allowed was enough for repairs, but not for repairs 
and clandestine production.  Hence the equipment deteriorated very 
quickly.154 
 
The salient characteristics of both these cases are clear:  both engineers aptly dodged the 
administrative procedures designed to minutely control their job performance, and they 
did so with the collusion of at least their immediate circle of co-workers.  The strategies 
used by these technocratic elites were among the more subtle means of perverting the 
regime’s goals for one’s own benefit.  Regular workers in factories did not enjoy the 
same degree of control over the official transcript of their behavior, and were forced to 
rely on more primitive means of manipulating the system.   
 Various forms of workplace dissimulation and theft were ubiquitous.  Signing up 
to work somewhere, receiving an advance and work equipment, and then never showing 
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up again—in the manner of Sándor H.—seems to have been commonplace.155  Workers 
in the food and service industries were able to augment their earnings by stealing from 
work or saving scarce goods for favored, well-paying customers.156  Textile workers 
made up for their comparatively low wages by smuggling cloth out of their factories.157  
Shoes were often resoled with stolen transmission belts.158  These widespread practices 
of covert appropriation seem to have reached their apogee in the building trades, where 
wages were low, raw materials were plentiful, and supervision apparently minimal.  A 
pipe-fitter in Budapest described his job environment thus: 
 
We had plenty of opportunities to do black work, after our work in the 
plant.  Everybody needed some installation work, or pipe fitting, or 
anything like that.  We were always called to private homes to do different 
kinds of work.  Out of the black work we could make as much money as 
our regular pay was [sic].  All the workers were doing the same, this was 
the main reason they liked the gas factory, and tried to stay there.  
Everybody used the material of the plant for the private works, the 
material was simply stolen.159 
 
An electrician with a Budapest housing repair cooperative echoed this praxis.  His black 
work added 400-500 forints per month, or almost half his income, to his salary.  Like the 
pipe-fitter above, he also collaborated with his coworkers: 
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Whenever we found ourselves on a job somewhere we tried to find 
something for the masons to do, as the collective did not always have 
work for them.  Whenever they had no work they were only paid the flat 
rate. As “one hand washes the other,” the masons would also scrounge up 
work for us: thus they would not start work until the power had been 
switched off, or they would dismantle the [electrical] main.  In some cases 
we simply tore the main out of the wall.  In this way we caused a lot of 
extra work for the masons.160 
   
Numerous other accounts from workers in these fields recount similar experiences.161 
These workers farther down the labor hierarchy adopted much more basic means of 
dodging the system.  The gains they made by doing so were similarly circumscribed by 
their relative lack of control over the official transcript generated by their work.  But like 
their counterparts at the commanding heights of industry, they often seized the 
opportunity to defraud or steal from the state.   
 The extent of this workplace theft was remarkable.  By early 1952, there were 400 
investigations of factory theft per month in Budapest alone.162  Most of the cases singled 
out for mention in the 1954 and 1955 Budapest police reports on factory theft involved 
thousands of forints’ worth of goods, and quintals of raw materials; it seems likely that 
smaller-scale theft slipped by under the radar for the most part.163  (It is probably no 
coincidence that workers in heavy industry consistently won the twice-yearly scrap-metal 
collection campaigns conducted by the regime.164)  Regardless of the mixed motives 
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behind its commission, workplace theft severely hampered the successful completion of 
the plan. 
Although the desperate economic plight of most Hungarians was doubtless a 
major motivation in stealing from work, it was also widely perceived as a covert means 
of attacking the regime.  Most Magyars interviewed both before and after 1956 concur on 
not only the endemic nature of workplace theft, but also its commission as a deliberate 
act of resistance.165  Some jokingly referred to daily workplace theft as the “10-forint 
movement.”166   Others went so far as to state that “most people regard it as a duty 
because it weakens the system,” or even that stealing became “a national virtue.”167  One 
economist summarized all three of these points—the relative ease of theft, the self-
interest involved, and its political basis—in a lengthy diatribe during his 1957 interview: 
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Why did people steal?   They were obviously in need of 
supplementing their meager incomes and there was ample opportunity 
everywhere to procure something.…  All kinds of materials, raw and 
finished, were shipped around needlessly, in a rather complicated, 
roundabout way.  Sizeable quantities were lost track of or were forgotten 
in the process.  Material, valued in the hundreds of thousands, was 
standing there rotting or disintegrating, for years.…  Now who could 
accuse a man of stealing if, seeing the obvious waste and conscious of his 
own urgent need, he collected these [products], took them home, and used 
them as he saw fit?  This is the way people viewed stealing.  We must 
therefore sharply distinguish actual stealing from wage-supplementing 
(bérkiegészités).  Stealing is that when a person steals personal belongings 
from another.  The taking away or “procuring” of material which more or 
less does not belong to anybody (félig gazdátlan dolgok elvitele) is 
definitely not stealing.   
Aside from these factors I just mentioned, stealing was also a 
conscious anti-Communist action.168  
 
The goods stolen from factories and shops were then traded on the black market, where 
systemic shortcomings were also evident.  
Like the trend towards the nationalization of the economy and the politicization of 
the legal apparatus, the black market’s origins antedate communist rule.  The disruption 
of the domestic economy during World War II had resulted in a thriving black market.  
This persisted in the dire economic conditions of the postwar period despite the coalition 
government’s attempts to control it.169  The economy of scarcity that prevailed under the 
Rákosi regime provoked a return to these illicit practices.  The inefficiencies of the 
centralized economy were most obvious in the perennial shortages of food, consumer 
goods, and all other commodities.  Long queues in front of state department stores were 
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commonplace, and the perennial shortages that plagued the system were generally the 
proximate cause of the few intermittent outright disturbances that occurred throughout 
the period.170  Thus, the regime tolerated the existence of free, or “gray,” markets where 
peasants would sell the produce and other goods they produced on their farms.  They 
remained in operation throughout the period, but were closely monitored and periodically 
raided by police squads.171  Regime propaganda provided the ideological counterpoint to 
the regulatory activities of the economic police, framing those guilty of speculation, 
hoarding, and various other illegal economic activities as menaces to society.    
One example is provided by the unfortunate M.T., who was arrested for 
speculation in June 1952.  According to Magyar Rendőr, M.T. had started trading on the 
black market after the war.  She quit her job at a candle-making enterprise in 1950, and 
from that time had relied solely on her illegal income.  The police found more than 
40,000 forints’ worth of goods buried in her cellar when she was arrested; worse yet, they 
were unused and rotting.  This, the reporter concluded, was enough to reveal “the true 
face” of this “economic hyena:” 
 
With the exposure of M.T., our people’s economy has again gotten rid of a 
malign hyena, who without batting an eye abstracted thousands of forints’ 
worth of the public supply from the workers.  The spoiled, cached textiles 
would have been sufficient to clothe more than 100 children.  
  
According to the public transcript, her criminal disregard for society’s needs mapped 
onto her private life: M.T.  had abandoned her five children, who were now vagrants.  
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She had likewise turned out her husband, and at the time of her arrest only kept the 
company of like-minded speculators.172  She went to prison, as did over 22,000 like-
minded “economic hyenas” during the period 1948 to 1956.173  Occasional raids and 
ideologically-charged media coverage did not prove effective deterrents.  The black 
market made up the difference between what the state was able to provide and what 
Magyars had to sell or buy, and the combination of poor regulation and economic need 
ensured that it remained in operation throughout the stalinist era.  
The black market operated in symbiosis with the aforementioned practices of 
workplace resistance, albeit with significant differences.  The black market was 
absolutely not a site of anti-regime solidarity, and black-marketeering does not seem to 
have acquired the same social legitimacy that accrued to workplace theft.  Prices on the 
black market were generally substantially higher than the norm, and competition was 
cutthroat.174  Despite all that, as Elena Osokina notes for the Soviet case, “the black 
market pumped goods and raw materials from the legal socialist economy and, to some 
extent, acted as its parasite in what could be viewed as a kind of economic revenge.”175  
It also provided the key site of exchange for the other forms of illicit economic activity 
afoot in the country.   
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This illegal trade in stolen goods was also augmented by various practices of 
small-scale production.  Women seem to have predominated in this field.  Homemade 
wine was a common black market product, and many women made a practice of home 
distilling during this period. This was potentially a lucrative trade, as a liter of 60% 
alcohol, which would cost 100 forints from the pharmacist, could be made at home for as 
little as 18 forints.176  As the state factories produced poor-quality clothing, there was 
great demand for homemade clothes as well, and contracting out a state loom meant that 
one could manufacture clothing for sale on the black market as well, with very little risk.  
Piecework knitting filled the same niche, and an entire underground readymade industry 
sprang up in Budapest and the other major cities.177 However, small-scale production 
seems to have contributed only a portion of the activity on the black market.  
For the most part the black market ran on finished products and raw materials 
stolen from the factories and shops.  A worker in the state building enterprise in Baja who 
escaped in 1954 recounted how he regularly capitalized upon his prior business 
connections (he had owned a mill prior to 1948) in his dealings on the black market.  
During “campaign” episodes he was even called upon by his managers to illegally 
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procure scarce goods needed to fulfill the factory production quota.178  A manager in a 
Budapest glass factory recalled that he made a tidy profit by regularly expediting the sale 
of glass to unapproved customers.  After his transfer to Győr in 1953 he continued doing 
so, and also acted as a middleman between people seeking glasswork done and private 
providers.179  One account suggests that in Csepel, the state store was actually also the 
center of the black market.180  The Danube also served as a conduit for illegal trade: one 
sailor recounted how he and his compatriots would regularly trade on the sly for watches 
in Vienna, leather products in Bulgaria, goosedown clothes in Romania, bicycle tires and 
other goods in Yugoslavia.  Other firsthand sources support his claim of the waterborne 
trade.181  Indeed, many of the goods for sale on the black market relied on a transnational 
web of illicit exchange.  Even as the communist regime was unable to entirely penetrate 
Hungarian society, so was it was unable to close itself off from illicit exchanges with its 
neighboring people’s democracies—or the West.  In addition to the low-level smuggling 
that went on between the Eastern European states, two major foreign sources funneled 
goods into the shadow economy.   
The Soviet occupiers themselves were a major source of Western goods for the 
black market.  Soviet soldiers in occupied Austria returned to the Soviet Union through 
Hungary, and they were desperate to convert watches and other goods “liberated” from 
the Austrians into more readily-concealable cash before they got home.182  According to 
                                                 
178 OSA/RFE Items 9783/54, mf 45. 
179 OSA/RFE Items 7701/53, mf 26. 
180 OSA/RFE Items 11403/51, mf 5. 
181 OSA/RFE Items 1209/54, mf 34, p. 1, OSA/RFE Items 1315/54, mf 34, OSA/RFE Items 4785/55, mf 
54.  
182 OSA/RFE Items 12232/53, mf 31. 
 76
a Győr black-marketeer who escaped in 1953, this illicit trade was conducted with little 
interference from the authorities.  He usually resold his goods locally, but would 
sometimes take them on the train to deal in Budapest.183  The Soviet-based black market 
in the capital was more closely monitored. Although the railroad stations themselves 
were heavily policed by plainclothes detectives, deal-making went on at a frenetic pace 
outside the immediate environs of the station.  One enthusiastic young interviewee—an 
ex-antiaircraft gunner, who escaped in 1955 with his brother—recalled that he and his 
partner would generally pick up a Soviet soldier in a taxi and then conduct their business 
in the back seat while driving around Budapest: even though they had to cut the driver in 
for a share of the profits, and moved the goods directly to a fence rather than trying to 
resell them themselves, they still made profits of 50 to 300% on goods ranging from 
chocolate to nylons to cameras.184  Other sources echo the central role of Soviet soldiers 
in the black economy; according to one RFE monitor writing in 1954, the activities of 
these soldiers “has become almost an institution of the current Hungarian economic 
condition.”185  This was a short-lived bonanza, as it ended in 1955 when the Red Army 
withdrew from Austria.186 
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Packages sent by private individuals and foreign aid organizations also provided 
an indirect source of products for resale on the black market.  The communist 
government did not halt all private exchanges between East and West; although parcels 
and letters were examined en route, familial and interpersonal connections spanned the 
Iron Curtain.187  Hungarians were allowed to receive parcels via a state distribution 
agency, IKKA; the contents of these parcels ranged from foodstuffs to clothing to fashion 
magazines. Goods from the West were in high demand:   
 
I was able to dress exclusively from the packages I received from abroad, 
especially from the United States from my cousin.  If there was something 
I couldn’t use, I could always sell it in the office and among friends.  
People were very eager to buy anything that came from abroad.188 
 
Over and above these interpersonal connections, foreign aid organizations also abetted 
illicit exchange in Hungary.  Perhaps the most important organization in this regard was 
the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (the JDC, or Joint).  Founded in 1914, 
the New York-based JDC had vastly expanded its operations in Eastern Europe after the 
end of World War II.  By 1948, its operations in Hungary accounted for over a quarter of 
its expenditures, or $8.4 million; although this aid decreased over time, it still amounted 
to $2.2 million in 1952.189  This money was devoted to channeling funds and supplies to 
Jewish organizations in Hungary, to individual aid packages for those Jews remaining in 
Hungary, and also to expediting the emigration of Jews to Israel.  The Joint was allowed 
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to operate in Hungary up until 1953; even after its exclusion from the country in January 
of that year, the JDC was able to continue channeling funds to Hungarian Jews via an 
intermediary Switzerland-based organization.190  As IKKA offices were regularly 
haunted by black-marketeers,191 it is likely that both JDC aid and the contents of 
individually-sent packages swiftly found their way onto the black market.  In these 
manners, outside sources of goods rendered the regime unable to entirely cement its 
control over the economy/  This flow of goods from west to east was matched by a flow 
of people in the opposite direction.  
Many of Rákosi’s unwilling subjects voted with their feet.  Just as the illicit 
economy resolutely resisted centralized control, so did the minefields, barbed-wire 
fences, and watchtowers that made up the Iron Curtain fail in their intended prophylaxis.   
The exact number of illegal emigrants during this period is impossible to determine.  
Although Tibor Valuch cites a figure of 100,000 and 110,000 people who left the country 
in the years 1945 to 1953, he does not distinguish between legal and illegal emigration.192  
Interestingly enough, attempts to illegally cross the border actually increase in late 
1953.193  The most likely explanation for this phenomenon is a surge of border-crossers 
who were now less concerned about possible repercussions for their families, and a spate 
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of freshly-amnestied ex-convicts who made it their first priority to get out for good.194  
The numbers only increased during Rákosi’s 1955 return to power.  In that year, there 
were 1104 Magyars convicted for attempting or planning to cross the border illegally.  
Their salient characteristics are as follows:   
 
1. A vast majority (874, or 80%) were under the age of 30.  
2. Over 67% were of worker or peasant class origin. 
3. Just over 60% of them were heading to Austria. 
4. Most had no political allegiance, although 60 were currently or had 
been in the MDP, and another 212 had been in the DISz.  
5. Their recorded motives were: 
Swayed by enemy propaganda    27 
Fleeing prosecution for a crime    115 
Adventure-seeking or wanderlust (kalandvágyból)  548 
Smuggling       74 
Family reasons      258 
Evading military service     5 
Other reasons       77 
 
Moreover, almost three-fourths were arrested planning their escape; only 298 were 
actually arrested in the border zone.195  It is impossible to determine how representative 
this sample is, what percentage of actual escapees they represent, or how much the 
border-crossers were able to conceal their real motives, goals, or destinations.  This 
particular transcript is very well hidden indeed.   
Fortunately, the Radio Free Europe interviewers often asked their interviewees 
about their escapes as well as their lives in Hungary.  They also interviewed a number of 
border guards who fled, and even a few border guides.  Their reports of conditions at the 
border reveal that crossing over was indeed a risky undertaking.  Cash awards and leave 
                                                 
194 State Security Historical Archive (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára, or ABTL) 1.11.9. 
 80
were offered to guards who caught escapees.  Border guards were also told that even if 
escapees had made it to Austrian soil, they were to shoot them and then drag the bodies 
back across the border.196  One woman lost her husband in the Danube; an engaged 
couple barely escaped in a hail of bullets.  Stories such as these are common.197   
However, most of the escape stories also suggest that the same systemic malfunctions 
that pervaded the rest of the legal apparatus were in equal effect at the border.  
Border fortifications were not well maintained, and border guard units not well 
organized.  Coupled with the fact that border guards (albeit a branch of the ÁVH) were as 
poorly-paid as policemen, this led to oversights and mishaps both deliberate and 
accidental.  A 1952 escapee, a technician at the Szentpéterfa power station, recounted that 
the guards in that border district had let the minefields and barbed-wire fences fall into 
disrepair; they often turned a blind eye to escapees, listened to western broadcasts, and 
shot fowl on duty to sell to local villagers.   A Hegyeshalom border guard who escaped in 
1955 reported that his unit seldom knew its orders until just before they went on duty, 
large stretches of the border were left unpatrolled, discipline was slack, and absenteeism 
high.  As a consequence, few border-crossers were caught.198 The border at Gasztony 
seems to have been particularly poorly-run: guards would sleep or play cards while on 
duty during the winter, officers would seldom check on them, and excess food was traded 
to villagers on a regular basis.  In many places the barbed wire lay on the ground, and the 
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minefield was so harmless that the post’s guard dogs would “play, gambol, and roll 
around” in it “like bad children.”  This guard recounted that his unit caught only one 
escapee in a six-month period.199  Although this was the most extreme account of 
negligence in the archives, many of them tell similar stories: border obstacles in disrepair, 
inefficient operation of the border posts, dealing on the sly with local villagers.  
 As a result, several of the personal accounts of escape in the Radio Free Europe 
archives are curiously dull.  Although most escapees went solo or in pairs, more difficult 
crossings were not unusual.  A 17-year old cripple made his way across the border into 
Yugoslavia in 1953, and thence into Austria in 1954.   Entire families were able to cross 
illegally into Austria without mishap.  A lawyer from Vamosgyork had little difficulty 
getting across the border with his wife and daughter in 1953.  One man—who, according 
to his RFE interviewer, “might better be described as a commuter,” crossed and recrossed 
the border three times between 1947 and 1956.  On the second occasion in 1950, he 
brought out his pregnant wife and daughter.  They re-defected to Hungary, but were 
subject to intense harassment by the regime.  They decided to escape again, and did so in 
January 1956; on his last trip, he brought out his wife and both children as well as two 
other families. According to another young man from Szombathely, he and his 
companion practically strolled across the border; they saw nobody guarding the obstacles 
at the border, and crossing into Austria “was like going across the street.”200  Perhaps the 
best escape story in the Radio Free Europe archives—one that begs recapitulation, and  
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one that also illustrates the manner in which these interstitial, marginal, and border 
weaknesses compounded and fed off each other—is that of four men who fled together in 
December 1955. 
 They all worked for the state trucking company, and were lucky enough to be 
assigned together to duty in the border zone near Szombathely.  Having examined the 
border obstacles in the course of their work, they resolved to steal one of the firm’s 3½-
ton trucks, armor the sides and bottom with 8mm steel plate, and drive it through the 
minefield.  Having made the necessary alterations to the truck (with materiel either 
heisted from work or acquired on the black market) they bribed the night watchman of 
the motor pool with a week’s worth of meal vouchers and set out in the early hours of 8 
December 1955.  Although they were stopped by police, they were able to talk their way 
out of trouble.  Despite getting lost at one point, they were soon at the border.  They 
drove headlong most of the way through the border obstacles before a mine disabled the 
truck, and then 
 
They jumped out of the truck with their parcels under their arms and 
jumped into the river Pinka.  The water was only chest-high but the 
current was very strong and they had to swim.  They lost their caps and 
parcels but reached the opposite side safely.  After a few moments’ rest, 
they saw red and white signals flashing through the night on the 











Their clothing and hair were frozen stiff.  After two hours of wandering, 
they reached a road which led them to Nemetlovo after a short walk.  
There, they knocked on the window of one of the houses.  Here, visitors 
arriving at uncommon hours were common.  They did not have to say 
anything; the occupants of the house knew what their visitors were.  Their 
host greeted them in Hungarian, which added to their joy: they had found 
someone to tell their tale to.  After a hot breakfast, in dry underclothing 
and wrapped in warm blankets, they rested for awhile….  Their 65-year-
old host insisted on taking them to the road, to keep them from getting lost 
and returning to Hungary by mistake.201    
   
 
The story sounds fantastic.  However, independent confirmation is available: their arrival 
in Austria was widely reported in the press (they were denied political asylum, and their 
future exploits are unknown),202 and the armored truck, as it turned out, was taken to a 
Szombathely repair shop shortly after the incident.  A mechanic at this shop, who escaped 
in March 1956 himself, recalled seeing the truck and recounted its impact on his 
coworkers to his RFE interviewer:   
  
The workers really liked it, and talked about it to each other nonstop.  The 
source recalled someone saying “Now that’s a progressive work method!” 
(Na ez aztán a haladó munkamódszer!)203 
   
At some irreducible level this success story is due to ingenuity and pure dumb 
luck.  However, it was also made possible by poorly-guarded trucks and materiel, readily-
bribable night watchmen, bad police work, and shoddy border controls—all characteristic 
features of the communist system.  The communist regime failed not only at the border, 
but also in the offices, the courts, the factories, and the markets.  Fleeing communist 
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Hungary was not easy—but then neither was staying.  Both options were greatly aided by 
the various shortcomings of the system detailed above.  
 
* * * 
 
The effects of communism in Hungary were not simply those of a foreign 
ideology forced upon a recalcitrant society. Its high-modernist ideology readily seized 
upon nascent trends already present in the Hungarian political and economic system.  A 
tendency towards centralization and a drive to catch up to the industrialized West had 
been apparent since the nineteenth century, and it persisted during the interwar, wartime, 
and immediate postwar periods.  The distinctive features of the communist system 
imposed after 1948 were the frenetic pace with which it set about accomplishing these 
high-modernist goals, and its instrumental use, or abuse, of the legal system to 
accomplish these ends. 
The industrialization and urbanization of the country would have generated a 
certain degree of resentment and antipathy regardless of the specific content of its 
guiding ideology.  Modernization forces people into new modes of social and economic 
interaction, and some degree of conflict invariably ensues.  However, in the Hungarian 
case, these underlying tensions were channeled into anti-regime sentiment.  Rákosi and 
the MDP sped the pace of development well past what they could safely control, and the 
regime rightly took the blame for the hardships suffered in the pell-mell dash to 
modernity.  By mid-1952, the system had generated a remarkable amount of antipathy.  
The New Course after Stalin’s death ameliorated but did not evaporate this resentment, 
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and the halfhearted return to doctrinaire stalinism after 1955 only whetted the popular 
appetite for change.   
Resentment engendered resistance, and this resistance took many forms. The 
high-modernist scheme in Hungary foundered on over-planning and desperate stopgap 
measures to make up for unwanted repercussions.  The result was a chaotic mess of 
contradictory and impossible directives, quotas, and plans.  This enabled many to work 
the system for their own benefit.  The police and courts were not immune to these 
dysfunctional tendencies, as personal interests often interfered with the smooth 
functioning of the legal administration.  Workers at all levels of the labor hierarchy—
from technocrats to pipe-fitters—were often able to cover their tracks in the blizzard of 
facts, figures, and falsehoods that buffeted the administration.   Falsifying the plan, 
stealing from work, and doing “black work” on the company clock were all ubiquitous.  
These criminal acts were committed not only for personal benefit but also as resistance, 
in a deliberate attempt to sabotage the workings of the state: ten forints at a time.   
The regime was also unable to successfully force its diktat past the margins of its 
authority or patrol its borders efficiently.  The economy of scarcity provoked by 
communism provoked in turn a return to wartime practices of illicit exchange.  The black 
market swiftly regained its wartime preeminence; now, however, its web spread beyond 
the borders of Hungary.  The state proved as unable to subdue its operations as it was 
impotent to halt the steady hemorrhage of escapees to the west.  
The result of these intrinsic and systemic weaknesses was that by early 1956, even 
the party-state’s Western monitors had become aware of the substratum of discontent 
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underlying the apparent tectonic rigidity of the communist system.  According to an 
intelligence survey commissioned by U.S. Army Intelligence,  
  
Passive resistance in Hungary is perhaps more common than in any other 
European satellite.  There are indications that this kind of resistance has 
grown in intensity since the Communist coup in 1948.  The abandonment 
of the ‘new course’ in early 1955 was partially responsible for this growth, 
and the predictable failure of the regime to achieve economic stability 
under a stricter program will probably continue to stimulate it.”204 
 
These forms of “passive” resistance—workplace theft, dissimulation, blackmarketeering, 
and so on—were difficult but not impossible in the urban centers of communist Hungary.  
As we shall see in the following chapter, they were given much fuller rein in the 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF FEKETEVÁGÓ UR 
In February of 1955, a recent escapee from Hungary was interviewed at length by 
a Radio Free Europe staffer.  The informant, János S., had fled Hungary for fear of being 
arrested and interrogated by the secret police; however, this was not due to any 
conspiracy or overt anti-regime activity on his part.  In the course of his interview, it 
came to light that 
 
János couldn’t complain about his livelihood ….  Every month he brought 
home 3000 to 4000 forints.  How was this possible?  He perpetually had 
one foot in prison because of his illegal slaughtering [here fekete vágás; 
more commonly feketevágás].    It was common knowledge that the 
penalty for illegally slaughtering one calf was six months in prison; as 
János did it regularly, he opined that he would be sent up for no less than 
five years if caught.…  János was well known among the population of the 
countryside for his illegal slaughtering and meat selling.  When a farmer 
had a cow ready to calve, he would call around: “you may sharpen your 
knife in two weeks, János.” – “Okay, bring it at night, when it’s born” – 
was the response.  The illegal slaughter took place at night, and János 
would be distributing the meat by daybreak.205 
 
 According to János, he had cornered the meat market in his small town; he 
numbered among his customers the wives of the local party secretary and collective farm 
president, the local ÁVH lieutentant and two of his informers, and the two local priests.  
János’s income from feketevágás and other illicit activities may have been over twice 
what a skilled worker could expect to make at that time; his ÁVH customer jokingly 
addressed him by the mock-honorific nickname of ‘feketevágó ur,’ or ‘Sir Pig-killer.’206  
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Although János’s experience was almost certainly atypical, it illumines the broad range 
of criminal activity and unregulated exchange that was possible even during this most 
oppressive period of communist rule in Hungary.  
Although the literature on collectivization in Hungary is extensive,207 peasant 
resistance in Hungary has attracted much less attention; moreover, major contributions in 
the theoretical literature on peasant resistance—especially regarding everyday resistance, 
as is our concern herein—have not yet been applied to the Hungarian context.  In the 
past, many scholars have taken the absence of any significant open resistance—in the 
form of riots, strikes, or other direct confrontation—to mean that there was no real 
opposition to communist rule in the countryside.  This apparent quiescence of the Magyar 
peasantry is misleading.   The subversion of the party-state’s designs apparent in Chapter 
1 was carried to its fullest realization in the villages, fields, and byways of communist 
Hungary.  The result was a turbulent history of antagonism and resistance in which the 
peasantry was consistently able to work the system to minimal disadvantage.  
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Tensions between nobles and peasants, between villagers of differing status, and 
between country and city antedate the inauguration of Communist rule by centuries.  
Prior to World War II, the lives of peasants in Hungary (as throughout much of Eastern 
Europe) were nasty, brutish, and short.  Throughout this period, their perennial desire—
for control of their own land and sovereignty over their labor—was achieved only by a 
minority, who were regarded with envy by the rest.  Noble landlords were widely disliked 
by all segments of the rural populace. For most Magyar peasants, the most important 
event of the postwar period was the 1945-47 land reform: for literally the first time ever, 
many were granted the land they desired and the autonomy to farm it as they chose.  We 
must view collectivization in this light: not merely as a new intrusion by the state, but as 
one that revoked the single most important act since 1848, when the serfs were freed. 
Although some peasants in Rákosi’s Hungary benefited from the regime’s policies, most 
regarded them as unwelcome intrusions and reacted accordingly.  As a result, 
collectivization enjoyed only dubious success even at the height of the collectivization 
drive in early 1953.   
Rural resistance to communist rule was founded in both historic practices and 
innovative responses to the intrusive party-state.  Work-shirking, refusal to meet 
compulsory deliveries, and other forms of passive resistance confounded the regime’s 
efforts to control agricultural production at every turn. Wood theft, a perennial form of 
peasant resistance, was practiced assiduously throughout the period.  Pig-killing, 
previously a legal and well-established custom, was criminalized but also continued 
regardless.  The irony apparent in both of these forms of resistance was that their 
products—illegally-procured wood and meat—found their way onto the black market.  In 
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this regard the socialist scheme of centralizing the economy actually backfired.  The 
regime’s agricultural policy actually encouraged a hypercapitalist mindset among its rural 
subjects, and the products of these illicit activities became commodified as they had not 
been under the interwar capitalist regime.  
 
The Hungarian Peasantry and Land Reform 
 
 
The apparent calm of the Hungarian countryside before World War II masked 
significant animosities between peasants and landlords, between differing strata of 
peasants themselves, and between the country and the city.  The prewar Hungarian 
countryside was dominated by latifundia or large estates.   The abolition of serfdom in 
1848 had done little to erode noble privilege on the ground: many former serfs became 
(landless) manorial workers, and many new landowners lacked the skills and capital to 
manage their land grants effectively.  Indeed, the effects of the April Laws of 1848 were 
similar to those of the Enclosure Acts in Britain, as the landed aristocracy was able to 
appropriate many important former commonly-held areas (pastures and forests, ponds 
and streams) even as it retained its monopoly on milling and other key intermediary 
economic processes.208  Noble hegemony in agricultural production was keenly resented 
by most peasants, especially those whose poverty left them no other option than manorial 
labor.  These manorial workers surrendered their independence in return for one-year 
                                                 
208 Lampland, Object of Labor, p. 104. 
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renewable contracts at the whim of the landlord.209  However, these noble-peasant 
conflicts were only the tip of the iceberg of submerged village animosities. 
The rural socioeconomic hierarchy in pre-Communist Hungary was clearly 
defined.  It was contingent on how much land one owned, and to what extent one was 
master of one’s own labor. The inequalities caused by the uneven distribution of these 
elements were drastic, and they tended to reproduce inequality in turn.  The minimum 
area necessary to support a peasant family was between 5 and 10 holds (katasztrális hold, 
or kh); a farm of 20 holds or more generally indicated a well-off farmer, who would hire 
help at harvest time.210  The rich peasant (nagygazda), who owned 20 kh or more, might 
receive up to 800 days of free labor annually from his neighbors in reciprocation for the 
loan of his horse and plow.  This was the highest rung on the peasant social ladder, but 
only 7% of the peasant population enjoyed this relatively comfortable existence.  Middle 
peasants, who owned from 5 to 20 holds and made up 23% of the peasantry, were 
generally able to scrape by from one winter to the next.  The vast majority of Magyar 
peasants owned less than 5 holds; 46% owned no land at all.211  Migrant workers and day 
laborers occupied the bottom rung on the rural social ladder, from which it was almost 
                                                 
209 As Lampland notes, “the phrase used to convey the act of contracting at the manor as a worker 
(cselédnek ment or elment cselédnek), an act undertaken most often in desperation, was analogous to the 
phrase used to describe a man moving to his wife’s house at marriage.”  Object of Labor, p. 73 
210  The cadastral hold was the standard unit of land measurement in Hungary after 1851; it measured 1.42 
acres, or .57 hectares.  The minimum viable area for peasant subsistence is a matter of some debate among 
historians of Hungarian agriculture, and it varied by region.  Bell (Peasants in Socialist Transition, p. 29), 
Lampland (Object of Labor, p. 38), and Romsics (p. 162) all concur on the 5-10 hold minimum.    This 
minimum viable area was higher on the Alföld, where extensive cereal crops were the norm:  Fél and Hofer 
suggest 15-20 holds per family in the village of Átány (Proper Peasants, p. 56), and Bodó suggests a 
minimum area of 10 hold for subsistence and 20 for any sort of capital accumulation for Nagyrév (p. 141).  
Held’s estimate—that 14-52 holds were necessary to maintain “a relatively secure existence” (The 
Modernization of Agriculture, p. 300)—seems high.  The Columbia researchers who compiled the CUHRP 
interviews held that 1 hectare would feed one person for one year, which is probably an adequate country-
wide generalization.  CUHRP, Subject Files: “Minutes of the Seminars,” 17 March 1958, Box 29, p. 2.    
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impossible to ascend into solvency, much less respectability.   This social stratification 
was partially ameliorated by “an elaborate network of reciprocal ties”—in which farm 
equipment, labor, and even spices and kitchen utensils were regularly traded, borrowed, 
and loaned between peasant families.212  Manorial workers were excluded even from this 
scant support network, and were looked down upon by the “proper peasants” of the 
village.  This rigid rural social hierarchy remained largely unaltered until after World 
War II.      
Throughout the period 1848 to 1945, what few changes occurred in this basic 
structure were largely to the peasantry’s disadvantage.  Some members of the richer 
peasantry were able to cash in during the rash of land sales during the 1860s and 1870s; 
they also benefited in the period just after World War 1, as high agricultural prices 
coupled with runaway inflation eased the repayment of prewar loans.  However, most 
peasants were unable to beat the system.  Outright peasant rebellion was infrequent, 
although the late nineteenth century did witness a harvester’s strike in 1897 followed the 
next year by widespread rioting and land seizure in the northeastern districts.213  Due to 
their prohibitive cost, new farming technologies were only gradually adopted, and then 
generally only on manorial farms; the introduction of mechanical harvesters was actively 
discouraged by the Agricultural Ministry, which sought to keep as many peasants as 
possible employed on the land as a means of social control.214  The Depression resulted 
                                                                                                                                                 
211 Romsics, p. 162.  
212 On this point see especially Fél and Hofer, Proper Peasants, pp. 174-176. 
213 Peter F. Sugar, Péter Hanák, and Tibor Frank, editors, A History of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1994), p. 271.  
214 Lampland, Object of Labor, p. 64. 
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in thousands of foreclosures and widespread poverty for those who remained in the 
countryside, exacerbating the preexisting tensions in the rural socioeconomic hierarchy. 
  The third axis of prewar antipathy was between city and country.  In the rural 
mentality, Budapest (and to a lesser degree the other cities of Hungary) loomed large as 
the locus of both danger and temptation.  The encroachment of capital, bureaucrats, and 
ideas from Budapest threatened both the peasant’s economic stability and his traditional 
way of life.  The tax structure, designed by and for the urban middle class and nobility, 
was profoundly regressive: by the interwar period, smallholders paid from three to five 
times as much per hold as their richer urban counterparts.215 There was neither love lost 
nor trust wasted on the government itself: as Andrew Janos asserts, “Parliament was, at 
best, a distant place where educated people conducted their own business at the expense 
of the peasantry.”216  However, Budapest also beckoned with the promise of year-round 
employment at wage labor, modern commodities, education and electric light, cinemas 
and theaters, cafés and department stores, indoor plumbing, and all the other trappings of 
modernity.   As modernity equaled debauchery in the peasant mentality, Budapest’s 
threat was also couched in moral terms, as demonstrated by the response of the family of 
Gyula Illyés (1902-1983) when his father quit his job and started planning a move to 
Budapest:  
 
                                                 
215 Bodó, Tiszazug, p. 139. 
216 Janos, Politics of Backwardness, p. 241. 
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My father’s relatives received his plans with astonishment; they were 
scared and horrified of Budapest, which to them was a sink of iniquity.  
They would much rather have borne the shame of my father sinking to the 
level of a swineherd at home than his becoming a factory worker. They 
would sooner have agreed to his moving to America than Újpest.  And 
they were quite right: one could return from America, but never from 
Újpest.”217   
 
 
Both destinations were popular among the agrarian poor, at least until the end of World 
War I.  The population of Budapest tripled between 1869 and 1913; in the same period 
more than 1.5 million people emigrated from (Greater) Hungary to the United States.218  
After World War I, American immigration was drastically curtailed and Budapest 
became the primary destination for peasants fleeing the countryside.  By 1941, its 
population had reached 1.165 million, primarily via interior migration rather than natural 
increase.219  However, those that fled the countryside for the USA or Budapest were the 
exceptions to the norm.  
Those who remained on the land continued as before.  The interwar period saw 
the continued impoverishment of the peasantry, fuelling the popular conception of 
Hungary as “the land of three million beggars.”220  Although there was a half-hearted 
attempt at land reform in 1920, it accomplished very little.  In 1935, just over 72% of the 
1,634,407 landowners in Hungary still owned 5 holds or less; the richest 1070 
landowners controlled 29% of the land, averaging 4,494 kh apiece. The wealthiest noble 
                                                 
217 Gyula Illyés (G.F. Cushing, translator), People of the Puszta (Budapest: Corvina, 1967), pp. 280-281. 
218 Note that this number is for the entire eastern half of the Austro-Hungarian empire; many of these 
emigrants were Slovaks and Ruthenians (ethnic Ukrainians) from poverty-stricken farming regions, whose 
rate of return—over 40% for the period before WWI—was also higher than ethnic Magyar emigrants.  
Tibor Frank, Ethnicity, Propaganda, Myth-making: Studies on Hungarian Connections to Britain and 
America (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1999), pp. 79, 85. 
219 András Gerő and János Poór, editors, Budapest: A History from its Beginnings to 1998 (Boulder: Social 
Science Monographs, 1997), pp. 104, 140, 142;  
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families controlled 50,000 kh or more; the largest single landholder was the Catholic 
Church, which held 1.2 million kh (685,000 hectares).221   As throughout Central Europe, 
the popular demand in Hungary for drastic land reform grew steadily throughout this 
period.  By World War II, widespread poverty, resentment of the nobility, and a rigid 
social hierarchy all provided a widespread impetus for change—and also rural 
animosities the Communist Party might be able to play upon to its advantage.   
 Although World War II left the Hungarian countryside in ruins, it also swept 
away the old governing elite and nobility.  The postwar coalition government began 
planning a major land reform even before Hungary was entirely out of the war.  It was 
carried out in a haphazard manner between 1945 and 1947. The vast landholdings of the 
church and nobility were the primary targets of redistribution; the agrarian poor, the 
primary beneficiaries.  Over one third of the total area of Hungary (5.6 million holds) was 
redistributed; fully 93% of the individuals receiving land were previously landowners of 
5 holds or less.  However, the equitability of the land reform on paper was marred by its 
practice on the ground.  The availability of expropriated land varied by region, and not 





                                                                                                                                                 
220 The term was coined by the right-wing populist Oláh György in the 1920s. 
221 Lampland, Object of Labor, p. 40.  The largest single owners were the Eszterhazy family, who 
controlled 207,000 kh (294,000 acres); the Habsburg family possessions amounted to almost 70,400 kh 
(100,000 acres), and various other noble families (e.g., Festetics, Pallavicini) were all well above the 
50,000 kh mark.  Held, Modernization of Agriculture, pp. 234-235.      
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Many returning prisoners-of-war and Hungarian refugees from neighboring countries 
were excluded, as were Roma.223   The distribution of property at the local level was 
heavily determined by kinship and other extralegal ties, leading to charges of nepotism 
and bribery.  Despite all these shortcomings, the land reform was a largely-successful 
exercise in leveling the rural social hierarchy—while it lasted.  
Although individual farming is antithetical to socialism in its Soviet variant, the 
Party supported land reform at this time.  Much like their counterparts throughout Eastern 
Europe, communist agitators went along with the popular demand for land redistribution 
                                                 
222 from Romsics, p. 228. 
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in hopes of gaining rural support.224  This pragmatic strategy for Eastern Europe was 
based not only on the immediate postwar political context of coalition government but 
also on the historical lesson learned during the Russian Civil War (1918-1922).  At that 
time, the Bolsheviks had encouraged peasants to seize noble lands in order to gain their 
support against the White Armies.  This had proven a key measure in their eventual 
victory, and collectivization had been delayed for almost a decade.225  Hungary also 
offered a striking example of how not to reform agricultural production:  In 1919, Béla 
Kun had made the mistake of insisting on immediate collectivization, thereby losing the 
support of the peasants of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Republic.226  His postwar 
counterparts throughout Eastern Europe had learned their lesson, and bided their time.   
However, as Joseph Held notes, by supporting land reform the party  “destroyed much of 
its own base of support among the agrarian poor; by giving them land, they were turned 
into champions of private ownership.”227  This hands-off policy lasted only as long as it 
took the Party to seize control.  The collectivization drive began in earnest on 20 August 








                                                                                                                                                 
223 Lampland, Object of Labor, pp. 119, 121. 
224 Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, p. 20. 
225 Ronald Suny, The Soviet Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 88-93. 
226 Berend, Decades of Crisis, p. 128. 
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Collectivization and Rural Crime 
 
 
The collectivization of agriculture was one of the key doctrines of communist 
rule.  Large agricultural enterprises owned and controlled by the state promised control 
over both agricultural production and the rural population, and the surplus labor freed up 
by the mechanization of agriculture could then be channeled into the ranks of the urban 
proletariat.  Although Marx had articulated this need for agricultural “industrial armies” 
and “the combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries” in his Communist 
Manifesto in 1848, the precise methods of this transposition of socialist organization from 
industry to agriculture had remained inchoate until the late 1920s.  The Soviet example is 
instructive.  After a severe grain shortage in late 1927, the USSR resorted to forcible 
requisitioning of grain from its peasantry;  then, in November 1929, the decision was 
made to collectivize the entire country into large, rationalized, and legible agricultural 
units.  Flying squads of activists and police descended on the villages; millions of 
peasants lost their land and were deported to Siberia and Central Asia; many millions 
more died in the man-made famine that followed, especially in Ukraine.  Collectivization 
in Hungary and throughout Eastern Europe after World War II was carried out with the 
same strong-arm tactics: it was “a virtual civil war between state and peasantry…in 
which the front was the village and the shock troops an embattled and unpopular minority 
of local officials and peasant activists who had gone over to the other side.”228   From 
1948 to mid-1953, and again from early 1955 to mid-1956, the primary goal of the 
communist regime in the countryside was to coerce Hungarian peasants off their private 
                                                 
228 Lynn Viola, Peasant Rebels Under Stalin, pp. 235, 114.  
 99
farms and into state and collective farms (termelőszövetkezeti csoportok, or tszcs-k).229  
Its success was equivocal.  
Collectivization was not entirely unpopular.   The collective farm promised 
regular employment year-round, bonuses for exceeding production quotas, and even sign-
on bonuses.  Even after the land reform, 1.4 million peasants and their families remained 
on untenable holdings of 5 holds or less.  Former manorial workers, accustomed as they 
were to niche roles in large-scale manorial agricultural production, lacked the skills and 
knowledge to successfully run a small farm.  They also experienced difficulty integrating 
into the peasant hierarchy.  For them, collectivization was a return to predictable incomes 
and stability.230 For poor peasants, it potentially offered a new route of escape from their 
perennially-destitute status.  Over and above the peasantry’s immediate economic 
concerns, the rhetoric of egalitarian, communal activity doubtless appealed to many 
idealists; the chance to settle old scores doubtless appealed to many opportunists.  
However, for most peasants—for whom the desire to own their own land and control 
their own labor was a central element of their identity—joining the tszcs was an 
abhorrent, last-ditch decision.  To many, collectivization must have seemed a particularly 
tragic farcical reenactment of a prior tragedy: being forced into unfree labor on a 
                                                 
229 There were three gradations of collective organization in Hungary, ranging from sharing only tools to 
the complete assimilation of one’s goods and land into the communal pool; see Lampland, Object of Labor, 
pp. 145, 188, for a more detailed explanation of these differences.  As Romsics notes (p. 278), both state 
and collective farms were directly subordinate to the National Planning Office, and the distinctions between 
these categories are therefore largely formal for our purposes.   
230 Bell, Peasants in Socialist Transition, pp. 101-106, Lampland, Object of Labor, pp. 149-150.  
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manorial farm different only in name.231   This, coupled with the historic animosity 
towards Budapest—one that Communist propaganda did little to assuage—made most 
peasants wary of joining the tszcs. 
The state adopted a number of strategies to coerce them into the collectives.  
Delivery quotas, reestablished in 1946 on a progressive scale, required richer peasants to 
yield a much greater percentage of their produce to the state than their poorer 
neighbors.232  Taxes on private farms were also revised drastically upwards, trebling 
between 1949 and 1953.233  The communist regime imported the concept of the “kulak” 
(kulák in Hungarian), or the rich peasant who exploits his poorer compatriots, from its 
Soviet context relatively unchanged.234  In an effort to bring the poor peasantry over to 
the side of the Party, regime propaganda demonized kulaks as rentiers, parasites, and 
holdovers from the bourgeois past.  Kulaks were singled out by legal administration for 
persecution, expropriation, and internment. In Hungary, any peasant who owned more 
than 25 holds (14.25 hectares) of land fell into this category.  However, as in the USSR, 
this standard was applied unfairly:  relatives of party members and other locals with good 
connections often found themselves in much less danger of being labeled a kulak than 
                                                 
231 “As peasants were forced to join the kolkhozes in Hungary they were allowed to keep one hold, slightly 
more than one acre, of land under family cultivation.  This was exactly the amount of land to which 
manorial laborers on the large estates before word War II were entitled.  There were many other parallels. 
…  [there were] several kolkhozes which occupied exactly the land of the former estate. … This historical 
continuity did not escape the attention of former villagers either. … one of our respondents told us about 
his experiences in the kolkhoz: “We are manorial laborers on extended service” (“Tovább szolgálo cselédek 
vagyunk.”).  He knew what he was talking about.  Before the war, as a young man, he had been the carriage 
driver for local landlords … later, he drove wagons for the kolkhoz.”  Szelényi, Socialist Entrepreneurs, p. 
21. Lampland encountered a slightly different form of the aphorism, “Tovább szegödö cseléd” or “rehired 
manorial worker,” during her fieldwork in Sárosd (Object of Labor, p. 150). 
232 On this point see Lampland, Object of Labor, pp. 141-144. 
233 Romsics, p. 277. 
234 See Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1975), pp. 490-491. 
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their less-favored neighbors, regardless of the size of their holdings.  Over 140,000 holds 
of rented land were seized outright from kulaks in September 1948; the “kulak list” 
included some 71,600 families altogether.235  When all else failed, ÁVH troops and 
népnevelők would descend on the villages and bully peasants into signing over their 
property, tools, livestock and labor to the newly-established collective farm.   
This inchoate “virtual civil war” between the state and the peasantry took concrete 
form in the courtroom.  Open, public opposition—in the form of strikes, riots, or 
demonstrations—was futile and foolhardy, and very few cases of this type occurred 
throughout this period. Arson was a different story.  Burning something to the ground—a 
freshly-harvested crop on collective land, an unguarded harvester or other piece of farm 
machinery, or even the house of a particularly-disliked official—could be done covertly 
at night.  It was a safer means of attacking to the regime, and Magyar peasants practiced 
it assiduously.  Nationwide, 12,649 arson cases were investigated in the period 1951 to 
1955.  At the peak of repression in 1952, there were 4539 arson incidents investigated, or 
an average of roughly twelve fires per day.236  Although the assault of administration and 
party officials was one crime that would invite close investigation by the regime, it was 
still not uncommon.  Increased attacks on collections officers and other agents of the state 
were probably the primary reason for the creation of a new category of crimes, “assaults 
on agents of the state,” in 1952; at this time, crimes of this type averaged over seven per 
day.237  Indeed, by the end of the year there was “a critical shortage” of collections 
officers, as they stole away from their positions in the local administration to less 
                                                 
235 Swain, p. 42; Balogh, ed., Nehéz Esztendők Krónikája, p. 30. 
236 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (F) / 70 ő.e., p. 314a.   
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dangerous occupations.238  However, arson and assault both involved a fair amount of 
risk.  Avoiding collective labor, cheating on one’s deliveries to the state, and other forms 
of “passive” resistance were much more viable everyday options.   
High-profile crimes like murder or arson aside, the history of rural crime in 
communist Hungary largely boils down to the state’s attempts to extract everything 
possible from the peasants, and the peasants trying to yield as little as possible. During 
the period 1948 to 1950 alone, over 400,000 peasants were put on trial, the majority of 
them for crimes against the public supply.239  The 1951 countrywide report on the trials 
connected with the summer and autumn compulsory delivery campaigns clearly detailed 
the various legal troubles that plagued Magyar peasants.  Almost half of all trials were for 
the failure to deliver pork, chickens, or eggs.  Another quarter was for failing to 
participate in collective harvesting or sowing.  Failing to deliver crop quotas, hoarding 
grain, and illegal trading made up the rest of these crimes.240  Kulaks were 
disproportionately represented on this list, accounting for just over half of all these 
crimes.  They also drew stiffer sentences.  Of the twenty kulaks tried by the Kaposvar 
district court in the autumn of 1950 for not delivering their full quotas, each drew a 1-2 
year sentence.241  One Csongrad kulak found guilty of attempting to hide 3 quintals of 
grain was sentenced to 3 months in prison and a 1000-forint fine, a sentence the assessor 
found “too lenient.”242  Another kulak had failed to bring his tractor to harvest on time.  
                                                                                                                                                 
237 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (F) / 70 ő.e., p. 314a. 
238 Rév, “The Advantages of Being Atomized,” p. 343. 
239  Révai, editor, Törvénytelen Szocializmus, p. 85.  
240 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 14 ő.e., p. 228. 
241 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 2 ő.e., p. 40.   
242 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e., p. 68. 
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He was sentenced to “only” 3 months in prison, a 2000-forint fine, and 5 years exclusion 
from public affairs.243 (In comparison, S.H., an agronomist guilty of the same crime, got 
off with only a 1000-forint fine.244)  As a rule, sentences for working peasants were much 
lower. 
This war waged on the peasantry by the regime suffered from the law of 
diminishing returns.  It soon became apparent that if convictions continued at their 
current pace, it would negatively affect the fulfillment of the plan.   An April 1951 
proposal from the Ministry of Justice to the MDP Central Committee suggested the 
suspension of all sentences under one year for all working peasants who had joined a 
collective farm or worked at a machine-station; the amnesty would extend even to (non-
collective) day-laborers, as long as their crimes were of a non-political nature.245  (The 
archives do not contain a response to this proposal, and there is no record of it being put 
into effect.)   As noted in Chapter 1, matters seem to have come to a head in 1952, when 
regime monitors noted the first signs of mass rural resistance.     
Throughout the entire stalinist period, the “weapons of the weak” utilized by 
Magyar peasants severely hampered the success of the collectivization drive.  By June of 
1953, 5,224 collective farms and cooperatives had been created in Hungary, employing 
376,000 persons and covering 1.62 million hectares, or only about 30% of the total sown 
area in Hungary.246  The total area farmed actually decreased throughout the period, 
                                                 
243 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e., p. 77a.  One quintal equals 100 kilograms. 
244 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., p. 311.  
245 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iű) / 5 ő.e., p. 286.  Crimes specifically defined as ‘political’ by this author 
included weapons-hoarding and illegal border-crossing. 
246  By comparison, collectivization in the USSR began in earnest in 1929; by 1932, 60% of the arable land 
was collectivized, and the rest shortly thereafter.  Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and 
Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 62.  
 104
falling from a prewar high of 5.47 million hectares in 1938 to 5.36 million hectares in 
1953, and 5.19 million hectares in 1956.  Likewise, the total agricultural output stagnated 
throughout the 1950s, surpassing the 1938 standard only twice, in 1951 and 1955.  By 
1952, Hungary—historically one of the major exporters of wheat on the continent—was 
forced to import wheat, a situation that did not change until the 1970s.247  With the 
advent of the reform-oriented New Course in 1953, peasants deserted the collectives in 
droves.  278,000 deserted in the first four months.  Although Rákosi and the other 
hardliners enjoyed some success in reversing that trend after their return to power in 
1955, 1956 again witnessed widespread collective dissolution and abandonment.  
Collectivization was not finally completed until well after the revolution, in 1962.248 In 
short, even on paper collectivization was less than successful. 
On the ground it was chaos.  A 1951 report from Csongrad county discussed the 
collectivization drive at some length.  According to the report, officials were incompetent 
and interdepartmental cooperation was infrequent. 
 
The county council fails to adequately supervise the manner in which the 
district and county committees prepare for the grain deliveries.  This is 
due to the fact that every one of the county committee secretaries is 




                                                 
247 Romsics, pp.277-279, Swain, p. 76.  Note, however, that both 1950 and 1952 were drought years. 
248 Romsics, p. 330. 
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Farms qualified as kulak
Peasant small farms
State and cooperative farms together  
 
The same report found that many work competitions and other collective farm activities 
existed “csak papiron”—only on paper.249  Reports from practically every county in 
Hungary joined this chorus with a similar refrain.  Party membership in the countryside 
was quite low: at one state farm, only 36 of its members were also members of the 
party—and of them, only 13 worked in the field and not the administrative office.250    
Poor pay contributed to a high attrition rate among tszcs workers:  in Mezőtur, three 
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peasants who had signed on as skilled workers promptly left when they found out that 
their pay came out to only 450 forints per month.  The man who had organized the 
collective farm in the first place was among them.251   Poor organization and high 
turnover rates severely hampered the success of the collectivization drive. 
 The rural administration was also particularly vulnerable to the types of interstitial 
machinations described in Chapter 1.  County-level party officials and collective farm 
managers found themselves caught between Budapest’s unrealistic expectations and the 
volatile and difficult local conditions in which they had to operate.  The latter often 
prevailed.  One 1956 émigré, a mechanical engineer at a tractor station near Pecs, 
recalled that “Cheating was commonplace at the tractor station, when it came to fulfilling 
the prescribed norms.” The regular machinery inspections were regularly foiled by the 
members of different tractor stations working together:   
 
Inspectors used to check on the condition of the machinery—[sometimes] 
some of the machines were not repaired so, for the station to protect itself, 
these faulty machines were hidden and another station was contacted for 
the purpose of borrowing repaired machines.  That’s how the production 
of the tractor machine station was put in a favorable light.  Repaired 
machines used to be transferred from tractor station to tractor station, 
preceding the committee of inspectors.252 
 
Another tractor-station administrator, this one an agronomist from the Harkany region, 
recounted the exact same book-keeping legerdemain at his workplace: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
249 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 40 ő.e., pp. 2, 3, 42.  
250 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 423 ő.e., p. 102. 
251 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 40 ő.e., p. 8. 
252 CUHRP Interview 402, Box 13, pp. 28-29. 
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[F]or the periodic inspections of equipment frequently the same machinery 
was borrowed from station to station, the equipment was then returned 
after the inspection.…  Tractor stations all had “black” tractors.  These 
were tractors officially turned in as decrepit, useless equipment but 
actually kept while some junk was handed in to the junkyard.  
 
This latter source also echoed the relatively lax enforcement of the administration’s will: 
“Peasants disregarded work contests, paid their taxes late, evaded compulsory jobs and 
contributions,” and theft from the fields was commonplace.253 The lack of law 
enforcement personnel made laying down the law much more difficult in the countryside.  
Villages of 3000 or fewer souls had no regular police force and were only visited on a 
weekly basis by officers from neighboring larger towns, while towns of up to 15,000 had 
only one or two policemen.254  The ÁVH was also spread thin in the countryside.255   In 
many villages and smaller towns, the party-state’s local representatives consisted of only 
a handful of functionaries and activists.  Over and above whatever sympathies local 
administrators might have had for their local subjects, they were often simply unable to 
enforce the regime’s program.  Thus, as Rév states, 
 
Those [party functionaries] who really cooperated with the peasantry had 
the best chances.  They allowed the peasants to sell their cows on the 
black market and reported the sudden loss of animals in the village; helped 
the peasants falsify their birth certificates so that the population suddenly 
grew old, and those above 65 years of age could qualify for quota 
reductions; shut their eyes when the peasants organized 
pseudocooperatives; tolerated the division of land among family members; 
contributed to hiding animals in the woods or grain under the ground. …  
                                                 
253 CUHRP Interview 406, Box 13, pp. 36-37, 49, 28. 
254 See, e.g., OSA/RFE Items 8670/53, mf 27, OSA/RFE Items 19/54, mf 32, and OSA/RFE Items 
8851/54, mf 44. 
255 Parádi,, editor, A Magyar Rendvédelem Története, p. 144. 
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For the members of the apparatus to survive, the survival methods of the 
producers were indispensable.256 
 
In short, it was the vested interest of everyone involved—both the members of the 
administration and the peasants it supposedly controlled—to resort to subterfuge.  These 
tendencies that pervaded the entire system, as we have seen in Chapter 1, were especially 
prevalent in rural areas.  The intricate webs of illegal activity, workplace theft, and the 
black market pervaded the countryside, as is clearly apparent in János S.’s experience. 
János’s biography recapitulates both the stasis of the interwar period and the 
tumultuous upheavals that followed.257  He was born in 1928, and grew up in the small 
town his family had lived in for two hundred years.  Although most of his family 
remained on the land, two of them tried their luck in the USA: his father worked there 
from 1908 until the outbreak of World War I, and his aunt still lived there in the 1950s. 
His father fought in World War I and then entered business as a livestock buyer and 
dealer in other commodities.  János was just young enough to avoid the draft in World 
War II, and trained as a butcher’s apprentice from 1946 to 1949.  He then drifted to 
Budapest, where he worked a stint in the Mátyás Rákosi ironworks in Csepel.  János 
returned to his hometown in 1951, when he married and began to dabble in the black 
market.  During this time one of his cousins was arrested for black-marketeering, and one 
of his uncles, labeled a kulak despite his legal status as a working peasant (he owned only 
20 holds), was arrested for not fulfilling his delivery quota.  János’s first run-in with the 
                                                 
256 Rév, “The Advantages of Being Atomized,” p. 339.   
257 The following is a summary of the copious biographical data collected by his RFE interviewer in 
OSA/RFE Items 1370/55, mf 50.  János was interviewed on three separate occasions between March and 
May of 1955. 
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state apparatus also occurred in that year, as the local party officials seized half of the 
plot of land left him by his aunt in America.  He swiftly sold off the other half before it 
was expropriated as well.  To avoid the draft, and possibly the unfriendly attention of the 
local authorities, he went to work in the mines in Miskolc.  He ended up serving a few 
months in an ÁVH border unit anyway, but managed to get himself dismissed as unfit for 
service shortly after the advent of the New Course.258  On returning to his small town in 
mid-1953, János was finally able to devote himself to the profitable, and entirely illegal, 
trade in wood and meat.  
 
Wood Theft and Pig-killing  
 
 
Both wood theft and pig-killing had significant but disparate historical precedents.  
All throughout Europe, and well into the nineteenth century, the right to harvest wood 
and other forest resources was a perennial source of conflict between peasants and their 
landlords.  Lords and other landholders sought to arrogate to themselves all uses of 
wooded areas, while peasants appealed to hereditary or customary forest usage rights to 
harvest wood and hunt game.  In England, legal clashes over the right to gather wood and 
hunt in the forests date back at least to the thirteenth century.  By the mid-nineteenth 
century, custom-based peasant claims on common forest resources had been usurped by 
enclosure and capital. The pattern evident here is common throughout Europe: against the 
courts, which regularly ruled in favor of the landholder, “the peasantry and the poor 
employed stealth, a knowledge of every bush and by-way, and the force of numbers.” 
                                                 
258 OSA/RFE Items 1370/55, mf 50, pp. 5-7. 
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Between the two extremes of the rural hierarchy, the “forest-keepers and under-keepers, 
who had long supplemented their petty salaries with perquisites, made inroads into the 
venison, sold off the brushwood and furze, [and] made private arrangements with inn-
keepers and pastry-cooks, butchers and tanners.”259  Similarly, German princes matched 
their innovations in silviculture with an increasingly ruthless prosecution of the peasants 
who infringed on their forest resources.  By 1836, roughly 70% of the 207,000 cases 
brought before Prussian courts were for wood theft and other forest-related offenses; in 
1842, one in every four inhabitants of Baden was convicted of wood theft.260  This 
tension between hereditary, common-usage rights and exclusive landholder forest use 
was apparent in Hungary as well. 
Maria Theresa granted her Magyar peasants forest-use rights in the Urbarial 
Patent of 1767, and even briefly enforced this legal right over the objections of the 
Hungarian nobles.261  However, this period of support lasted only slightly longer than the 
reformist tendencies of Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II.  By the early nineteenth 
century, the legal battle over enclosure and forest use had shifted back in the nobles’ 
favor.  During the 1848-49 revolution, peasants attempted to reassert these traditional 
prerogatives; like the Habsburgs, the revolutionary government responded with 
                                                 
259 E.P. Thomspon, Customs in Common (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 103, 104. 
260 The legal struggle over forest resources was actually one of the major early influences on Karl Marx’s 
intellectual development.  Peter Linebaugh, “Karl Marx, the Theft of Wood, and Working-Class 
Composition: A Contribution to the Current Debate,” Crime and Social Justice (Fall-Winter 1976) pp. 5-
16, p. 13. 
261 Initially the current attorneys-general were tasked with carrying out the Patent.  As they were 
themselves members of the rural nobility and not predisposed to enforce laws that encroached on their 
privileges, Maria Theresa was eventually forced to appoint royal commissioners in order to enforce the 
Patent.  Sugar, et. al., editors, A History of Hungary, p. 153.   
 111
propaganda, arrests, and when those failed, executions.262  By the interwar period, the 
state had entered the lists as a major controller of forest resources; those forested areas 
not already absorbed by the Horthy state were taken over by the coalition government 
during the land reform of 1945-47.  Under the communist regime, Hungarian forests fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of State Farms and Forests (Allami Gazdaságok és 
Erdők Miniszterium, or AGEM).  Wood harvesting was restricted and carefully 
monitored, and forest wardens prowled the forests in pursuit of wood thieves and 
poachers.  According to regime propaganda, these measures were effective deterrents for 
this perennial mode of peasant resistance. 
The accounts of forest-related crime in Magyar Rendőr suggest that the forests 
were closely policed.  One 1949 photographic essay went into some detail about how one 
wood thief was tracked down.  Upon discovering trees missing, the forest warden 
contacted a police patrol.  The police sleuthed around the cut area, eventually finding the 
tracks of a loaded cart pulled by two horses.  Combined with the fact that the type of 
wood stolen was probably intended for use in smoking tobacco rather than firewood, the 
patrol set out to find a farm with both a two-horse cart and a tobacco-smoking shed.  The 
second house they searched—owned by one I. B., a kulak who owned 30 holds—fit both 
criteria, and the discovery of some of the stolen wood there confirmed his guilt.  Under 
interrogation, I.B. revealed that he had stolen the wood in conjunction with his son-in-
law, an ex-gendarme.  Both culprits went to jail and the remaining wood was returned to 
                                                 
262 Istvan Deak, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-49 (London: Phoenix 
Press, 2001), pp. 50, 116-117. 
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the forestry department.263  A 1952 case involved two kulaks who were apprehended in 
the act of cutting wood: although they had forest-clearing permits, further investigation of 
their farm revealed five wagonloads’ worth of illegally-cut wood.264 A poaching story, 
also from 1949, reveals the same predictable trope: the villain is swiftly brought to 
justice, competent and reliable forest wardens are once more the heroes of the day.265 
Throughout, the official line on forest resource-related crimes repeatedly drove home 
these two key themes:  that the usual suspects and most likely culprits were almost 
invariably kulaks, and that AGEM officials, the police, and the courts interacted swiftly 
and efficiently in dispensing justice to these antisocial elements.   
 The archives reveal almost the exact opposite.  A report issued after a 1952 
interior survey of AGEM’s operations lamented the widespread corruption, wage-fraud, 
glossing-over of mistakes, and other deviations that ran rampant among the forest 
ministry workers.  As in the collective farms, party organization in the county- and 
district-level offices was a mess.  In many, the local apparatus was entirely uninvolved in 
AGEM affairs; some regional offices had no party organization at all; even of those that 
did, many failed to even respond to the survey.  It closed with a recommendation to 
monitor ministry activities on at least a quarterly basis.266  A later report, from February 
1956, repeats this refrain: party organization and competence in the county-level offices 
still varied wildly.  It also revealed that the majority of forestry workers knew very little 
about forestry science, or forests in general. The latter report ends with a suggestion for 
                                                 
263 “Fát lopott a kulák,” Magyar Rendőr, 1 October 1949. 
264 “Az erdőirtó kulak,” Magyar Rendőr, 17 May 1952. 
265 “Az orvvadasz,” Magyar Rendőr, 15 December 1949. 
266 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 / 331 ő.e, p. 2. 
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monthly evaluations.267  Albeit primarily a rural phenomenon, it appears that wood-
stealing was also a matter of concern to the urban authorities as well.  The first article to 
draw attention to urban wood theft (from the wooded areas in and around Budapest) ran 
in November 1951.268  The autumn 1954 Budapest police report called attention to wood 
theft, and called for closer coordination with the forestry department as well as joint 
actions by the district investigative forces and the ÁVH.269  Although most stolen wood 
was probably kept for personal use, some of it found its way onto the rural black market. 
János S. became involved in the illicit wood trade.  The winter of 1953-54 was 
brutally cold; there was no place in his village to buy wood legally, and even when 
someone could make the trip to the state store in nearby K. there was often no wood 
available for purchase.  János started scheming well in advance of the 1954-55 winter. 
 
At the start of September 1954, I happened to make the acquaintance of a 
young forester at the P. state forest. …  The young forester seemed like 
quite a regular guy [nagyon rendes embernek látszott], so I broached the 
topic to him.  First I asked him if he wouldn’t like to make a little extra 
money.  The young forester jumped at the opportunity, and went on to tell 
me that he already sold many people wood from the state forest.  He was 
only concerned that nobody learn his name.  The deal was settled, and I 
bought 15 quintals [1.5 tons] of wood from him for 600 forints, which my 
uncle brought home that very night. 
 
As János tells it, this would have been a one-time deal.  However, as the winter 
progressed his friends and acquaintances started approaching him for the scarce 
commodity—and offering cash up front.  He contacted the young forester once more, and  
                                                 
267 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 / 331 ő.e, pp. 3, 5. 
268 “Fatolvajok,” Magyar Rendőr, 24 November 1951. 
269 BFL XXXV. 95. e / 107 ő.e., “Intézkedési terv,” p. 3. 
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the latter was amenable to further dealings.  A mutually-beneficial illicit trade in 
firewood commenced.  The young forester harvested 1.5 tons of wood at a time, for 
which he received 500 forints per load.  János’s uncle—who had access to a truck, 
probably via a state job—would then transport the wood to its destination, for which he 
would receive 100 forints.  János retailed each load at 800 forints, thus making 200 
forints profit per trip. They sold ten truckloads, or 15 tons, of wood in this manner over 
the course of the next few months.270  In this case at least, wood theft was carried out on 
a massive scale, with relative impunity, and with the collusion of a member of the 
organization tasked to patrol precisely this type of deviant behavior.  
Thus, rather than extirpating this perennial mode of peasant resistance, the 
centralized command economy inadvertently encouraged and enabled it.  Prior to 
communist rule, peasants stole wood primarily for their own use, and generally only as 
much as they could carry.  AGEM inadvertently generated the diathesis for illicit 
behavior on the part of its underpaid employees.  The scarcity of firewood generated 
demand.  All that was required was an entrepreneurial middleman to connect the supplier 
with his potential customers.  János filled this role, and made a healthy profit thereby—
but only reluctantly, according to him.  His reluctance is understandable, as dealing in 
wood was a much higher-profile crime, and nowhere near as lucrative, as his main source 
of income: feketevágás, or illegal pig-killing.   
 
                                                 
270 OSA/RFE Items 3534/55, mf 53, pp. 2-3. János did not reveal the name of his source to his RFE 
interviewer either. 
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Illegal slaughter might seem an odd practice to interrogate for signs of peasant 
resistance; however, the pig occupies a central position in the cultural and culinary world 
of the Magyar peasant.  Prior to communist rule, the annual pig-killing (disznóölés) was a 
major event, “at least as important as Christmas,”271 in the cultural life of Magyar 
peasants.  Although the custom doubtless has earlier antecedents, its widespread 
observance can be reliably dated back to the start of the twentieth century. One of the 
many attendant effects of economic growth in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire was that 
native Hungarian pig breeds were supplanted by the more fertile and fatty Serbian 
Mangalica strain; after the turn of the century, pig husbandry spread rapidly throughout 
the Hungarian countryside.272  By the late 1930s, there were 3.1 million pigs in Hungary 
against 1.8 million cattle.273  Pigs make good economic sense, as are relatively easy to 
raise and their feed-to-yield ratio is significantly higher than that of any other common 
farm animal. 274  One full-grown (160-180 kg) pig supplied enough pork, bacon, and lard 
to last a family of four all year, while wealthier families might slaughter four or five pigs 
per year.   
The actual slaughter of the pig was a festive event.  After the pig’s throat was cut, 
the rest of the day was spent in rendering the carcass.  This communal process was 
characterized by a gendered division of labor: while the men butchered the pig, the 
women washed the intestines for use as sausage casings, did the rest of the preparation 
                                                 
271 Fél and Hofer, p. 160. 
272 The meatier, but also more labor-intensive, Yorkshire strain was slow to catch on in Hungary, 
accounting for only about 15% of the national stock in 1911. Romsics, p. 22.  
273 In this regard Hungary is unique: every other Central European country had many more cows than pigs 
in the interwar years.  M.C. Kaser and E.A. Radice, The Economic History of Eastern Europe 1919-1975 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), Volume 1, p. 200. 
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for preserving the meat by smoking and salting, and cooked all day.  In addition to 
providing a year’s supply of meat, the disznóölés was also an occasion for a feast, 
generally numbering twelve or more.  Although peasant families would usually restrict 
the guest list to family members (including some in-laws), they would also send a ‘taste’ 
of the meat around to their neighbors, seizing the opportunity to strengthen non-kinship 
bonds—and catch up on gossip—in the process.275  The significance of pig-killing in the 
cultural world of the Magyar peasantry is indicated by its regular occurrence in the 
popular lexicon: as a signifier of poverty—“one who does not stick a pig is a real 
pauper”—and as a symbolic shorthand for familial closeness, as a man who had 
successfully inveigled his siblings out of their inheritance might find that “he has the 
land, but can hardly find anyone to stick the pig.”276  Pig-killing was, thus, a major 
element of Magyar peasant life.  Any attempt to alter its practice was certain to run afoul 
of entrenched custom.  
Meat was even scarcer than other commodities in communist Hungary.277  World 
War II had seriously depleted the national livestock reserves, and collectivization only 
exacerbated this problem.  An abundance of swine, like any conspicuous display of 
wealth, rendered the owner more likely to be labeled a kulak.  Many peasants would also 
                                                                                                                                                 
274 On this point see Richard A. Lobban, Jr., “Pigs and their Prohibition,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (February, 1994), pp. 57-75, p. 65. 
275 Fél and Hofer, Proper Peasants, pp. 119, 206.  Bell notes that after one 1951 pig-killing the family 
distributed ‘tastes’ to twenty-three other families.  p. 226. 
276 Fél and Hofer, Proper Peasants, pp. 257, 276.  On this point see also Bell, Peasants in Socialist 
Transition, p. 76, and Lampland, “Pigs, Party Secretaries, and Private Live in Communist Hungary,” 
American Ethnologist Volume 18, Number 3 (August 1991), pp. 459-479.  
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choose to slaughter their animals before joining the collective farm, choosing a short-
term binge—and, as we shall see, the chance to make a significant profit, if distributed 
wisely—over the long-term near-certainty that the state would take away their animals.  
In an effort to head off the wholesale slaughter of livestock the regime established a 
bureau, the National Office for Pork and Lard Distribution, in order to monitor meat and 
lard collection.278  Peasants desiring to slaughter their livestock were required to receive 
permission from the local authorities to do so, and then turn over the majority of the meat 
and lard to the state.  To require this of the Magyar peasant was to ask him not only to 
change one of his most significant cultural practices, but also to threaten his self-
sufficiency and even his survival.  Despite the difficulty of concealing this process—
slaughtering and rendering a pig is obviously a lengthy, arduous, and at least briefly a 
very noisy task—peasants responded to collectivization and the imposition of communist 
rule with a pig-killing spree. 
Although specific data for the entire period were unavailable, a report for the 
week of 29 January 1951 reveals the contours of this outlawed but socially-normative 
behavior.279  In that week alone, there were 180 sentences for illegal slaughter passed 
down: 26 defendants were labeled kulaks, the remainder working peasants.  As with other 
crimes, kulaks got the worst of it.  Over half of all working peasants drew 3 months or 
less, and a majority of their sentences were suspended.  Kulaks generally drew sentences  
                                                                                                                                                 
277 In 1953, the average Eastern European consumed about 17.6 kilograms of meat.  Although this was 
slightly better than in the USSR (17.2 kg), it was still a third less than the prewar average and compared 
miserably to the American standard of 70 kg per annum. “‘The ‘New Course’ and the Livestock Economy 
in the Soviet Bloc.” CIA/RR IM-397, 17 September 1954, pp. 1, 10.  This document is available online at 
http://www.foia.ucia.gov/ (viewed 9 December 2007).  
278 Magyar Közlöny, 25 September 1948. 
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of 6 months or more.  Kulaks also paid heavier fines, their transgression generally costing 
them over 300 forints (as against the 100-300 forint average fine for working peasants).  
The 10 acquittals were all working peasants.  The gender distribution of this criminal 
population was also significant: fully ¼ of the sentences passed down for feketevagás 
were women, and from what specific case data is available it appears that they were 
always arrested as part of a group, rather than operating singly.  This suggests that the 
gendered division of labor that typified disznóölés carried over into the illegal practice of 
                                                                                                                                                 
279 MOL M-KS 276. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e., pp. 156-211.  
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pig killing under the communist regime:  some Magyar peasants continued to slaughter 
pigs in the traditional fashion, despite the regime’s sanction.  However, in addition to 
now slaughtering their pigs on the sly, peasants responded to the criminalization of pig-
killing with at least one other major change in praxis.   
Historically, disznóölés meat had been salted and smoked, and then consumed 
sparingly by the peasant household so that it would last out the year. Feketevágás meat, 
on the other hand, was evidence of a recently-committed crime—and, in the meat-scarce 
Hungarian economy, it was also a lucrative product on the black market.  A deposition 
sworn at the Sárospatak police department in summer 1951 provides some sense of how 
the black trade in meat was practiced.  G.J. testified that on some evening towards the 
end of 1950, his acquaintance B. showed up on his doorstep and told him to grab his coat, 
as they were going to purchase some meat. 
 
I got in the car and we drove out to M.P.’s place, where we went into a 
room and B. started haggling with over the price with him.  They were 
unable to reach an agreement on the price… I also recall that comrade B. 
and M.P. discussed the possibility of taking pigs from the neighboring 
tszcs.  B. wanted to come back the day after tomorrow with the car.280 
 
 
Given the lack of any supporting evidence, the motives behind depositions like these are 
impossible to determine: jealousy and coercion seem the most likely.  Regardless, it is 
apparent that feketevágás, like wood theft, was now practiced for profit as well as 
subsistence throughout the period, and on a mass scale. 
A monthly survey of feketevágás sentences from April 1953—just before the 
advent of the New Course—suggests a modal shift in the persecution and prosecution of 
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illegal slaughter and the trade in meat.  In this month, 787 sentences were passed 
down.281  Hungary had almost run out of kulaks by this point—they constituted less than 
6% of these convictions. As in 1951, roughly two-thirds of all sentences were for less 
than 6 months.  What is different from the earlier period is that the monetary penalties are 
much higher (almost half of them were over 1000 forints) and the penalties for the worst 
offenders were absurdly stringent.  S.K., a Nagykallo seasonal worker, was caught selling 
two calves he had slaughtered illegally: he got a 2000-forint fine, another 2000 forints’ 
worth of property confiscated, and 3 ½ years in prison. J.T., a Debrecen seasonal worker, 
was found guilty of slaughtering and selling more than 20 animals.  His sentence was 
2000 forints and five years. The absolute worst penalty in this report—and, in all 
likelihood, the most extreme punishment meted out for this crime in the entire period—
fell on F.V., a kulak from Nagyatad who was found guilty of killing and selling 11 veal 
calves.  He paid a 2000-forint fine, had all his property confiscated, and was sentenced to 
eight years in prison.282  Despite excessive penalties such as these, feketevágók continued 
to ply their trade throughout the entire period.     
As he had in the wood trade, after 1953 János swiftly established himself at the 
nexus of the illegal meat trade. As the other four butchers in his town had long since been 
forced out of business by the nationalization of the meat industry, he had no local  
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281 Regrettably, the available statistics do not disaggregate illegal slaughter form the general run of crimes 
against the public supply.  Both the 1951 weekly and the 1953 monthly figures suggest an average of about 
750 feketevágás convictions per month, which translates to 9000 cases per annum for the period of high 
stalinism. 
282 These men probably did not serve their full sentences—many of them would have been pardoned in 
1953, and after 1956 the Kádár regime had much larger fish to fry.  MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 17 ő.e., p. 
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competition.  At least every other week or so he would acquire an animal, generally a 
veal calf or cow, for 150 to 300 forints. He would then slaughter it and sell it off in 
portions of 12-20 kilos apiece.   János’s meat was priced to sell, at 12 to 16 forints per 
kilo—well below the official price of 22.50 forints (on the rare occasions it was available 
in stores).   For sheep—available only on the black market in his vicinity—he was able to 
charge as much as 20 forints per kilo.283 All in all, a tidy profit.  Even if he didn’t quite 
make the 3000-4000 forints per month he bragged about to the RFE interviewer, his 
illegal activities probably paid rather well.     
János’s activity was only the tip of the iceberg in his small town, however.  Both 
his suppliers and customers were also active participants in the illegal economy.  Peasants 
forced to sell their cows or pigs to the state farm at ridiculously low prices would instead 
injure the animals and then slaughter them “in an emergency.” Animals were reported 
stolen and then slaughtered, carved up, and sold off before the police arrived.  Perhaps 
the most interesting scam was one that János only heard about afterwards:  after a disease 
struck a number of swine at a neighboring state farm, the peasants bought the corpses 
from the swineherd, reported the deaths of their animals, showed the local officials the 
carcasses of the diseased pigs, and then slaughtered and sold their healthy animals.284     
His customers ran the gamut from priests to the local authorities: nobody wanted to arrest 
the butcher that killed the golden calf.  János was only the middleman: a talented one, 
certainly, but without the pervasive and widespread collusion of the village and the 
members of the local administration his activities would have been doomed.  With supply 
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284 OSA/RFE Items 2743/55, mf 52, p. 9. 
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and demand both accounted for by a steady stream of contacts derived from both kinship 
ties and the village social network, all János required was a cogent distribution scheme.  
He hit upon the solution of using Roma, or gypsies,285 as intermediaries in his illegal 
cottage industry.   
 
The Advantages of Being Marginalized 
 
 
The Roma presence in Hungary dates back to at least the early fifteenth century.  
As elsewhere in Europe throughout the succeeding centuries, they were invariably 
marginalized and often oppressed by a succession of governments.  To take but one 
example, during the otherwise enlightened reign of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, over 
8,300 Roma children were removed from their families and placed with Christian foster 
parents or in orphanages (1780) even as two hundred Roma were tried and executed on 
false charges of cannibalism (1782).286  Until World War II, they managed to eke out a 
precarious existence via various skilled and itinerant crafts (smithing, woodworking, etc.) 
where possible; they also lived off illegal activity (theft, black-marketeering, etc.), 
which—combined with their distinctive appearance, dress, and customs—made for a 
pejorative cultural stereotype that then affected their treatment by society and the courts.  
Given the heightened and racialized nationalism of the early twentieth history, this 
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stereotype operated to lethal and predictable effect during World War II: the Roma were 
nearly exterminated in the Holocaust (Pořajmos in Romani).  Like the Jews, they were 
rounded up and transported to Auschwitz and other extermination camps.  Of the half 
million Roma that died in the Holocaust, roughly 30,000 were Hungarian.287  In short, 
until the communists came to power, the story of the Roma in Hungary—as throughout 
Europe—is one of incessant marginality punctuated with interludes of outright 
oppression. 
Thus, the communist regime’s attempt to integrate the Roma into society was 
unique.  Schooling, housing, combating anti-Roma sentiment via propaganda, and above 
all integration into the proletariat were the four planks of the party’s Roma program.288  
They were encouraged to join the armed forces, the ÁVH, the local administration; 
schools and cultural opportunities were extended to the Roma settlements (cigánytelepek) 
on the outskirts of villages. A 1956 report from the legal branch of the administrative 
department, “On the Resolution of the Gypsy Question,” summed up the 
accomplishments to date:  of the 120-130,000 Roma then living in Hungary, fully 80,000 
remained in Roma settlements—another 8,000 had no permanent address, in itself a 
remarkable admission for a regime that prided itself on monitoring its populace so 
closely.  Many Roma had joined the party; many others were working in collective farms 
and various other industries.  Life in the cigánytelep was still far from ideal: most of them 
were overcrowded and lacked running water and electricity.  The illiteracy rate among 
                                                 
287 Crowe, “Hungary,” p. 119.  As with all casualty figures for the Holocaust, this number is widely 
debated.  Some estimates place the number as high as 1-1.5 million, e.g., Hancock, “Chronology,” in 
Crowe, and Kolsti, eds., The Gypsies of Eastern Europe, p. 21.     
288 Michael Stewart, The Time of the Gypsies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 97.  
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Roma was generally around 90%.  According to the report, the cultural and moral 
development of the Roma was also a matter of some concern: unmarried couples 
frequently lived together, and polygamy and incest were commonplace.  The regime’s 
attempt to ‘civilize’ the Roma met with only partial success, as did its attempts to 
improve their living conditions.  The propaganda against anti-Roma sentiment likewise 
foundered due to the fact—bluntly stated in the department report—that many of the 
members of the local party and administrative organs suffered from the very same 
prejudices they were trying to eradicate.289 
The report also went into some detail about the Romani resistance to socialist 
work discipline, their insistence on continuing their traditional vocations such as horse-
trading and tinkering, and their tendency to commit crimes. 
 
The gypsies also cause many problems in regard to public security:  in 
certain categories of crime—crop and wood theft, robbery—gypsy 
criminality [cigánybünözés] signifies an unrelenting problem, especially 
for the rural population, or rather our police organs there. …In essence, 
the majority of gypsies live on the periphery of society, or often as 
parasites.290  
 
The report urged increased proselytization by the DISz and other official 
organizations.291  
The problem with Roma (and, incidentally, the anti-Roma bias mentioned in the above 
report) was spelled out even more bluntly in a detailed report from the Kaposvar district 
                                                 
289 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., p. 544. 
290 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., p. 543. 
291 But not, interestingly enough, the MNDSz.  The women’s organization was initially included in the list 
of organizations tasked with the socialization of the Roma, but it was crossed out by the (unknown) editor 
of the report.  MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., pp. 548, 550.  
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administration, from July of the same year.  Although 900 of the district’s 8000 Roma 
had joined the state farm and another 1500 worked for the state on a seasonal basis,   
 
A number of the Roma just don’t want to work.  They acquire one form of 
travel documents or another and then use that to justify their going from 
village to village, being vagrants and stealing.  Many of them work only in 
the summer season, but not in the winter.  In the winter they live from 
begging and theft. …  Quite a lot of them steal chickens or grain. In one 
case, in Siófok district, they also beat a watchman who caught them in the 
act of stealing grain.292 
 
Enemies of enemies were not allies, however. the Kaposvar Roma ran afoul of the 
Magyar peasantry as well. 
 
In Szulok district, even to this day the gypsies and peasants frequently 
brawl in the tavern.  There is such friction that they will quarrel over any 
crime, large or small.  If someone steals something, whether from a house 
or a field, the village public opinion is that it could only have been done 
by a gypsy.  This antipathy is based in part on the fact that among the 
gypsies are those who genuinely are thieves or commit various other 
crimes, thus damning the entire gypsy population by association.293      
 
On this point, at least, the regime and the peasantry concurred: gypsies were crime-prone.  
Their criminality was doubly articulated by their marginal status.  Their inability and 
unwillingness to assimilate294 not only predisposed them to a life of crime, but also made 
them the most likely suspects when something did occur.  Despite its many failings, the  
                                                 
292 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., pp. 538-539. 
293 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 49 ő.e., p. 540. 
294 Ian Hancock neatly sums up the bind Roma found themselves in: “Forbidden to do business with 
shopkeepers, the Roma have had to rely upon subsistence theft to feed their families; and thus stealing has 
become a part of the stereotype.  Forbidden to use town pumps or wells, denied water by fearful 
householders, uncleanliness becomes part of the stereotype.”  However, Roma culture is traditionally also 
very wary of outsiders, which was conducive to their self-marginalization.  “Introduction,” in Crowe and 
Kolsti, eds., The Gypsies of Eastern Europe, p. 6. 
 126
communist administration did make some effort to better their existence—much more, 
we must note, than had any prior regime in Hungary. Moreover, their long experience of 
operating on the margins of the legal economy seems to have come in handy when, under 
the communist system, entire branches of the rural economy became criminalized. 
During the 1950s, some Roma made out like bandits.  According to one 1955 
RFE informant, the Roma settlement at Felsőrajk was undergoing a veritable “golden age 
of the gypsies” (“A cigányság aranykora”) as a result of socialist rule. Although sanitary 
conditions remained substandard, they had improved somewhat since the war; the birth 
rate had finally eclipsed the death rate, and deaths from tuberculosis were at an all-time 
low.  There was a school for the Roma children, and practically every family had a cart 
and a horse or two.  This community of 20 families had relied on woodworking for its 
primary source of income until 1948, when it became impossible for them to acquire 
wood legally.  This drove this community of Roma entirely into the shadow economy, 
but one of them was able to obtain a position on the local council at Zalaegerszeg.  
Therafter they experienced little trouble with the law. Of course, their supply of firewood 
was illegally harvested from the nearby state forest.295 Another Roma, an 18-year old 
youth from Bácsalmás, reported his successes as a peddler.  Despite his prior record—he 
had been arrested in 1954 for operating without a license—he was able to obtain a trade 
license with very little difficulty from the local council, and supported his six-person 
family by traveling to trade fairs throughout the region.296  János certainly kept a number 
of Roma in work.  He used them as “front” buyers for animals when possible, and also 
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for distributing meat after the slaughter.  For helping him distribute his product, the Roma 
received their wages largely in kine: a few kilos of meat, the intestines, and also some 
wine.297 Although this income did not quite justify the risk involved, it was a niche 
economic role that was actually created by the regime’s attempts to regulate the 
economy.  Accustomed as they were to operating on the margins of society and the 
official economy, the Roma were perhaps less disadvantaged than the ordinary Magyar 
peasant when widespread passive resistance and the black economy assumed its 
preeminence under communist rule. 
  
* * * 
 
 
It was too good to last.  Perhaps János S. cheated someone in a deal or was 
denounced by a fellow villager; in any case, by the end of 1954 he was getting careless.  
His dealings in wood had progressed past the circle of his immediate acquaintances.  He 
had become similarly nonchalant about maintaining secrecy and deniability in the pig 
trade, as he had customers knocking on his door day and night.298  His black-
marketeering career came to an abrupt end one night in late 1954.  As János tells it, a 
black jeep pulled up in front of his house and several members of the ÁVH emerged just 
as he was carving up a slaughtered calf; it was obvious the jig was up.  János somehow 
managed to give them the slip, and—apparently abandoning his wife without a second 
thought—walked to Nyiregyhaza, caught a night train to Budapest, and from there made 
                                                 
297 OSA/RFE Items 2743/55, mf 52, p. 4. 
298 OSA/RFE Items 2743/55 mf 52, p. 2. 
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his way into Austria.299  His intention, as he explained it to his RFE interviewer, was to 
somehow make his way to America and go into business there.  With this, he vanished 
from the historical record forever.       
What, then, are we to make of his story?  I suspect he exaggerated his income and 
certain other minor aspects of his account, but taken in conjunction with the archival 
evidence, his story rings true.  Collectivization engendered widespread unrest and 
resistance; this in turn legitimized illicit behavior.  Peasants drew on a long tradition of 
stubborn resistance to outside authority in hiding their harvests, torching unguarded state 
possessions, falsifying their records, and otherwise eluding the state’s aegis.  This would 
have been impossible without collusion at the local level; administrators were far more 
likely to obey their immediate needs of survival (and opportunities for profit or acquiring 
scarce commodities) than the unrealistic directives emanating from Budapest.   
More specifically, the crimes of wood theft and feketevágás reveal the stubborn 
persistence of the past in rural Hungary.  Like its predecessors, the communist state was 
largely unable to halt the centuries-old practice of wood theft.  Peasants were swift to 
realize the limits of the state’s surveillance and co-opt its local representatives.   
Although criminalizing pig-killing would have generated a cultural backlash regardless, 
in the context of the meat-scarce rural economy it was tantamount to enticing the 
peasants to embark on lives of crime. The central irony in both of these forms of peasant 
resistance is that they were practiced not only for subsistence, but also exchange.  The 
illicit products were commodified:  in attempting to establish a socialist economy, the 
                                                 
299 According to János, he managed to distract them and then slip out the back.  A bribe seems more likely.  
His wife did not figure largely in his story throughout.  OSA/RFE Items 1370/55 mf 50, pp. 5-6. 
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state actually provoked capitalist tendencies among the peasantry.  These tendencies 
persisted throughout the communist period.  
  Although scholars concur on this outcome of peasant resistance in Hungary, they 
differ on its causes.  Writing in 1988, Iván Szelényi argued that “after three decades of 
mainly silent, passive resistance,” former Hungarian peasants “seem to be winning.  They 
certainly have not ‘overthrown’ the ‘bureaucratic class,’ but they have forced them into 
lasting and strategically important concessions.  Gradually, they have reinterpreted the 
rules of the game of state socialism and have transformed society into a structure 
complex enough that they can achieve within it living conditions that they find 
acceptable.” Szelényi argues that the force guiding this process was a class of prewar 
“incipient entrepreneurs,” whose development into full-blown capitalists was only 
temporarily derailed by the onset of communism.300  Martha Lampland concurs that the 
peasantry was able to wrest significant concessions from the regime, but she differs with 
his rationale for this outcome. Lampland instead finds that these entrepreneurial 
tendencies were apparent throughout the Magyar peasantry, not just the proto-
bourgeoisie—and that they evolved in response to the intrusions of the socialist state: 
“The great irony of the socialist state’s impact is to have generalized attitudes [i.e., 
rampant individualism and utilitarianism, a bootstrap mentality] across the entire 
populace which are usually defined as capitalist.”301  My account does not quite reconcile 
this debate.  With his ‘proper’ peasant background and parentage, János fits readily into 
Szelényi’s paradigm of an upwardly-mobile protocapitalist.  On the other hand, many 
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other feketevágok were drawn from the ranks of the seasonal laborers and other lower 
rungs on the rural social ladder, and Roma occupied a key intermediary point in the illicit 
economy.  Both these points support Lampland’s claim.  It seems likely that the rich or 
middle peasant’s extended networks of kinship and village relations eased his (or her) 
illicit interactions, but in the final analysis—given the relative inefficiency of the regime 
in the countryside—everyday crime was an option open to all ranks of the social 
hierarchy. 
This and the preceding chapter reveal a gaping chasm between the public and 
hidden transcripts of life in communist Hungary.  Communist industrialization and 
collectivization mobilized large segments of Hungarian society against the regime.  The 
tendency of many of the regime’s monitors to opt for collusion rather than confrontation 
rendered the regime unable to present a united front against its unruly subjects.  Magyars 
relied on informal social networks, such as shop floor allegiances, the black economy, 
and local kinship and village affiliations to wrestle some degree of autonomy and agency 
from the state.  However, societies are also not monolithic entities.  The apparent 
uniformity of criminal behavior and resistance in both city and countryside masked 
deeper social divisions.  As we have seen herein, both peasants and their monitors shared 
traditional anti-Roma sentiments;.  At least two other major social divisions also 
characterized Hungarian society in the 1950s: gender-based and generational hierarchies.  
As we shall see in the following two chapters, the party-state’s few nominal successes 
resulted from the close parallel between its intentions and these underlying social 
tensions.     
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CHAPTER 3:  GENDER, CRIME, AND COMMUNISM 
 
A man and his son are going for a walk.  The son sees a woman 
walking towards them and exclaims, “Look, dad, there’s an English spy!”   
After she passes, the bemused father asks his son to explain his 
conclusion.   
The son says, “Well, she’s wearing a hat, elegant, young, and 
pretty … and she’s not pregnant.” 
—a Hungarian joke from 1953302 
 
 
There is very little funny about this joke’s outright misogyny and implicit 
celebration of the male gaze, but as a cultural artifact—offering, as it does, an entry-point 
to a foreign system of meaning—its historical value is significantly greater.303  This 
caricatured “deviant” body reveals in turn the normative gender codes at work in 
Hungarian society at the time.  There was, indeed, a short-lived increase in the birth rate 
in 1953 and 1954, and even the least perceptive visitors to Budapest noted the ubiquity of 
pregnant women in the shops and streets.304 However, this baby boom was not the 
product of postwar affluence and ebullience as it was in the west.  It was instead the 
result of an intrusive population policy imposed by the state in the face of a declining 
birth rate.  The trope that ideologically-sound women dressed plainly was also no 
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laughing matter, as dressing in an overtly stylish manner did not go unnoticed—by either 
joke-tellers or regime monitors.  As one émigré recalled during her interview in 1957, 
 
[D]uring the revolution I was given my kader sheet.  I read it with interest 
and I was surprised for it wasn’t very bad.  It noted that I was of bourgeois 
background and of bourgeois disposition and that I was cosmopolitan 
which was a bad adjective.  I was dressing in a cosmopolitan way, because 
I followed French fashion as much as I could and I used pink lipstick, 
while the proper communists, following the outdated Soviet women, used 
red or purple.  Of course, once pink became acceptable in Russia, we too 
could wear it with impunity.  I also committed the error of wearing gloves 
on the street.305 
 
In short, even minor, “cosmopolitan” stylistic transgressions entered one’s personal 
record as signifiers of deviance—and therefore political unreliability as well.  The humor 
in this joke, such as it is, was predicated largely on a reified stereotype of socialist 
woman—chaste, plainly-dressed, and pregnant—and the obviously deviant, and 
potentially criminal, character of any female body that did not conform to those rules.  
Since the 1980s, a number of scholars have created and contributed to the 
historiographical and sociological literature on women and gender in socialist Hungary. 
The bulk of this scholarship concurs that the various communist schemes to establish 
gender equality—the right to equal pay for equal work, to a divorce, to reproductive 
freedom—were generally halfhearted and contradictory, and foundered on preexisting 
                                                 
305 The kader sheet was one’s personal file with the ÁVH.  CUHRP Interview 245, Box 13, pp. 15-16. 
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patriarchal norms. 306   The result, as women moved into workplace and administrative 
positions previously reserved for men only, was widespread male resentment of “socialist 
women,” as the precept of gender equality was damned by association with 
communism.307  The early Soviet period of intensive industrialization and collectivization 
was the most important formative moment in this historical trajectory; however, as yet no 
scholar has drawn upon the newly-available archival evidence and focused expressly on 
the politics of work, sexuality, and abortion during the period 1948-1956.  Herein I 
discuss how the regime attempted to mobilize Magyar women as workers, and the 
patriarchal backlash that followed; the implications of communist prostitution policy as 
an intrusive means of policing female sexuality; and the party-state’s pronatalist scheme, 
which succeeded only insofar as it successfully drew upon male resentment of intrusive 
communist women. 
  The communist regime’s egalitarian gender policy was dictated by both the 
ideological precept of the equality of all workers and the real demands of the 
industrializing project.  After 1948, women were encouraged to take up careers in all 
fields, even to the point of working in heavy industry, serving on the police force, driving  
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tractors, and other previously masculine-coded jobs.  As a result of this policy, many 
acquired a previously-impossible degree of economic freedom.  This newfound economic 
autonomy was matched by a new availability of political roles as well.  The MDP, the 
Democratic Association of Hungarian Women [Magyar Nök Demokratikus Szövetsége, or 
MNDSz), and other regime-sanctioned agitational work offered alternate routes for 
advancement and empowerment.  The communist regime indeed empowered some 
women—but this occurred under the broader auspices of a state bent on subjugating all 
its subjects.  A certain degree of resentment towards “socialist women” ensued.  The 
socialist regime’s treatment of gender-coded modes of deviance308 reflected this 
preoccupation with productive work and reproduction.   
Prostitution policy reveals much about communism’s stance towards female 
sexuality and criminality.309  Prior to the socialist takeover, prostitution was legal, albeit 
heavily policed; its social function, as throughout Europe, was to support patriarchy by 
strictly defining the bounds of permissible female behavior.  After 1948, it was  
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criminalized, labeled an unwelcome holdover from the bourgeois past (as with theft, 
embezzling, and the other “bourgeois” modes of crime and deviance discussed in the 
previous chapters), and blamed for the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases and other 
ailments of the body social.  Prostitution persisted regardless; after the 1953 amnesty, it 
flourished anew.  Many of these women labeled prostitutes by the regime were in fact 
working women who practiced casual prostitution on the side; many may have been 
guilty merely of transgressing sartorial or behavioral norms.  In any case, the regime 
broadened its regulatory gaze: in addition to its surveillance of bars and cafes, it also 
sought to include in its purview the residences of “dubious” women—in short, all those 
who were unmarried or jobless.  Despite these measures, state monitors proved unable to 
control this mode of gendered deviance.  Prostitution rapidly came to serve the same 
patriarchal social function it had under capitalism, and it persisted throughout the 
communist period.   
Illegal abortion (magzatelhajtás) was considered a much more serious crime by 
the socialist regime.  Alarmed by the falling birth rate, the regime criminalized abortion 
in February 1953.  Most scholars interpret the brief upswing in the national birthrate (in 
1953 and 1954) in this light, concluding that the state successfully forced women to 
reproduce.310  However, Andrea Pető has recently advanced an alternate interpretation of 
the politics of reproduction under communism.  Noting the persistence and prevalence of 
an underground network of abortion providers, she concludes instead that “solidarity 
within society was able to function—and did function—even in the case of ever-
                                                 
310 See, e.g., Haney, Inventing the Needy, p. 32, Fodor, Working Difference, pp. 122-23, and Goven, 
“Gendered Foundations”, fn 18, p. 32. 
 136
increasing police vigilance….  institutionalized regulation of female fertility failed in less 
than a year [i.e., by January 1954]…. it failed because of human, female solidarity, which 
sprang into action out of necessity and as a result of oppression.”311  My evidence bears 
out Pető’s argument.  The question, then, is how to account for the apparent success of 
the regime’s pronatalist campaign in 1953 and 1954.   The most likely explanation is that 
the regime’s reproductive drive coincided with a resurgence of patriarchy in shop floor 
infrapolitics and society: during the New Course, women were forced into lower-paying 
jobs or out of work altogether.  At the same time, the regime made having children more 
economically viable than it had been in the past.  The nominal success (in raw 
demographic terms) of the pronatalist drive was not due to the criminalization of 
abortion.  Rather, it was due to a symbiosis between the dual strands of post-1953 
reproductive policy—which consisted of both legal penalties for getting an abortion, and 
financial benefits for having children—and the persistence of traditional notions of 
patriarchal control over reproduction.   
Prostitution and abortion policy reveal complex dimensions of crime, deviance, 
and resistance in Communist Hungary.  As we have seen in the previous two chapters, 
the criminalization of many social, economic, and cultural behaviors and interactions led 
to many forms of criminality acquiring a certain social respectability, or at least 
tolerance.  Many of these behaviors were also construed as resistance by their 
practicioners as well as the legal armature of the state.  This close parallel between crime 
and resistance is not as apparent for these gendered modes of deviance.  Regime policy 
aligned itself with underlying patriarchal norms.  Women’s bodies were much more 
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closely policed than they had been in the past, or than those of their male counterparts.  
Those Magyar women who aspired to the same sexual and reproductive freedom men 
enjoyed as a matter of course found themselves up against not only state policies but also 
patriarchal antipathy.  To the extent these deviant behaviors constituted a form of 
resistance, it was one that militated against both communist policy and underlying 
patriarchal norms.              
 
 
Socialism With a Female Face 
The mobilization of Magyar women in industry was not a socialist innovation.  
Before World War II, they entered the proletariat in Hungary much as elsewhere in 
Europe:  primarily in the textile and light industries, and almost without exception in the 
lower brackets of the wage scale.  By 1920, 129,000 women had entered the world of 
wage labor; this constituted roughly 19% of the total workforce, and this percentage 
remained roughly constant throughout the interwar period. By 1930, fully 169,000 
women worked outside the home.312  World War II acted as a catalyst for women’s 
participation in the workforce, as women took the places of the hundreds of thousands of 
men off at the front.  However, it was only during the Rákosi era that their presence in 
industry really exploded.    
The regime’s decision to mobilize women in industrial production was based 
partially in ideological concerns but primarily in pragmatism.  Gender equality has long 
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been a precept of socialist theory,313 and certain of the new laws reflected this underlying 
preoccupation.  Divorce law had already been liberalized in the immediate postwar 
period, and the communist system did nothing to stifle this progressive development.314  
According to the 1952 family code, women enjoyed equal property ownership with their 
spouses; alimony proceedings were made much easier, and women were allowed to keep 
their own names after marriage.315  The abolition of gender inequality (in the abstract) 
was doubtless an attractive notion to many. However, ideology aside, the MDP’s main 
preoccupation was with the vast cadres of workers necessary for “building socialism.”  
Women were a major, largely-untapped labor pool.   After 1948, enterprises were 
encouraged to hire women for all positions, even those for which women were previously 
thought biologically unfit (e.g., in heavy industry).  In 1951, precise quotas were set for 
women in all industries: official policy dictated that women must constitute 60% of all 
bricklayers, 40% of all carpenters, and so forth, dictating a vast increase in the number of 
women in many industrial occupations.316   
On paper, at least, this quota policy made significant progress towards redressing 
the gender gap.  The number of women in the workforce more than doubled between 
                                                 
313 Corrin, “Introduction,” in Superwomen and the Double Burden, edited by Corrin (London: Scarlet 
Press, 1992), pp. 11-12.   
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Trials] (Budapest: Kossuth 1986), pp. 99, 173.  
315 “Az új családjogi törveny [The New Family Law],” in Sándor Balogh, editor, Nehéz Esztendők 
Krónikája 1949-1953: Dokumentumok (Budapest: Gondolat, 1986), pp. 433-443.  Prior to WW II, a wife 
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316 Gyula Belényi, editor, Munkások Magyarországon 1948-1956 [Workers in Hungary, 1948-1956], 
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1938 and 1953, rising from 172,000 to 371,000.317  By 1955, women made up one-third 
of the total workforce.318  From 1949 to 1960, fully 75% of people joining the workforce 
were women.319  Women made up more than 60% of the workforce of many factories, 
especially in the lighter industries.  The men’s clothing enterprise in Budapest employed 
2500 workers, of which over 70% were women; the same percentage of female workers 
was apparent in the Szombathely Leather and Footwear Factory, the Nyiregyhaza tobacco 
factory, and numerous other enterprises throughout Hungary.  In heavy industry, these 
percentages were lower but still significant: for instance, the 4th April Machine Factory in 
Budapest’s XIth district employed 150 women out of a total workforce of 950, and of the 
900 workers at Brickmaking Factory #4 in Győr, 15% were women. 320  This egalitarian 
quota policy was applied even to occupations that had previously been the exclusive 
domain of males, such as the police force.321  Although few industrial concerns were 
successful in fulfilling the gender quota, their managers were regularly pressured to hire 
more women and promote them to positions of responsibility.    
The most concerted agitation by the regime for gender equality in the workplace 
was in the traktorlány, or female tractor driver, propaganda campaign, and its failings are 
suggestive of the problems that plagued the mobilization of women in industry.   Women 
were encouraged to join the collective and state farms but especially to train and work in 
                                                 
317 Romsics, p. 275. 
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agricultural production as traktorlányok.322  The quota for female participation was set at 
50 percent. After a brief training course, women—some as young as 16323—were sent out 
to these prestigious positions at machine-stations (gépállomások) throughout Hungary, 
where they then drove the tractors and harvesters the expanding network of state and 
collective farms relied upon.  In the spring of 1953, one intrepid young traktorlány, 
M.M., wrote a series of letters to Szabad Ifjúság324 singing the praises of her new 
occupation.  In May, she bragged of her success (and that of her sister tractor-drivers) in 
overfulfilling the plan.  In July, she sang the praises of the training program she had just 
attended.325  One of her earlier letters, sent in February, provides insight into the editing 
praxis at Szabad Ifjúság as well: from the archival report of that week’s letters to the 
editor we know that she also lamented the scarcity of women at her tractor station, and in 
that same week another traktorlány wrote in complaining that her work was 
unappreciated.  These complaints are invisible in the 12 February edition of Szabad 
Ifjúsag, where M.M.’s letter was published under the heading “We appreciate our female 
workforce (Nálunk megbecsülik a női munkaerőt)”—with her critical statement excised. 
In the published version, the workers at M.M.’s machine station come across as a big, 
happy family: the older (and predominantly male) workers respect their younger 
counterparts, and realize the benefit of the tractor-driving schools, while on their part the 
younger workers follow advice willingly and industriously dedicate themselves to their 
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work and to further training courses.326  Another traktorlány told of how her supervisor 
even encouraged her to pursue fulfillment in her private life as well, telling her “just 
because you get married doesn’t mean you should divorce the tractor.”327   Editorial bias 
aside, it seems that M.M. and some of her fellow tractor-women were able to succeed and 
possibly even excel in this field. 
However, in general the traktorlány program did not live up to the expectations of 
either the regime or the women themselves.  A June 1953 Szabad Ifjúság article 
announced that the total percentage of female tractor drivers was still “intolerably” low, 
only 12 to 13 percent against the mandated 50 percent.328  Moreover, their enforced 
presence at these commanding heights of the rural economy did not translate to 
recognition of their achievements:  after the 1952 harvest, women received only 1 of 39 
outstanding awards for operating harvesters, 1 of 14 for operating combines, and 3 of 14 
in the catchall category of “individual achievement” (“egyeni eredmények”).329  A 
number of letters received by Szabad Ifjuság and other media outlets complained that the 
efforts of women in the machine-stations were not appreciated.330  In 1955, a woman 
tractor-driver at the Red Star station wrote to the state radio station that after the most 
recent norm increase, she generally made only about 22 to 49% of her new production 
quota; she intended to look for another job if her workload was not lessened.331  Very few 
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traktorlányok remained at their jobs long after training, and job turnover was high.332  As 
was the case for practically every aspect of life in Rákosi’s Hungary, the joyful portrait 
painted by the regime differed immensely from how Hungarian women (and men) 
experienced work in their everyday lives. 
The contentious experience of the traktolányok was representative of women’s 
work experience throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. Women’s presence in increased 
numbers in industry did not translate to social or economic parity with their male 
counterparts.  The managers of socialized enterprises—caught as they were between the 
unrealistic demands of state planners and a shortage of skilled labor and materials—came 
to rely heavily on the prewar elite of male, skilled workers.333  Despite the lack of any 
real representation in the party-run unions and the relatively limited options for organized 
resistance, this shop floor patriarchy still enjoyed some influence in how the factories 
were run.  As Mark Pittaway argues, “Skilled workers sat at the apex of a hierarchy 
where women, the young, those commuting from rural areas not to mention the semi-
skilled and unskilled were placed in a subordinate position within shop floor culture….  
State attempts to introduce women to traditionally male occupations were defeated by 
furious and successful resistance among the men.”334  These immediate economic 
concerns about female labor were compounded by traditional patriarchal notions of 
“woman’s work” and the woman’s role in the family.  One young worker recalled that 
                                                 
332 Some statistics:  in Hajdu-Bihar county, of the 410 women who had been trained to drive tractors by the 
winter of 1952, only 110 were still working. Between April and August of 1952, 781 new women tractor-
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Identity in Stalinist Hungary,” Journal of Historical Sociology, Volume 12, Number 3 (September 1999), p. 
287, and “Az állami ellenõrzés társadalmi korlátainak újraértékelése,” especially pp. 79-80. 
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“At the weaving mill and wood finery in Budapest I had an inferiority complex.  Most of 
the fellow workers were women and I felt that I did a job that could be accomplished well 
by women.335  Another émigré stated, “Women should be returned to their place in the 
family....  By the woman’s full-time job, both the family and the woman are loosing [sic] 
of their dignity, of their moral value, and of their character as a society-stabilizing 
force.”336 Yet another 1957 interviewee concurred:  
 
I do not think [the mobilization of women in industry] was a good thing.  I 
reject it because it represents the first step towards the systematic 
destruction of healthy family life.  There are, of course, girls who want to 
work and who do not intend to marry.  The primary purpose and natural 




Whether due to traditional notions of a woman’s place in the home or the real economic 
threat they posed skilled male workers, the regime’s inclusion of women in the industrial 
workforce was complicated by a substratum of male resentment.  As we shall see, further 
complications arose when women tried to fulfill their reproductive “responsibility” as 
well. 
Similar problems arose in the administration’s attempt to include women in 
political activity.  By 1952, women made up 29% of the MDP’s membership and actively 
participated in the administration and organization of party affairs, but they were seldom 
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admitted to top positions.338 The main opportunity for women’s involvement in politics 
was the MNDSz.  This women’s organization was originally founded in 1945 as a 
charitable society (albeit secretly funded by the party) devoted to immediate postwar 
needs such as rubble clearance and caring for returned prisoners of war.  The MNDSz 
openly assumed the character of a political organization after 1948, and by 1951 had 
absorbed all other women’s organizations with “salami tactics” analogous to Rákosi’s 
scheme of consolidating political power.339  By 1950, the membership of the women’s 
organization numbered 600,000 women, one-third of them in Budapest alone.340  
MNDSz puppet shows, lectures, and especially reading circles (olvasókör) spread the 
good word of socialism throughout the cities and countryside.  As MNDSz members, 
women were in charge of many of the mundane tasks of organizing gatherings, arranging 
decorations for parades, and so forth.  In addition to this traditional behind-the-scenes 
“woman’s work,” however, MNDSz members were also expected to devote themselves 
to enlightening and educating their fellow women workers and at times men as well.  
This proselytization often took intrusive form, and it was not limited to lecture halls and 
formal meetings. 
MNDSz activists were also mobilized in the workplace in efforts to encourage 
their coworkers to greater productivity.  A 1950 attitude survey of Budapest workers 
conducted after a major norm revaluation is instructive in this regard.  The MNDSz 
factory workers were given the responsibility of demonstrating, via agitational lectures 
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and their own performance, that the higher new quotas were attainable.  Initially, the 
report suggests that this demonstration met with some success: 
 
In the Rákosi Works Bicycle Shop #3, where the old norm was lax and the 
new norm resulted in an average 100 forint wage reduction, morale was 
bad.  Good agitational work was accomplished: the attitude of the women 
workers was changed and they endeavored with greater diligence to step 
up production.  In Bicycle Shop #2 the more unenlightened 
[öntudatlanabb] women workers sought to demonstrate that their norms 
were too stringent.  Here also, with good informative work and the 
example shown by the MNDSz women, the disgruntled women workers 
were convinced of the error of their standpoint. 
 
 
However, the report also conceded that this proselytizing mission was not successful 
across the board: in the Orion radio factory, where the MNDSz demonstration was 
targeted at recalcitrant men as well, the report notes merely that 14 women were 
successful in reaching the new quota. In the Elzett factory, where the old norm was only 
infrequently met, the new norm was fulfilled only about 50 to 60% on average.  Here the 
spectacle of stalwart stakhanovite labor provided by the MNDSz agitators was apparently 
inadequate: the workers’ morale remained poor, the new production quota was not met. 
According to the report, “Here the party organization and the MNDSz are absolutely not 
finished with their agitational work.”341  The workers were quite aware that the new 
quotas required more work from them for less money; that this point was driven home by 
female activists made it no more acceptable. 
MNDSz agitational work was further complicated by the dismissive attitude 
shown towards it by the other branches of the administration.  Despite its mobilizatory 
                                                 
341 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 646 ő.e, p. 7.  See also OSA/RFE Items 1092/53, mf 19, for an account of a 
normal MNDSz factory meeting. 
 146
potential, the women’s organization was comparatively low on the regime’s list of 
priorities.  Funding was inadequate, and local party secretaries and other party and state 
officials often ignored the MNDSz activists as much as the peasant women did.  As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, the farther one traveled from Budapest and the regional urban 
centers, the more haphazardly and sporadically the regime was able to monitor and 
control the rural population.  An October 1952 report from the mine camps in Borsod 
county demonstrates this tempestuous relationship between the women’s organization 
and the other local organs of authority.  The MNDSz peace-loan subscription342—their 
main purpose in visiting the Borsod camp—was stymied by an ad-hoc party meeting that 
ran late; the local party organization also turned a deaf ear to the MNDSz’s pleas for help 
with agitational work.  The bitter author of the report also noted that the local women 
were passive and cared more about new furniture and paint for their houses than political 
involvement. MNDSz agitators even had to stay away from one Borsod mine camp 
altogether, as the “rough women” who lived there would not hesitate to physically attack 
the activists.343  This report clashes with the upbeat tone of a December 1952 internal 
report on MNDSz activities, which found that matters had improved since the late 1940s.  
Traktorlányok and working-peasant women now met regularly, and many of the women 
participating in the reading circles were applying their newfound literacy towards 
studying for the party membership entrance exams.  However, many of the district-level 
party secretaries still failed to record even the most basic data necessary for successful 
agitational work (e.g., the numbers of women entering the collective farms), and as a 
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result the county-level organizations’ smooth operation was severely hampered.344  Not 
only the peasantry but also the other branches of the administration often ignored the 
MNDSz’s agitational work.       
Overall, the track record of the women’s organization was mixed.  As with the 
DISz, it was not even popular among its constituents.  Women were reluctant to join the 
organization, even more reluctant to come to meetings, and frequently failed to pay their 
membership fees.  Even the wives of party members were hesitant to join.345  One 1956 
émigré, a former MNDSz member, recalled that she never paid her dues or went to 
meetings.  When asked about the organization’s goals, she replied “I don’t know; I think 
they wanted to train groups of women to fight for equal rights.”346  Despite this 
widespread apathy and the problems noted above, the MNDSz did serve as a vehicle of 
advancement for some women.  As admission was heavily biased in favor of women of 
peasant or working-class origin, women who had very few opportunities under the old 
regime were now able to control their destinies to a much greater degree than was 
previously possible.  Over and above the advantages afforded the women who joined the 
MNDSz, its socializing mission was not entirely fruitless either. The reading circles, 
consisting of 5-15 women each, numbered 8000 by late 1952.  Although illiteracy had 
been largely eradicated in the interwar period, many rural Magyar women had only 
rudimentary reading and writing skills.  Despite the singularly uninspiring reading 
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materials the olvasókörok offered,347 they still provided the opportunity to acquire 
functional literacy—and perhaps more importantly, they also provided the basic grammar 
of “speaking Bolshevik”348 in which appeals to the state and justifications of one’s 
behavior must be couched if they were to enjoy any degree of success. 
In addition to serving in the MNDSz, women also often served as népnevelők, or 
“people’s educators.”  This form of agitation required routine and unwelcome visits to 
peoples’ homes, demanding their scarce time and money for subscriptions to the party 
newspaper Szabad Nép, scrap-metal collecting drives, and so forth.  One ex-népnevelő 
recounted her experience in the working-class XIIIth District to a RFE interviewer in 
1952 at some length:  In addition to her weekly party meetings and biweekly népnevelő 
meetings, she and the other agitators also met once a week with the local apparat of 
building supervisors, party secretaries, and other officials.  At these two-hour meetings, 
the party secretary in charge would explain the current propaganda line, lecture on 
general questions of domestic and foreign policy, discipline any agitators who had cut 
meetings or committed other transgressions, and set assignments for the upcoming week.   
Travelling in pairs, the agitators would then visit their assigned addresses.  They would 
start by ascertaining their targets’ standing with the party and making sure they were 
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subscribed to Szabad Nép, the party newspaper. Depending on the subject’s status and 
willingness to buy into whatever fundraising scheme was currently in the works, they 
might be there as little as an hour; they might also stay two or more hours as 
circumstances dictated.  They would then write up reports on their visits, detailing their 
successes and identifying those households that would require more attention on future 
visits.  All told, evening népnevelő work consumed at least five additional hours of 
(unpaid) work per week.349  Agitation in the workplace was even more intrusive:  a 
young locksmith in a Budapest precision-tool shop recounted how her position required 
her to harass workers who came in to work late, dodged meetings, or failed to properly 
maintain their machines. According to this latter source, failure to carry out one’s 
assigned népnevelő tasks or skipping too many meetings could result in demotion and 
salary cuts.350  Like the MNDSz activists, the népnevelők were often tasked with the least 
popular agitprop jobs.   
The extent to which labor and political activity empowered women was eclipsed 
by both their continued responsibility for household tasks and the resentment generated 
by their intrusion into public life.  The state’s visionary promises of nurseries, crèches, 
and other household labor-saving projects remained on the drawing board until well into 
the 1960s.351 Women remained the ones responsible for the cooking, laundry, shopping, 
and household chores in the classic “double burden”—or even “triple burden,” if we 
include the expectation of political activity as a separate form of labor—that was the 
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norm throughout communist Eastern Europe.  One woman interviewed after 1956 
articulated precisely this point in precisely these terms: 
 
The status of women is the worst someone can imagine.  Their lives 
become very difficult because they have to carry a double burden.  They 
have to go to work for 8 hours a day and they have to do their 
homemaking for 8 hours, and every woman who cares [even] a little bit 
for her family is a slave, working for 16 hours a day.352 
 
Women’s lives were made more difficult not only by this increase in labor, but also by 
the fact that they were identified with the regime’s intrusive goals.  Joanna Goven aptly 
sums up the social dimension of women’s political activity:  
 
Women’s participation in this work as MNDSz or party activists meant 
that women became publicly conspicuous simultaneously with, and as a 
dimension of, state intrusion into private life.  Women, and particularly 
“emancipated” women, became associated with state intrusiveness, as if, 
with women’s escape from the confines of the household, necessary and 
appropriate boundaries had broken down.353 
 
In short, the unity apparent among wide segments of the populace in opposition to the 
regime’s impositions did not transcend gender difference.  In a very real sense—as the 
state’s intrusive policies were carried out in factories and offices by female MNDSz 
agitators and népnevelők—women were blamed for communism’s faults.  The 
persistence of patriarchy in communist Hungary was also apparent in the regime’s failure 
to eradicate prostitution and its nominal success in controlling women’s reproduction, to 
which we now turn.   
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Policing Sexuality: Prostitution 
 
Prior to communist rule, in Hungary as in many European countries, prostitution 
was regulated but not illegal.354 Although religious leaders and health administrators 
railed against it on a regular basis, it also fulfilled an important function in maintaining 
patriarchal control over society. The bourgeois ideal of womanhood—chaste until 
marriage and monogamous thereafter—relied on the spectacle of its opposite, the “fallen 
woman,” as a means of social control.  As Jeffrey Weeks argues, “the familial ideology 
[of the nineteenth century] was accompanied by, and often relied on, a vast underbelly of 
prostitution, which fed on the double standard and an authoritarian moral code.”355 
Nineteenth-century Hungary does not differ significantly from this broader European 
norm. According to the 1885 Statute on Brothels, prostitutes were required to register 
with the police and submit to twice-weekly medical examinations by a police doctor.   By 
the early twentieth century, the detection of a sexually-transmitted disease in the course 
of a regular examination was grounds for forced admission to a hospital.  Otherwise, 
registered prostitutes were free to operate in brothels and private residences licensed for 
that use.  Streetwalking, on the other hand, constituted grounds for possible incarceration, 
of up to a month’s duration for a first offense.356 By tolerating a network of discreet 
brothels, the authorities accomplished a dual purpose:  brothels concentrated the 
dangerous specter of female sexuality in spaces that were at once invisible to children and 
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proper women, and perfectly transparent to their medical and police monitors (and, of 
course, customers).357  In short, sex was for sale as long as it was kept discreet. In the 
bourgeois worldview, men paying women for sex was viewed as a natural and largely-
unremarkable phenomenon; the important thing—to the authorities, anyway—was the 
maintenance of public order and the protection of the body social from sexually-
transmitted diseases.     
Conversely, unregistered or “covert” (titkos) prostitution was perceived as a threat 
to both of these modernist axioms.  It was therefore subject to pervasive surveillance and 
draconian enforcement.  Some of these “covert” prostitutes were doubtless actively 
plying the trade, either exclusively or alongside their day jobs.  Others, however, were 
guilty only of dressing or behaving inappropriately in public.  By the late nineteenth 
century, these notions of propriety were themselves in flux.  With the onset of 
industrialization, more and more women entered the streets and public spaces—as 
prostitutes, certainly, but also as workers, shoppers, and charity workers.  This increased 
female presence in previously male-coded public spaces occurred even as the normative 
dress code for females became racier: “looser-fitting, sportier and ever-shorter skirts” 
became au courant, and the corset was finally abandoned.358  As in all European 
countries, the fin-de-siècle perception of prostitution was shaped by the myth of the 
“white slave trade,” as the Budapest presses spewed salacious stories of innocent virgins 
sold into prostitution against their will to aghast-yet-titillated readers.  Unlike their 
western European counterparts, significant numbers of Hungarian women actually ended 
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up in brothels in foreign lands.359  All in all, for women the new freedom to move about 
the city unchaperoned was mitigated by the increased danger of harassment—from 
random men and also the police themselves, who by this time had created an entire 
department, the ‘morality police,’ to deal with morals and the maintenance of public 
decency.360  Prostitution policy thus served as a means of patriarchal social control: “all 
those women whose behavior could not be reduced to the patterns of either the virgin or 
the faithful wife and mother were suspected of ‘covert’ prostitution,”361 and the onus of 
proof was on them to prove otherwise.        
After the first decade of the twentieth century, this basic scheme remained largely 
unaltered until World War II.  The Statute on Brothels was significantly revised in 1909.  
While the status of registered prostitutes improved slightly—inasmuch as they were no 
longer forced to pay for their gynecological exams and they were no longer restricted to 
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Although the white slave trade was far more moral panic than historical fact, we must note that—primarily 
as a function of contemporaneous trends in international emigration—women from Eastern Europe were 
much more likely to end up in foreign brothels than their Western European counterparts: of the 6413 
prostitutes registered in Buenos Aires in the period 1889-1901, almost one-third were from Russia, the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, or Romania (Corbin, p. 287).   
360 On this point see Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight, especially pp. 41-80.  
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brothels—covert prostitutes could now be registered against their will and forced to 
submit to the regular examinations.362   Moreover, places of entertainment were now 
licensed and monitored by the police, and unlicensed prostitutes were not allowed to 
enter them.  At this point, as Zimmerman argues, “the police had, in fact, acquired a legal 
right that could, in principle, be applied to any woman:”363 to women actually guilty of 
taking money for sex, but also to any woman who deliberately or inadvertently 
transgressed the bourgeois visual and behavioral codes of propriety and chastity.    This 
bipolar praxis—the regulation of registered prostitutes, and the surveillance and 
persecution of covert ones—continued largely unchanged throughout the interwar period.  
Prostitution flourished in the utter economic devastation and poverty following World 
War II: according to the Budapest chief of police, more than 10,000 unregistered women 
were plying the trade in the immediate postwar period.364      
The communist regime did not immediately move against this institutionalized 
prostitution scheme upon seizing power, but change was not far behind.  In the 1 May 
                                                                                                                                                 
361 Zimmerman cites a passage from Kornél Tábori and Vladimir Székely’s 1908 publication Erkölcstelen 
Budapest [Immoral Budapest] to this effect:  “In Pest one sees a whole army of women housemaids, 
needlewomen, and female teachers roaming about, always eager to have this or that kind of adventure.  
They accompany you where you wish for some money, perhaps a supper, a week-end excursion or even a 
couple of warm words.  Some of them begin to deal directly in prostitution; the majority however looks at 
these adventures as a source of entertainment and satisfaction only.”  Zimmerman, p. 179.   
362 The number of Hungarian women forced to register as prostitutes is unknown.  In France, where 
prostitution was regulated in a similar manner, fully 73% of these registrations were involuntary.  Corbin, 
p. 33.       
363 Zimmerman, p. 187.  The same patriarchal function of prostitution policy acting as a behavioral 
regulator on all women occurred in France at this time. Corbin labels this the “hyperregulationist” moment, 
and describes its effects thus:  “Unregistered prostitution, if people were not careful, would run the risk of 
spreading erotic behavior throughout the social body as a whole.  Fears concerning the sexual integrity of 
bourgeois women were of utmost concern to the regulationists of ‘the moral order.’  This explains the 
emergence of that hyperregulationism whose avowed aim was to supervise not only registered or 
unregistered prostitution but all extramarital sexual activities.  It was the logical culmination of the 
regulationist project.”  Corbin, p. 24.       
364 Pető, “Átvonuló hadsereg,” p. 95. 
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1948 edition of Magyar Rendőr, The police doctor Dr. István Bálint summarized the 
legal administration’s obligation: “The goal of police supervision is to keep prostitutes, 
and the brothels (bordélyházak) they live in, in line with the protection of morals and 
health.”  For Bálint, the greatest danger posed by prostitutes was the transmission of 
sexually-transmitted diseases.  He asserted that the regular examinations for registered 
prostitutes are an effective inhibitor, and that covert prostitution was the main culprit in 
the spread of venereal diseases.  Bálint drew attention to the socioeconomic effects of 
prostitution, arguing that it endangers not only the individual (in the form of debilitation 
and possibly an early death) but also the economy, in the form of “lessened worker 
capacity” (csökkent munkákepesség) and lost workdays.  Bálint also linked this form of 
female deviance with other transgressive behaviors, noting that prostitutes tended to 
congregate in the same places as burglars, pickpockets, fences and smugglers.  This 
explains his admonition to his police readership: 
 
Accordingly, when the big-city cop on the beat ends up in those parts of 
the city frequented by prostitutes, he must do so with open eyes and 
attentive ears, as here he may have come closer to the underworld of the 
criminals, and might spy criminals of rather greater importance. 
  
 
In closing, Bálint stated that prostitution had been eradicated in the Soviet Union (a 
dubious assertion at best), declaimed that “this type of lifestyle is unknown in a healthy 
workers’ society,” and called for its criminalization.365  Not surprisingly, prostitution was 
banned shortly after Bálint’s article appeared.  Thousands of women were rounded up by  
                                                 
365 “Bűnügyi lélektan: prostitució,” Magyar Rendőr, 1 May 1948.  
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the police in raids on bars, nightclubs, and clandestine meeting places (titkos 
találkahelyek).  The fates of these women were mixed.  Some of these women were 
indeed retrained as taxi drivers and in other occupations, but these were the lucky ones.  
Most women arrested for prostitution were jailed or sent off to forced-labor projects in 
Sztálinváros and other sites of socialist construction.366  Although this crackdown on 
prostitution signaled a significant shift from the pre-communist praxis, at least one 
element remained the same: there is no record of pimps or procurers being prosecuted in 
like manner. 
As the police and courts turned up the heat on prostitution, the communist presses 
matched this persecution with heightened invective.  In his October 1951 Magyar Rendőr 
article, Tivadar Vértes both reiterated and elaborated upon the themes introduced by Dr. 
Bálint three years prior.  Unlike Bálint, Vértes made no mention of prostitution’s 
perennial presence in western civilization.  He instead described it as a specifically 
bourgeois and capitalist phenomenon.  Vértes concurred that the major danger posed by 
prostitution is that of sexually-transmitted disease, that prostitutes often run around with 
other criminals, and that it diverts “a countless number” of men from productive work, bu 
then went on to list a number of its other pernicious aspects as well.  Prostitution also 
“debauches the morals of society” and, worst of all, it “endangers our most precious 
treasure—our children.”  He declaimed the need for a more ambitious program of 
training and educating prostitutes for productive work, but also averred that those women 
who were unwilling or unable to leave “the debauched lifestyle of the capitalist world” 
                                                 
366 Volgyes, “Social Deviance,” pp. 38, 39, OSA/RFE 6418/51 mf 3, OSA/RFE Items 321/51 mf 1, 
OSA/RFE Items 598/51 mf 1, OSA/RFE Items 8358/51 mf 4.      
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were to be locked up “in such a place that their moral contagion is unable to harm our 
society.”367  Vértes’ invective is representative of the regime’s new stance on 
prostitution.  The activities of the morals police—which continued in communist 
Hungary as an organization separate from the regular police—also modulated into a 
higher pitch.    
By early 1952, about 350 women per month were being arrested for prostitution, 
and the Budapest police raided “clandestine meeting-places” about three times per week 
on average.  Women of bourgeois, or deklasszalt, origin were arrested for prostitution in 
numbers disproportionate to their presence in society, accounting for one third to almost 
one half of those brought to trial.368  These women were doubly-damned by their class 
origin:  they were both less likely to have obtained viable jobs after 1948 and thus more 
likely to have resorted to prostitution, and they were much more likely to be detained and 
charged in police sweeps than their working-class counterparts.  Not surprisingly, these 
underlying socioeconomic and political factors were elided in the official transcript.  
According to the March 1952 report on police activity in Budapest, “the activities of the 
morals police demonstrates the intensification of the class struggle, as of the [370] 
prostitutes arrested, 157 were of the deklasszalt or capitalist element.”369  Sentences for 
prostitution were stiff: in September 1953, sentencing guidelines dictated 6 months to up 
                                                 
367 “Harc a prostitúció ellen,” Magyar Rendőr, Vol. 5 No. 36, 27 October 1951.  
368 Budapest Fővarosi Leveltár  XXXV. 95. e / 107 ő.e., “A bpi rendőrkapitanság március havi szakmai 
munkájáról jelentés,” 24 April 1951, p. 4, “A bpi rendőrkapitanság április havi szakmai munkájáról 
jelentés,” 30 May 1952, p. 4. 
369 BFL XXXV. 95. e / 107 ő.e.,  “A bpi rendőrkapitanság május havi szakmai munkájáról jelentés,” 13 
June 1952, p. 4.  
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to 3 years in prison.370  A representative sentence from early 1954 was 6 months in prison 
and 3 years internal exile; by late 1954, the Budapest police had resolved to expel all 
known prostitutes (as well as pickpockets) from the city.371   
This latter precaution was probably in response to what a September 1953 police 
memorandum termed a “blossoming anew” of prostitution in the wake of the New 
Course.  Although 397 prostitutes had been arrested that month, the report averred that 
this was certainly only a fraction of the total number of women engaged in this behavior.  
This memorandum also noted that despite the fact that the majority of these women 
worked in factories during the day, the factory-based DISz and trade unions were doing 
nothing to reeducate them or monitor their behavior.  It closed with a request for 
information from the trade unions on prostitute activity in the workplace and suggestions 
on what political methods to use in “the battle against prostitution.”372  The responses it 
received were not useful.   
The report from the chemical workers’ union revealed that several ex-prostitutes 
had found work in the factories after their release from prison, but they did not stay long: 
 
Today only one or two such women still work in the factories.…  thirteen 
ex-prostitutes started at the Kőbanya pharmaceutical factory [when the 
brothels were shut down], but every one of them stayed there only a short 
while.…  They had a bad attitude towards work and work discipline. They 
did not behave appropriately in the workplace.  They behaved and dressed 
conspicuously, drawing attention from their fellow workers with bawdy 
language .…   
                                                 
370 Note that this is even after the advent of the New Course, when the penalties for most crimes were 
reduced. Magyar Rendőr, 19 September 1953. 
371 Esti Budapest, 9 January 1954, BFL XXXV. 95. e / 107 ő.e., “Intézkedési terv a Főváros őszi 
közbiztonsági helyzetének megjavitására,” 15 September 1954. 
372 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., Memorandum to N.J.né (no title), 24 September 1953.    
 159
At the Budapest oxygen plant, four such women found jobs.  They also 
had a bad attitude towards work discipline, and every one of them quit 
after a short time.  Of the 7 women who found positions at the Csepel 
mineral oil plant after the closure of the brothels, 6 left of their own 
accord.  One of them, Sz.F., still works there; she finishes her work 
punctually, and also demonstrates good work discipline.  She is a rare 
exception.373 
 
A common refrain in this report is that even while these ex-prostitutes worked at these 
factories, they often carried on their prior occupation at night (az esti órákban tovább 
folytatni az előző foglalkozását).  The consensus among the surveyed factory managers 
and personnel department heads was that in all likelihood there were still such women in 
the workforce, but they had no hard evidence to this effect. 
The union tasked with monitoring workers in the service industries didn’t even 
attempt to address the question of how many women might be working as prostitutes.  It 
instead provided a list of suggestions for how the authorities might keep track of 
prostitutes in general.  They suggested that the records of “particular women” who had 
rented flats in the immediate wake of the brothel closure should be reexamined: those that 
didn’t work and weren’t married should be forced to explain their means of support.  The 
morals police should supervise the public parks, certain cafés and other nightspots, and 
the workers’ hostels.  The recommended means for ferreting out “covert prostitutes” in 
their homes goes into particular detail: 
                                                 
373 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., “Jelentés az ipari üzemekben elhelyezkedett volt prostituált nőkről,” 12 
October 1953. 
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If this issue is to be cleared up in its entirety, an important assignment is to 
check the apartment-block- and district-level inhabitant records of women 
residents, as these indicate whether they are married or single [hajadon] in 
addition to where they work, and if single, who provides for them.  This 
could also be accomplished by the superintendents [házfelügyelők], 
because they know the inhabitants and the tenants.    From these records it 
will be possible to determine which women don’t have jobs, aren’t 
married, and don’t have anyone providing for them.  In this manner we 
would be able to get a clear picture of the district.374 
 
 
The administrator in charge of responding to the directive summed up both documents.  
Noting that the factory management hadn’t the faintest idea of the presence or the degree 
of prostitute activity in the workplace, and that for the most part prostitutes worked in 
places the trade unions couldn’t effectively reach, she concluded that she was unable to 
recommend any political methods for educating these women.375 
This spate of reports and memoranda reveals significant elements of how 
communist prostitution policy regressed to patriarchal norms in its control of women’s 
sexual activity.  Whereas the MNDSz women described above were judged primarily on 
the basis of their achievements, the dress, behavior, and language of the ex-prostitutes 
was central to their representation in the official transcript.  That they also were depicted 
as undisciplined and indolent workers should come as no surprise:  although Sz. F. was 
able to redeem herself through work, she was a rare exception—of all the factories 
surveyed, she was the only ex-prostitute who was found still working in the same factory 
                                                 
374 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., Memorandum to N. J.né, 15 October 1953.  Note that the Hungarian 
word hajadon also denotes ‘virgin’ and ‘maiden,’ as well as ‘spinster.’  
375 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., Memorandum to K., n.d., p. 2. 
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in 1953.376  Those women deemed especially worthy of surveillance were those working 
in low-income jobs (charwomen, attendants, etc.), as taxi-drivers, and in cafés and 
nightclubs.377 Women moving from the countryside to work in the factories were also 
thought to be in particular danger of falling into disgrace.378  Above all, women who 
appeared on the books as single or jobless were to be monitored most closely.  The 
parallel with the socialist state’s bourgeois predecessor is clear: those women who failed 
to live up to the normative standards of dress and behavior were those who found their 
sexual activity most closely monitored.  The major difference, of course, was that even 
after the advent of the New Course the brothels remained closed: socialist patriarchy had 
inadvertently divested itself of a proven means of controlling unruly female bodies. As 
monitoring sexual behavior was difficult in the factories, the administration turned its 
regulatory gaze to the streets and parks, to the bars and coffeehouses, and, most 
intrusively, into the residences of single women.   
A number of the émigrés interviewed after 1956 were cognizant of both the 
regime’s stated intent to eradicate prostitution and its relative inefficiency in 
accomplishing this goal.  Many of them were able to name specific sites of prostitute 
activity:  the “Three Hussars” Inn and the Ilkovics restaurant by the Western Railroad 
                                                 
376 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., “Jelentés az ipari üzemekben elhelyezkedett volt prostituált nőkről,” 12 
October 1953.  In addition to the specific factories mentioned in this report, N.J.né also received reports 
from the Budapest offices of the textile, ironworks, and postal unions.  
377 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., Memorandum to N. J.né, 15 October 1953.  One woman’s guarded 
account of her job in a café is suggestive of how the service industry might be conducive to a life of casual 
prostitution: “During the last five years I worked in a small restaurant.  It was a kind of meeting place for 
dates.  We served food and drinks….  I was a waitress but I had to keep company as well, so that the guests 
would drink more and thereby we would reach the prescribed norm….  Frequently, we also had a pianist 
and while he was playing we could charge twice the price for everything.  I made good money ….  No, I 
don’t think I was exploited.  I would rather say that this time I exploited the Communists.”  She also stated 
that she generally made 5000 forints per month, which seems very high. CUHRP Interview 126, Box 8, pp. 
10, 15. 
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Station in Budapest, a number of establishments in Berkocsis street, and so forth.379  
According to one young student from Debrecen,  
 
The Communists tried to be severe and punished prostitution, however, 
without any real results.   The police could not do anything.  In Debrecen 
the students knew exactly the houses of prostitution and tried all of them.  
I have no experience from Budapest.380 
 
 
Another interviewee recalled “Yes, a secret prostitution survived with the effect that the 
authorities lost any control over it, since officially prostitution did not exist any more.”381  
Another 1956 émigré, this one an engineer from Budapest, concurred: 
 
There was no officially recognized or tolerated prostitution.  It continued 
nevertheless in places and under circumstances that were beyond the limits 
of effective control of the authorities.382 
 
 
One young male interviewee demonstrated a degree of sympathy for the plight of young 
women trying to live on limited incomes: 
 
[T]here was a great deal of prostitution, especially in town.  The fact that 
the houses of prostitution were illegal contributed to this, because 
prostitution was forced out into the streets.  Often financial difficulties led 
women to this, and possibly loneliness and the fact that they were far away 
from their families. 
 
He was the exception.  Most male (and some female) respondents articulated the common 
patriarchal double standard:  that prostitution is a natural element of society, and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
378 BFL XXXV. 95. e. / 107 ő.e., Memorandum to N.J.né, 24 September 1953. 
379 CUHRP Interview 154, Box 10, p. 37. 
380 CUHRP Interview 228, Box 12, p. 39. 
381 CUHRP Interview 137, Box 9, pp. 47-48. 
382 CUHRP Interview 127, Box 8, p. 43. 
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prostitutes (not their customers) were lacking in moral character. Some of the 
respondents even openly articulated the patriarchal backlash against communist rule by 
associating “socialist women” with ex-prostitutes: “many former streetwalkers got Party 
offices,” and “Those women, who were engaged in that kind of business, mostly became 
members of the police force.”383   
These stereotypes obscure the reality of women’s sex work today much as they 
did in the 1950s. It is impossible to state with any certainty the actual motivations or 
intentions of those women who were labeled prostitutes by the regime.  Some of them 
were certainly selling sex for money.  However, the broader social and cultural context of 
sexual behavior in communist Hungary suggests a number of other alternatives.  Many 
accounts of life under communism recounted a severe lapse in morals in the 1950s, which 
begs interpretation in at least two different ways.384   Some women were doubtless 
experimenting with the same degree of sexual freedom men had always enjoyed: 
 
It seems that they [the regime] are stricter about sexual matters, but in 
reality sexual life became much looser.  In villages the youth is watched 
very carefully, and since the blame was laid on the girl, girls are reserved.  
The same could be observed among college girls, with a very few 
exceptions. …It was different, however, with the working class.  Girls 
have received complete equality, in life as well as jobs.   They moved and 
behaved as free and independent women if they went to work.  Since most 
of the women had jobs, it happened very frequently that they were 
involved with one of their colleagues.  The opportunity, and sometimes 
the desire to keep a job, resulted in a loosening of sexual morality.385  
 
 
                                                 
383 CUHRP Interview 208, Box11, p. 36, CUHRP Interview 132, Box 9, p. 22. 
384 I discuss this moral panic over morals at greater length in Chapter 4. 
385 CUHRP Interview 137, Box 9, p. 48. 
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However, as her closing remark indicates, women might also be forced to respond to 
unwanted sexual advances if they wanted to stay employed.  Secondly, as with the 
abolition of the corset at the turn of the century, notions of what constituted proper dress 
doubtless affected both popular and administrative perceptions of female sexuality and 
immorality.  Like the émigré who found herself officially labeled a cosmopolitan deviant 
for wearing pink lipstick, many other sources also recounted the strict, and dull, dress 
code of the stalinist period.386  The New Course ushered in significant change in this 
regard as well:   
 
[T]here were changes in 1953.  It was allowed to play chess even though Western 
dances were still forbidden.  Women were allowed to wear hats, nail polish and 
they could wear even high-heeled shoes which were not permitted before.387 
 
This relaxation of implicit sartorial controls coincided with the administrative perception 
of an increase in prostitute activity, and incidentally with the ‘joke’ at the start of this 
chapter: it seems that the New Course was significant in this regard as well.  Throughout 
the entire period, however, overdressed (by regime-normative standards) women were 
more likely to run afoul of the morals police.   Both the actual behavior and the 
motivations and intentions of those women labeled prostitutes by the regime remain 
opaque.  Regardless, even as these preexisting patriarchal biases replicated themselves in 
their new, communist context, prostitution continued under communism much as it had 
prior to 1948.   
                                                 
386 See, e.g., Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray, The Revolt of the Mind: A case Study of Intellectual 
Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Praeger, 1959, p. 130, CUHRP Interview 252, Box 13, pp. 
3-4, OSA/RFE Items 8245/51, mf 3, OSA/RFE Items 3213/54, mf 37, and OSA/RFE Items 7341/55, mf 57.   
387 CUHRP Interview 134, Box , p. 138.  
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In the relaxed atmosphere of the 1960s and 1970s, it became even more 
widespread.  Surveying the Hungarian flesh trade in 1977, Ivan Volgyes argued that “the 
prevalence and survival of working class prostitution … seems to indicate that this 
activity fulfills a functional social need and a socially acceptable role among the working 
class.”388  The “functionalism” and acceptability Volgyes identified was the perpetuation 
of the Janus-faced, patriarchal moral and sexual norm: one that remained alive and well 
under communism as it had been under its bourgeois predecessor. Unable to eradicate 
prostitution, the regime and its representatives instead opted to rail against it on a regular 
basis, and to intermittently prosecute its practitioners, rather than address the deeper 
social causes at work—especially when many of these underlying causes, such as 
widespread social dislocation and poverty among working women, were the effects of the 
regime’s own modernizing drive.   The net result, by 1956 at the latest, was that 
prostitution became normalized under communism much as it had been under the prewar 
regime.  After an initial surge of regulatory ambition, the communist regime’s 
prostitution policy rapidly came to resemble its bourgeois predecessor.  The same was 
true on the abortion front, where a workable symbiosis between the administration and 
patriarchal authority is apparent as early as 1953.      
 
 
Policing Reproduction:  Illegal Abortion 
 
The real historical anomaly that begs explanation is not why abortion was 
criminalized in the 1950s, but why it had been previously decriminalized at all.   In 
Hungary, as throughout Europe, abortion was illegal before World War II.  Its supposed 
                                                 
388 Volgyes, “Social Deviance,” p. 42. 
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sinful nature—in the eyes of the predominantly-Catholic Magyars—was exacerbated by 
underlying concerns about national reproduction.  In Hungary, the debate on population 
policy and reproductive rights had begun well before the Rákosi regime consolidated 
power in 1948.  By the 1880s, the isolated peasant practice of egyke, or limiting the 
family to one (preferably male) child, had initiated a debate among academics and 
clergymen.  Inheritance practices had never been standardized throughout Hungary, and 
in many regions partible inheritance was the norm.  In poorer regions such as 
Transdanubia, splitting the familial lands after the death of a patriarch could spell 
economic doom for the entire family.  As acquiring more land was generally not an 
option, many peasant families chose to limit reproduction instead.  Although abortion had 
been made illegal in 1878, the enforcement of this ban in the villages was practically 
impossible, and midwives continued to dispense abortifacients and also perform 
abortions well into the twentieth century.389  
After the severe casualties incurred during World War I and the massive 
population and territorial losses suffered at Trianon—and in the face of the steadily-
declining Magyar birthrate—the egyke debate surfaced anew.  Albeit perhaps overstated, 
Steven Béla Várdy’s assertion “the shock of Trianon was so pervasive and so keenly felt 
that the syndrome it produced can only be compared to a malignant national disease”390 
evokes its profound impact—and explains the heightened invective provoked by the 
single-child family issue. Coupled with longer-durée concerns about national 
                                                 
389 Ildikó Vasary, “The Sin of Transdanubia: The One-Child System in Rural Hungary,” Continuity and 
Change 4 (1989), pp. 429-468. 
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extinction,391 the “Trianon complex” exacerbated egyke’s semiotic threat to the nation’s 
well-being in the popular imagination.  Despite the fact that egyke was practiced in less 
than 8% of villages in Hungary, the spectacle of these Hungarian women choosing not to 
reproduce—when the nation was in crisis—provoked a outcry from the religious and 
intellectual communities. In the period 1920 to 1940, more than 280 different books, 
pamphlets, and articles decried the pallor egyke cast over the future of the Hungarian 
nation.392  Depending on the political stance of the writer, the one-child family signified 
the need for land reform, the dangers of increasing secularization and women’s 
emancipation, or the pernicious effects of stagnant tradition in general.  Despite this 
heightened attention from the press, steadily-increasing surveillance by the state, and the 
spread of modern medical practices and personnel into rural areas, abortion was still 
widely practiced throughout the interwar period.393 
Abortion was briefly decriminalized in 1945.  Although this was probably at least 
partially due to the general spirit of democratization that swept Hungary in the immediate 
postwar years, it was primarily an emergency measure to cope with the hundreds of 
thousands of rapes of Hungarian women by Soviet soldiers during the 1944-45 
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invasion.394  In any case, after 1945 women were able to get abortions free of charge, in 
proper health care facilities, as long as they received authorization from a medical officer.  
Significantly, this liberalization of abortion policy was not codified in law, as this would 
have caused a rift in the fragile postwar coalition between the Social Democrats and the 
social conservatives in the Smallholders’ Party.  It was instead instituted by a decree from 
the Ministry of Health, and not widely publicized. 395  The 1878 abortion law remained 
on the books, providing a fig leaf for popular sentiment—and, presently, for the 
realignment of population policy along communist lines. 
After an initial postwar boom the birthrate began a steady decline.  More women 
working translated to fewer babies born.  The party leadership became concerned.  From 
1950, Minister of Health Anna Ratkó preached an extensive anti-abortion campaign with 
a backup choir of doctors and health officials; illegal abortion (magzatelhajtás) was 
prosecuted with increasing fervor and severity.396  Signs proclaiming “For girls it is an 
honor to have children, for women their duty” (“Lánynak szülni dicsőség - asszonynak 
szülni kötelesség”) were hung in hospitals, factories, and other public spaces.397  Local 
law enforcement and health administration officials reacted accordingly.  Magzatelhajtás 
arrests increased steadily from 1950 on. Matters came to a head in mid-1952.  In 
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mid-1951.  OSA/RFE Items 4808/51 mf 2.  Many of the CUHRP émigrés recalled them in 1957, without 
any prompting by their interviewer:  see, e.g., CUHRP Interview 103, Box 7, p. 33, CUHRP Interview 120, 
Box 8, p. 43, CUHRP Interview 121, Box 8, p. 24, and CUHRP Interview 133, Box 9, p. 53. 
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February, the abortion question had first been broached in a Central Committee meeting, 
and the minutes from the 14 March meeting indicate that Rákosi was preoccupied with 
the issue and concerned with the declining birthrate.398  Previously, on 4 March, Ratkó 
had instructed the Ministry of Justice to find a few appropriate cases for a show trial.399  
The trials described below were selected sometime during in the summer and the 
sentences were decided by 24 July, when the results of Rátko’s search were reported back 
to the Central Committee.  The judicial apparatus received the go-ahead for the actual 
trials on 14 August, and they were performed on 2 and 4 September.400 The evidence 
presented in these trials reveals much about the practice, nature, and extent of the 
underground abortion network.   
The first trial found two abortion doctors and three of their ex-patients before the 
court.  Both of the doctors confessed to having performed several abortions since 1945, 
always in their offices and with sterile instruments.  Although the doctors averred that 
they usually charged between 200 and 300 forints for their services, other witnesses 
testified to fees as high as 500 or 600 forints; Dr. L.M. may have charged as much as 850 
forints for one of his last abortions, in March.  (Both doctors made around 2000 forints 
per month in their legal occupations.)  Similarly, the precise number of abortions 
performed by both men is indeterminate. Although L.M. testified at the show trial to 
having performed 14 or 15 operations between January and July of 1952, he had  
                                                 
398 Jobbágyi, “Az abortuszkérdés a pártiratokban: 1950-1981,” Válóság 5 (1991), pp. 54-57.  
399 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 7 ő.e., p. 4.   
400 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 7 ő.e., p. 6 and pp. 7-8.   For some reason, the third trial suggested by the 
Justice Ministry—that of Dr. K.S., who allegedly charged as much as 1000 forints for some abortions—was 
not selected to fill out the bill of show trials. 
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previously confessed to 22 in that same period.  The case summary in the Justice 
Ministry’s internal documents puts the number at 25, while the midwife who had assisted 
him testified to 70 or 80 abortions.401  Both men were sentenced to seven years and six 
months in prison, a 10,000-forint fine, a 10-year ban from public affairs (közügyektől 
eltiltás), and a lifetime prohibition from practicing medicine.  The women involved drew 
much lighter sentences: 1 year each for K.F. and G. V., ten months for A.M., and three 
years’ prohibition from public affairs for all three.402 
The abortion providers in the second case had committed much more sensational 
crimes.  Neither was actually a doctor, although one had some medical training.  They 
had consistently performed abortions as a team.  Unlike the doctors in the first case, they 
had done so on plastic sheets in private residences and via glucose injection.  This 
method often incurred severe hemorrhaging: indeed, their arrest was due to one such 
incident, in which one of their patients started bleeding so heavily they rushed her to the 
hospital and were arrested as a consequence.  On a few occasions when the pregnancy 
was too far advanced for the injection method to be effective, they had resorted to 
infanticide, initiating childbirth prematurely and then killing the newborn baby. They 
charged around 400 forints per operation.  The leader of this group drew a 10-year 
sentence; the women in this latter case who had aided in the infanticides drew sentences 
of 3-4 years each; the women who had been operated on, less than a year each.403 
 
                                                 
401 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 7 ő.e., p. 6. 
402 BFL XXV. 4a. B. II. 4897/1952. 
403 BFL XXV. 4a. B. II. 3632/1952.  
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Given the regime’s intent to make examples of these men and women, their class 
origins and personal histories were largely irrelevant—except to condemn them all the 
further where they were disadvantageous.  One of the female defendants in the latter case, 
M.G., was the deklasszalt scion of a Jewish family that owned one of the major industries 
in Budapest until its nationalization in World War II. The leader of the second group put 
on trial, G. I., was an ex-Arrow Cross member. Although these dubious pasts were not 
stressed at the trial, they were the defining characteristics of these defendants as they 
were portrayed in the confidential 14 August memo.404  Possible mitigating 
circumstances—most notably Dr. L. M.’s demonstrated past devotion to the 
revolutionary cause (he had joined the Red Army of Béla Kun’s short-lived Hungarian 
Socialist Republic in 1919, was captured by the Romanian Army, and spent time in a 
Romanian jail as a result)405—counted for naught in the eyes of the court.   
Over and above the fates of these individual defendants, the trials also reveal the 
covert and extensive contours of the underground abortion industry.  The abortion 
network operated entirely via word-of-mouth.  In both trials, the women involved had 
learned where to go for abortions from other women, or (in the second case) the male 
accomplices were able to seek out the abortion providers with minimal effort. In the first 
trial, one of the doctors had repeatedly referred women seeking abortions to the other.  
The brief biographies included in the court records demonstrate two more characteristics 
of these informal networks.  Whereas illegal abortion networks in the countryside 
remained strictly circumscribed to a few villages at most, the urban networks that surface 
                                                 
404 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 7 ő.e., p. 6.  
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in these trials were not limited by neighborhoods or even cities.  Women came from all 
over Budapest to these abortion providers.  In the latter trial, two of the clients came from 
as far away as Tatabanya (62 km) and Balatonfűzfő (105 km).  While it was never easy to 
get an abortion, it does not seem that distance or surveillance proved insurmountable.    
A major issue in obtaining an abortion may have been not the state’s attempts to 
control reproduction, but affordability.  The women on trial on 4 September 1952 made 
an average of 720 forints per month.406  By mid-1952, the usual cost of an abortion in 
Budapest was 400 or 500 forints.  (Abortions were somewhat cheaper in the smaller 
cities: as late as 1956, the operation cost as little as 250 forints in Sztálinváros.)407  The 
price of an abortion was similarly prohibitive in a separate case dating from March 1953.  
Dr. H.B. had provided abortions for 27-year old B.I. in March 1952 and then again in 
November, charging her 500 forints the first time and 600 the second.  (Dr. H.B. received 
a sentence of 6 years in prison; B.I., 7 months in prison and a 400-forint fine).408  During 
his trial, Dr. L. M. testified that he charged poorer women as little as 150 forints, and in 
some cases he went through with the operation even when he knew he wouldn’t get 
paid.409  This was an expensive procedure for women living on or below the poverty line.  
For those women who were unable to procure abortions, this may have been due as much 
to poverty as it was statist intervention and surveillance. 
                                                                                                                                                 
405 Indeed, this might have actually worked against him—Mevius argues convincingly that the 1919ers 
were perceived as a threat by the Muscovite element in the MDP.  Mevius, Agents of Moscow, pp. 69-86. 
406 BFL XXV. 4a. B. II. 3632/1952, pp 37-38.  
407 Sándor Horváth, “Gyermekvállalás, abortusz, születésszabályozás Sztálinvárosban,” in Fons, Volume 3 
(2001). 
408 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Iü) / 17 ő.e., p. 17. 
409 BFL XXV. 4a. B. II. 4897/1952, pp. 44-45.  
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Lastly, the trials indicate the absence of alternatives to abortion.  Contraceptives 
had been available (albeit not displayed in pharmacy windows nor advertised) before the 
war, but a January 1949 resolution by the National Health Council made a prescription 
necessary to obtain them, and restricted these to women who could demonstrate medical 
need.410  None of the women in these trials indicated that they had ever used any barrier 
or chemical contraceptive means.  The youngest of the three women on trial, 27-year old 
K.F., had already had two abortions before the one for which she was arrested.411  Denied 
any alternatives, for these women abortion was their primary means of regulating 
reproduction. 
The trials demonstrated—as they were intended to—the increasing fervor of the 
regime’s pronatalist campaign, which kicked into high gear in late 1952 and early 1953.   
One Health Ministry pamphlet from early 1953 declared that one in four pregnancies 
were aborted.  It went on to state that 70-80,000 abortions were performed each year, and 
it clearly delineated their antisocial nature: had these women instead chosen to carry 
those children to term, the result would have been enough children to populate an 
industrial town.412  In August 1952, the Health Ministry secretly rescinded the 
“permissive” 1945 decree—still, as yet, without publicizing this change in reproductive 
policy—and spelled out the new abortion law. Although abortion was not made entirely 
illegal, any woman desiring an abortion had to plead her case before a committee.  A 
second committee was also established, for appeal cases.  Medical training was not  
                                                 
410 MOL XIX-C-19. 15. d., cited in Pető, “Women’s Rights,” p. 55. 
411 BFL XXV. 4a. B. II. 4897/1952, p. 22.   
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required of the men and women who served on these committees; in rural areas 
especially, where the woman seeking the abortion was forced to appear before members 
of her local community, these abortion committees operated as powerful social sanctions. 
The show trials, heightened propaganda, and the revision of the law in secret all 
antedated the official reformulation of regime abortion policy. 
In February 1953, the Decree for the Protection of Women and Children (or 
Hatarozat az Anya- és Gyermekvédelem továbbfejlesztéséről, hereafter HAGV) finally 
articulated the above abortion policy in the public transcript.  Significantly, it also 
provided various incentives for women to have children.413  It provided immediate 
payouts on birth for all mothers, and graduated incomes for mothers of large families.  
Six or more children earned the mother special recognition; 7 or more children earned 
added cash bonuses.  The HAGV also required those individuals age 18 or older—male 
and female alike—who chose to remain childless to pay a childlessness tax (gyermektelen 
adót).  It seems likely that Rákosi, Ratkó, and the other party officials concerned with the 
issue finally realized that incentives might be a necessary complement to prosecution.  
Signficantly, the finale version of the pronatalist policy had barely been put to the test 
when the New Course was inaugurated.  The regime’s obvious intent to crack down on 
magzatelhajtás was derailed by the general decrease in the prosecution of all crimes after 
mid-1953.  
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1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Investigations Arraignments Convictions
 
From 1950 to 1955, 6588 people were tried in connection with illegal abortion; 
4676 of them were found guilty.415  In 1952 alone, there were 1386 convictions for illegal 
abortions.  Of them, 894 were sentenced to prison terms varying in duration from six 
                                                 
414 Investigation data are from MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (F) / 70 ő.e., p. 314a; unfortunately, this report did 
not indicate the number of investigations for 1950. Trial and conviction data are from the Office of the 
Chief Prosecutor, MOL XX-10, cited in Pető, “Women’s Rights,” p. 75.  
415  Pető, “Women’s Rights,” p. 75.  See Tibor Valuch, Magyarország társadalomtörténete a XX. század 
második felében (Budapest: Osiris, 2001), p. 34, for live birth and abortion rates throughout the period of 
communist rule. 
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months or less to more than ten years in prison.  In January 1953, at the peak of the 
crackdown, 217 persons were convicted for magzatelhajtás-related crimes: in addition to 
the 113 women caught having abortions, 5 doctors, 16 nurses, 40 uncertified 
practitioners, and 43 accomplices (in either procurement or the operation itself) were also 
convicted.  In general, doctors found guilty of performing abortions received sentences of 
5-10 years in prison, unlicensed practitioners received 5-7 years, and nurses 2-5 year 
sentences.  The women themselves received sentences of 2-8 months in prison on 
average, while accomplices’ sentences were generally less than one year.  Hefty fines 
accompanied all these prison sentences.416  This hardline approach remained in effect 
until early 1953, but then magzatelhajtás prosecutions—as with most other crimes—
dropped off steadily after Nagy came to power in June 1953.    
The number of magzatelhajtás trials peaked in early 1953.  Whereas around 894 
people were sentenced in all of 1952 in connection with illegal abortion, 1387 were 
brought to trial—and 965 of them received sentences—in the first half of 1953 alone.417  
However, in the second half of 1953, only 453 new cases were initiated.  In this same 
period, magzatelhajtás convictions drop by 342%.  Illegal abortion convictions dropped a 
further 221% in the first half of 1954.  As was the case with other crimes at the advent of 
the New Course, there was also a spate of acquittals and cases that were simply dropped 
by the court:  more illegal abortion cases were dismissed in the third quarter of 1953 than 
                                                 
416 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 3 ő.e., pp. 410, 413, 414.  
417 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 18 ő.e., p. 338. 
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the entire first half of the year.418 As early as the summer of 1953, the regime had backed 
off on prosecuting magzatelhajtás.  Then, on 1 January 1954, “abortions for reasons of 
social difficulties” were allowed.419  In this more tolerant environment, the number of 
abortions reported to the health ministry increased almost exponentially: from 2,777 in 
1953 to 16,281 in 1954, thence 35,598 in 1955. As the number of reported miscarriages 
remains roughly constant throughout this period, this rise must be due to increased 
reporting of abortions previously hidden from the administration rather than an actual 
increase.420  A corollary effect of the HAGV, it seems, was to increase the legibility of 
women’s reproduction.   
 In all this the party leadership’s primary concern was to head off the declining 
birth rate.   According to Gábor Jobbágyi,  
 
The “abortion question” [az abortuszkérdes] was always presented as a 
population policy, or demographic, question.  That it was also a medical, 
legal, moral, and social question was never considered.421    
 
 
The birthrate did increase all throughout the country:  In Budapest alone, the number of 
live births rose from 28,694 in 1952 to 37,920 in 1953.422  Just as the continued decline 
in 1951 and 1952 had been partially responsible for the decision to ban abortion, so was 
the upswing in the birthrate regarded as a success by regime demographers.  Indeed, a 
                                                 
418 Although the conviction rate (i.e., the ratio of those sentenced to those brought to trial) also dips 
significantly in the second half of 1953—from the pre-New Course norm of 92% to 75%—this is more a 
reflection of the high volume of cases the courts were reviewing during this period.  By late 1954, the 
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421 Gábor Jobbágyi, “Az abortuszkérdes,” p. 54. 
422 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 6 ő.e., p. 115. 
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1954 study—with its projections based on the post-decree birth rate—forecast a 
burgeoning young population by 1965.423  As long as the issue was viewed at this 
abstract and impersonal level, the regime’s pronatalist scheme was a success. 
 Nurses and doctors, and the women whose reproduction had been planned for 
them, had a different perspective.  Even prior to 1953, the hospital system had never 
received adequate support from the state.  Its funds were cut even more during the New 
Course—precisely when a horde of babies descended upon the maternity wards and 
nurseries.  A medical student interviewed by RFE in October 1953 recalled that the 
gynecological wards were swamped with expectant 13- and 15-year olds.424  One nurse 
recounted her experience trying to run the premature ward at a major Budapest hospital 
during this time: six cubicles, each measuring two by two meters and intended to hold 
four babies apiece, usually held eight or nine instead.   
 
Two babies had to lie in one bed.  For two more, cushions were put into 
the drawer of the dressing table, which had to be kept on top of the bathtub 
and taken away at bathing time.  Aside from this, a stool with a laundry 
basket had to accommodate one or two more babies.425 
 
 
In another Budapest hospital, 22 cribs were somehow fit into a 20-square meter room.426  
Numerous sources cite other instances of 2 and 3 babies to a crib, and bedlinens left 
unchanged for several shifts at a time.  Contagious diseases spread like wildfire in these 
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hothouse conditions.427  The few crèches, children’s homes, and factory nurseries that 
had been built were swamped with children.     
The complete absence of planning for this baby boom was even more obvious 
outside of Budapest.  Reports to the Ministry of Health from all over the country 
regularly decried the lack of adequate facilities, beds, medicine, and medical staff.428 A 
December 1953 report from the Szolnok county party headquarters revealed that not a 
single rural medical facility had been modernized since the prewar period. Hospital 
expansions planned years prior had not yet been completed, and there were severe 
shortages of medical equipment.  These factors resulted in a county-wide 34% mortality 
rate among premature babies in 1953.  In Karcag, the maternity ward was 400 meters 
down the road from the hospital itself, and there was no provision for transportation 
between the two points.429 In Kunszentmiklós, the building intended to serve as a 
maternity ward was instead converted into a goose hatchery in 1954. When a birthing 
mother died due to inadequate treatment shortly thereafter, disgust with the regime—“the 
state cares more about its goslings than its children”—was reported swiftly thereafter.430  
Although the central committee’s fixation on population growth might not have been as 
monomaniacal as Jobbagyi suggests, it is clear that basic provisions for the health of 
Magyar women and the future generation of workers did not figure largely in the 
pronatalist campaign—with drastic consequences for those women who chose to have 
children at this time.   
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In light of this blatant administrative oversight, it is not surprising that the finer 
points of the pronatalist campaign were also overlooked or ignored by local officials.  
The HAGV’s provisions safeguarding women’s salaries as they took on less-strenuous 
jobs while pregnant, and guaranteeing their return to their original positions upon their 
return from maternity leave, were often ignored by employers. In most cases, pregnant 
women were simply told that there were no easier positions available, and put out of 
work.  The December 1953 follow-up report on the Mother- and Child-Protection Act in 
Budapest found numerous examples of pregnant women denied less-strenuous positions 
and new mothers who were denied their old positions on returning after childbirth.431  A 
nationwide Health Ministry survey conducted in 1954 found that “in both Budapest and 
the countryside, the lighter-work requirement for pregnant women is not observed in 
many factories, and difficult to implement in others.”  Although it did assert that some 
factories—those in which “there is a factory doctor and a district nurse and the 
relationship with the factory administration and trade union is good”—were able to 
successfully live up to the lighter-work and return policies, it only named one factory in 
which this was actually the case.  The majority of enterprises surveyed were failures in 
this regard.432  The benefits associated with the Mother- and Child-Protection Act were 
likewise distributed in scattershot manner.  One RFE informant reported in early 1954 
that every woman who gave birth received her 400 forints straightaway—800, if she was 
underage.433  If true, this would be the exception rather than the norm. An October 1953 
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report from the Kaposvár party organization to the Health Ministry revealed numerous 
problems with the administration of the birth bonus.  It disclosed that 
  
The distribution of the awards for the mothers of many children has not 
been uniformly applied in our county.  It has recently come to our 
attention that mothers who have 7, 8, or 9 children have been overlooked 
and have yet to receive any sort of award.  In the future the social-political 
organs as well as welfare officers will monitor how the district committees 
recommend these mothers for awards.434 
 
 
In light of the above evidence, it seems that regime officials were probably wise to focus 
solely on the demographic effects of its pronatalist campaign:  it was a failure by any 
other standard. 
The nominal success of this campaign was clearly not a straightforward function 
of the state’s persecution of abortion providers and these deviant women.  The birth rate 
had declined throughout 1951 and 1952 when prosecution was at its peak, and it 
continued to rise even after prosecution was reduced.  Here, two corollary effects of the 
New Course are of central importance.  One element of Nagy’s scheme to “rationalize” 
industry was to decentralize decision-making to some extent, putting more power in the 
hands of local managers—who were, in turn, reliant on the elite cadre of skilled male 
workers to ensure that quotas were still met even as costs were cut.  Moreover, although 
all workers benefited from New Course price cuts and wage increases to some degree, the 
shift in focus from heavy industry to light manufacture and agriculture resulted in the 
disappearance of many well-paying jobs.  The net effect of these changes was that many 
workers lost their jobs or were moved into less-lucrative positions.  New workers—
                                                 
434 MOL M-KS-276. f. 96 (Eü) / 9 ő.e., p. 41. 
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peasants, younger workers, and above all women—were the ones with the least influence 
with either the shop floor patriarchy or management, and thus the first to find themselves 
rationalized.435  After June 1953, the egalitarian drive to include women in industrial 
production was substantially weakened by what was essentially an implicit gentlemen’s 
agreement between managers and their skilled male elite.  Women lost out as a result.   
Viewing the 1953-54 baby boom solely as a victory for the state and patriarchal 
tradition would be a mistake.  Hungarian women who wanted to have children had been 
thwarted by a vicious two decades of history: the Depression, then World War II, then the 
poverty-stricken postwar years, and then the heyday of stalinist rule had all made having 
children and raising a family a difficult proposition.  Frequent oversights and unfulfilled 
promises aside, the HAGV made having children a much more viable option than at any 
other time in the last twenty years.  This simple desire to raise a family is apparent in the 
November 1954 interview with a peasant woman who had until recently lived in a small 
village near Szeged.  She discussed her recent marriage and the birth of her first child 
with a Radio Free Europe interviewer at some length.436  She and her husband were 
married, in a church, in the summer of 1953; she did not work outside the home, and 
became pregnant shortly after the wedding.  When she was due in March 1954, her 
husband took her to the nearest large village by oxcart, and then an ambulance took her 
the rest of the way to the hospital in Szeged.  She went into labor en route and gave birth 
just as she arrived at the hospital.  There were no further complications with the delivery 
of her first child, and the 27-year old mother was sent to the maternity ward shortly 
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thereafter.  While at the Szeged hospital, this women was made painfully aware of the 
repercussions of the regime’s abortion policy: 
 
Unfortunately, I also remember a number of deaths during my stay 
there.  For instance, when the ambulance brought some woman to the 
obstetrical ward who seemed suspicious (because someone, or she herself, 
had interfered with her pregnancy) the doctors could not examine her.  If 
she did not admit that some doctor, midwife, or whoever else had 
intervened in her pregnancy, and name them, she could not be admitted to 
the clinic and might even bleed to death right there.  
Such a thing happened while I was laid up in the clinic.  This 
woman—the only thing I knew about her was her name, something like 
Ilona—did not want to “confess,” and the inquiry into the matter took so 




These markedly divergent outcomes of these two women’s encounters with the 
communist regime are instructive.  Our informant was no ideal socialist woman: she had 
not joined the party, the women’s organization, nor the collective farm.  However, these 
failings did not result in her persecution, much less her death.  “Ilona,” on the other hand, 
was guilty of having procured an abortion—or perhaps merely the victim of a simple 
mishap.  Had she survived, she might have been tried for this crime and sentenced to six 
months to a year, or possibly more, in prison.  Whatever our informant’s other 
transgressions were, in duly performing her reproductive role she was at least acting in 
accordance with the regime’s gendered imperative—but this was also a choice she made 
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* * * 
 
 
No more power to uneducated peasant women! 
   —one of many slogans shouted during the 1956 Revolution438  
 
In the party-state’s drive to modernize Hungary, the mobilization of women in 
industry was both ideologically sound and economically necessary.  Just as the prewar, 
bourgeois socioeconomic hierarchy was to be replaced by equality of all workers, so was 
the preexisting patriarchal order to be supplanted by gender equality and equal 
opportunity for women.  However, as Katerina Clark found in the case of revolutionary 
Russia, even “when there is an inversion in the hierarchy of class….  a fundamental 
inversion of the hegemonic hierarchies is much more difficult to attain.”439  To build on 
this point, it is also the case that the initial surge of iconoclastic and revolutionary fervor 
will often recongeal around some preexisting axiologies once the dust settles: in this case, 
the patriarchal norms of interwar Hungary.  This process is clearly apparent in the early 
history of the USSR, when various measures intended to ensure equality for women 
(especially work opportunities, the right to divorce and appeal for alimony, and the 
legalization of abortion) were instated as early as 1918, but were largely abandoned by 
the mid-1930s.440  The same basic trend holds for Hungary; here, however, this 
thermidorian process took less than a decade. 
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The regime’s mobilization of women as workers and activists resulted in a 
patriarchal backlash.  Their successes, from being promoted at work to fulfilling their 
MNDSz duties and népnevelő subscription quotas, were perceived as encroachments 
upon male prerogative.  Although some women were able to work the system to their 
advantage—among them women of poor-peasant and working-class origin, who would 
never have had such opportunities under the old regime—most were subjected to the 
double burden of taking on wage labor while still being responsible for the household.  
The working mother was the norm; deviance from it, in the form of either sex work or 
reproductive independence, was considered a problem by both the state and patriarchal 
elements of society. 
The history of prostitution in early communist Hungary clearly indicates the 
gradual evolution of a workable symbiosis between regime and patriarchal interests.  
Although the administration set out to abolish prostitution, it proved unable to do so. 
Indeed, closing the brothels was probably counterproductive, as it removed a reliable 
means of policing female sexuality without providing an effective alternative in its place.  
Regulating sexuality then took the form of close surveillance of not only bars and cafés, 
but also the homes of potentially-deviant (i.e., single or jobless) women.  In any case, the 
regime gradually scaled back its attempts to abolish prostitution.  By the 1960s, the social 
and legal status of prostitution was such that it had resumed its patriarchal function of 
social control.  Although the monitoring of female sexuality had shifted from brothels to 
other public spaces—and, notably, residences as well—communist prostitution policy 
otherwise bore a strong resemblance to its bourgeois predecessor.   
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The politics of reproduction in Hungary also demonstrate this collusion between 
the state and patriarchal elements of society.  The liberalization of abortion policy in 
1945 was, historically speaking, an anomaly.  As the birth rate dropped, historic concerns 
about national extinction dovetailed with the regime’s desire for more workers.   
Propaganda and show trials both antedated the legal restriction of abortion in 1953. 
Despite these measures, an illegal abortion network persisted throughout the period:  
much as in liberal-democratic societies, banning abortion only drove it underground 
instead of eradicating it.  Throughout the period, those women who chose to have 
children did so; those that did not were able to regulate their reproduction even in late 
1952 and early 1953, when abortion was most stringently controlled—and afterwards, 
when the state’s proscriptions were augmented by the reassertion of patriarchal control.  
The regime’s success in combating magzatelhajtás came only when its proscriptions 
aligned with benefits for mothers and, more importantly, the reassertion of shop floor 
male prerogative after the advent of the New Course.  Shunted into lower-paying jobs or 
out of work entirely, many women chose to take advantage of the benefits offered by the 
HAGV.  The point is that stalinist repression was not the sole, or even the major, key to 
increasing the birthrate: it was rather the return to patriarchy that resulted in the 
population policy’s nominal success. 
Prostitution and abortion policy under communism reveal that social interests 
were fragmentary and divided, and not diametrically opposed to the party-state’s 
ambitions on every issue. These gendered forms of criminal behavior do not demonstrate 
the straightforward linkage between crime and resistance apparent in the previous two 
chapters.  Underlying patriarchal norms both complicated the regime’s intentions—as 
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was the case with prostitution—and complemented them, as occurred in the battle over 
reproductive freedom.  It seems likely that many of those women labeled prostitutes by 
the regime were merely guilty of practicing the same sexual freedom men enjoyed.  
Some—especially those already condemned by a deklasszalt background—may have 
simply been wearing lipstick, hats, or high heels, or acting in a manner that clashed with 
the unique stew of administrative and patriarchal social norms in effect throughout the 
period.  The motives of the women and doctors arrested for magzatelhajtás are similarly 
opaque.  Women based their reproductive choices on a number of factors and subject to 
many pressures.  I suspect that most made these choices based on personal, individual 
factors rather than as a deliberate attempt to thwart regime policy, while some doctors 
certainly performed abortions for pecuniary gain rather than out of any sort of 
oppositional intent.       
In any case, to the extent these behaviors were indeed intended as acts of 
resistance, they were directed against not only the regime but also the resurgent 
patriarchal norms of society.  As we have seen in the previous two chapters, the 
communist administration was riddled with competing interest groups.  This 
interdepartmental and administrative confusion severely hampered its ability to carry out 
the desires of the party elite, and unified and mobilized broad segments of society against 
certain of the state’s acts.   But as the above gender troubles suggest, society was no 
monolithic entity either.  Gender difference and the persistence of patriarchy significantly 
influenced the state’s attempts to alter social norms of sexuality and reproduction, 
problematizing the former but enabling the latter.  Moreover, gender was not the only 
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divisive factor in Hungarian society under communism.  As we shall see in the following 
chapter, there was also a generation gap. 
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CHAPTER 4: COSMOPOLITANISM AND DEVIANT LEISURE   
 
A curious letter to the editor appeared in an August 1953 issue of Esti Budapest, 
the evening leisure newspaper for Communist Hungary.  Entitled “We want to dance 
properly,” it described one young reader’s unsettling experience from the previous 
weekend: 
 
I’m young, I love life and I’m happy that I am living right at this moment.  
I also like to have a good time.  Last Sunday something happened to me 
that I can find no explanation for.  Three of us were walking around 
downtown looking for a good time…we heard music emanating from the 
Hungarian-Soviet fellowship club.  We tried to get in, but were denied 
entry at the door.  This surprised us, but we were even more surprised 
when we looked into the club.   A jazz ensemble was playing in front of 
the young crowd—but in such a manner!  There were four or five couples 
dancing . . . also outrageously!  If we hadn’t been in the Hungarian-Soviet 
Fellowship club, we could’ve imagined that we were in some kind of 
American dancehall.  …   We want to dance properly and not in the 
American, hooligan [jampec] mode.  We asked each other how it is 
possible that people dance in this manner in Budapest, and moreover how 
this could happen in such a place as the Hungarian-Soviet fellowship 
club.441 
 
In the absence of any contextual evidence, it is impossible to determine this young 
correspondent’s ingenuousness: this letter to the editor can be read as either the honest 
dismay of a true believer or a particularly adept case of “speaking Bolshevik.”442  What is 
certain, however, is that an underground jazz scene permeated communist Hungary.  In 
the late 1940s and early 1950s—at the peak of the cold war, and before the advent of rock 
                                                 
441  “Mi rendesen akarunk táncolni,” Esti Budapest, 12 August 1953.     
442  It is tempting to read this letter in the latter light, demonstrating as it does that it is specifically the 
Soviet-Hungarian club that is the site of this illicit behavior, and occurring as it does in the wake of Stalin’s 
death and the advent of the New Course, when criticism of the Soviet presence was more likely.   
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and roll—jazz was one of the more tempting cultural exports the USA had to offer.  
Scores of sources recount how Hungarians tuned in to jazz as well as political broadcasts 
from Western radio broadcasts on a regular basis, in villages as well as Budapest; 
moreover, musicians regularly flaunted the official proscriptions against playing jazz in 
bars, clubs, and cafes.  
Worst of all—from the regime’s standpoint—jazz seemed to be the major culprit 
in the coalescence of a deviant youth subculture: the jampec, or hooligan. These young 
working-class males wore flashy clothes, danced the latest western dances late into the 
night, and mouthed off to officials; they epitomized the recrudescent threat of western 
influence, or ‘cosmopolitanism.’  To the communist regime, this hip debauchery 
threatened not only the transformation of society currently underway, but also—as it was 
the youth who took to it most ardently—the entire forthcoming generation of workers.   
Ironically, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, roughly the same assumptions were made 
about the subversive potential of jazz, and the significance of hooliganism: Eisenhower’s 
White House used jazz as a popular-cultural complement to its propaganda broadcasts,443 
and the analysts at Radio Free Europe (RFE) interpreted the jampec phenomenon as a 
sign of open resistance to communist rule.444  Held in thrall as they were by the 
oversimplified and manichaean logic of the Cold War, observers both east and west 
concluded that the intrusion of jazz into the Communist cultural sphere was a proximate 
cause of ideological subversion.  
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Although the impact of American culture in the postwar period has inspired a 
wealth of literature on the “coca-colonization” of Western Europe, its effects in Eastern 
Europe remain largely unexamined.445  Analyses of the effects of western media in 
Eastern Europe have for the most part focused on the supposed political impact of 
broadcasts by stations such as RFE, Voice of America (VOA), and Armed Forces 
Network (AFN).446  Hungary is no exception to this rule:  fifty years on, one of the 
central debates in the historiography of 1956 remains the issue of Radio Free Europe’s 
complicity in inspiring or exacerbating the doomed rebellion.447  This debate seems 
deadlocked until the actual listening practices of Hungarians are examined in more 
detail.448  Leaving aside the indeterminate effects of western political broadcasts, it is 
clear that American and western European culture—in the form of literature, movies, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
443  According to a December 1955 progress report on NSC 5505/1, the “Music USA” program, which 
consisted of one hour of popular music and one hour of jazz, was explicitly targeted at youthful listeners in 
an effort to undermine Communist authority.  DEPL, OSANSA Records, NSC Policy Papers, Box 14, pp. 
15,18.  This report was finally declassified in February 2006. See also Joanna Granville, The Last Domino 
(College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2004), pp. 158-164. 
444 OSA/RFE Items 12594/52, mf 14, “Evaluation Comments.”      
445 See, e.g., Phil Melling and Jon Roper, editors, Americanisation and the Transformation of World 
Cultures (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), and Richard Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of 
Americanization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).  For a recent analysis that discusses 
cultural consumption on both sides of the Iron Curtain, see David Crew, editor, Consuming Germany in the 
Cold War (New York: Berg, 2003). 
446 See Alan L. Heil, Voice of America: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), Arch 
Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: the Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000), Michael Nilson, The War of the Black Heavens: The 
Battles of Western Broadcasting During the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), George 
Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Struggle for Democracy: My War Within the Cold War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997). 
447 Most recently, Charles Gati has argued that RFE should have supported Imre Nagy when he first 
assumed power, and that the station was guilty of unduly encouraging the rebels, while A. Ross Johnson 
has argued that it was, by and large, blameless. Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and 
the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), p. 102, and 
Johnson, “Setting the Record Straight: Role of Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,” 
HAPP Occasional paper No.3, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/happ.OP-3.pdf (viewed 1 
December 2007), pp. 1. 26. 
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especially jazz—were quite popular on the other side of the Iron Curtain.449  Hungarians 
avidly consumed the literature, movies, and music of the West—especially jazz, “the 
forbidden fruit” (“a tiltott gyümölcs”450) of decadent capitalist culture.  The regime 
proved unable to effectively combat this threat.  Its relevant constituent elements—the 
communist press, the legal administration, and the Organization of Working Youth 
(Dolgozó Ifjúság Szövetsége, or DISz)—operated at cross purposes.   Initially, the jampec 
served as a useful propaganda tool, a stereotypical ‘folk devil,’451 and the communist 
press railed against these youthful deviants on a regular basis.  This moral 
entrepreneurship did not fall entirely on deaf ears, as some members of the older 
generation—fed up with the perceived loose morals of the youth, and wary of the 
economic threat young workers posed to their livelihood—were receptive to this 
message.  At the same time, the police and legal administration closely monitored the 
most extreme manifestation of youthful deviance in the form of juvenile crime, while the 
DISz sought to convert the young to the communist cause.  These control measures were 
                                                                                                                                                 
448 See Mark Pittaway’s “The Education of Dissent: The Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary, 1951-
1956,” Cold War History, Volume IV, Number 1 (October 2003), pp. 97-116, for a promising first step in 
this direction.  
449 For the most part, scholars of Eastern Europe have focused on rock and roll rather than jazz.  See, e.g.,  
Anna Szemere, Up From the Underground: The Culture of Rock Music in Postsocialist Hungary 
(University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2001), Sabrina Ramet, editor, Rocking the State: Rock 
Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) Timothy Ryback, 
editor, Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). The exception to this rule is Uta Poiger’s excellent Jazz, Rock and Rebels: 
Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000).  On jazz in the USSR, see Michael May, “Swingin’ Under Stalin: Russian Jazz During the Cold War 
and Beyond,” in Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, editors, Here, There, and Everywhere: The 
Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), pp. 
179-191, S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union  (New York: Limelight, 
1994), and William Minor, Unzipped Souls (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995). 
450 Géza Gábor Simon, editor, Fejezetek a Magyar Jazz történetéből 1961-ig (Budapest:  Magyar 
Jazzkutatási Társaság, 2001), p. 175. 
451 See Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2002), especially pp. 
149-172. 
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not successful.  As hooliganism worsened in the mid-1950s, the jampec stereotype crept 
into the administrative transcript as well.  DISz reports on working-class youth reveal a 
deep-seated anxiety about the spread of hooliganism among factory workers.  It seems 
that the propaganda machine might have operated too well, inadvertently encouraging 
rather than dissuading youthful deviance of this type.   In any case, the battle against 
western culture was lost by summer 1956.  On the jazz front, the attempted cultural 
revolution was in retreat long before the actual shooting started in October. 
   
Communist Culture and All That Jazz 
 
  
The ideologues that ran the communist state sought to complement their political 
and economic centralization with a cultural program that would recast everyman (and -
woman) in the communist mold.  This program was based on the Soviet model that had 
calcified in the course of the 1930s.  In the Soviet Union, communist cultural policy was 
initially inchoate.  During the 1920s, censors had allowed a remarkable degree of 
freedom to filmmakers and other artists.452  The result was the Soviet avant-garde 
movement, one of socialism’s lasting contributions to world culture.  Films such as 
Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin (1925) and Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie 
Camera (1929) forever changed the way movies were made.  These films’ technical 
brilliance was not matched by popular acclaim, as most viewers preferred films with clear 
                                                 
452  Although the impact of socialist innovation was felt in all forms of cultural production, I will focus 
herein on cinema, as Lenin proclaimed it “the most important of the arts” and also to provide historical 
context for the two Hungarian films I discuss below. On Hungarian cinema during this period, see Gábor 
Szilágyi, Tüzkeresztség (Budapest: Magyar Filmintézet, 1992) and Életjel (Budapest: Magyar Filmintézet, 
1994).       
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plot lines and characters with which they could identify.453  The avant-garde’s ambition 
to change the world also clashed with the hardening contours of the stalinist system.  
Stalin’s “fantasectomy” in 1928 resulted in a dramatic shift:  cultural production settled 
down into a rut of heavily-censored “boy-girl-tractor-machine gun” melodramas.  After 
World War II, this model was transplanted to all the countries of Eastern Europe 
wholesale. 
During the interwar period, Hungarian film production had closely mirrored the 
European norm: light melodramas intended to appeal to a broad audience.  As the 
audience for Hungarian language-films was small, Hungarian filmmaking had been 
heavily subsidized by the government.  The result was a thriving cinema culture: eight to 
ten new movies were released every year, more than in Czechoslovakia or even Austria, 
and Hungarian actors and directors such as Béla Lugosi, Peter Lorrie, and Mihály Kertész 
were known throughout the world.454  Although film production continued right up until 
October 1944, most studios and production facilities were destroyed or severely damaged 
during the 1944-45 siege of Budapest. The industry was slow to bounce back after the 
war: only five films were produced domestically in 1946 and 1947.455  Filmmaking was 
therefore firmly under the aegis of stalinist culture when it resumed in earnest in 1948.   
Hungarian filmmaking, “one of the best weapons on the cultural and educational front,” 
was rigorously censored, while American films, “the propaganda weapon of the 
                                                 
453 Denise Youngblood, Movies for the Masses: Popular Cinema and Soviet Society in the 1920s 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
454 Kenez, Hungary From The Nazis to the Soviets, pp. 240-241.  Kertész’s name is better known in its 
Americanized form, Michael Curtiz.  
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[political] reaction” and the product of the “Hollywood gangster-school,” were 
banned.456  Cinema, like all forms of communist culture, was intended to both entertain 
and educate.  It failed on both counts. 
There seems to have been a close symbiosis between stage and screen, to the 
benefit of filmmakers and the detriment of filmgoers.  Censorship in the early Soviet film 
industry had generated a great deal of uncertainty among filmmakers and screenwriters 
about what sorts of screenplays might be acceptable.  The result was a persistent shortage 
of screenplays, or the “scenario crisis.”457 This does not seem to have been as much a 
problem in Hungary, as Hungarian filmmakers hit on the solution of adapting 
contemporary theatre productions for film.  As these plays had been thoroughly vetted by 
censors, they were much safer than taking a chance on untried material.  Thus the play 
“State Department Store” (“Állami Aruhaz”) was swiftly followed by a film version in 
1952, and “The Day of Wrath” (“A Harag Napja”) ran at the National Theater in 1952 
before it was made into a movie in 1953.458  The only exception to this rule seems to 
have been the cinematization of the theatre production of “Unforgettable 1919,” which 
ran at the National Theater in early 1952.  It was announced under production in May of 
                                                                                                                                                 
455 Balázs Varga, editor, Játékfilmek / Hungarian Feature Films, 1931-1998 (Budapest: Magyar 
Filmintézet / Argumentum Kiadó Nyomdaüzeme, 1999), pp. 315-318.  One of these films, Géza 
Radványi’s Somewhere in Europe (Valahol Európában, 1947), remains on of the best Hungarian films ever 
made despite its ideological bias. 
456 “Milyen Magyar filmet vár?,” Szinház és Mozi, 9 December 1949, and “Amerikai Film – A Népbutitás 
fegyvere,” Szinház és Mozi, 15 January 1950, “Hollywoodi gengszter-iskola,” Szinház és Mozi, 2 July 
1950.  
457 Youngblood, Soviet Cinema in the Silent Era, 1918-1935 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), pp. 
67-71. 
458 Theatre and film listings, Szinház és Mozi, 23 May 1952, 30 May 1952. 
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1952 but never released as a movie.459  (The tympanist for the National Theater Orchestra 
was one of the 1956 émigrés.  Although he recalled this production as “horrendous,” its 
failure to materialize on the silver screen was probably more due to the ongoing struggle 
in the MDP between the ruling Muscovite faction and the veterans of the 1919 
revolution).460  The result, however, was that bad theatre productions were transformed 
into bad movies. Practically every escapee and émigré interviewed declaimed the poor 
quality, predictable plot lines, and ideological pandering that characterized communist 
theatre and cinema.  
 
Until about 1953, people had to talk to each other in this way in the plays.  
“My darling,” said the man to the woman, “I love you so much that I am 
ready to fulfill my quota better tomorrow than before.”461 
    
Indeed, even the physical character of the trade magazine, Theatre and Film (Szinház és 
Mozi), was suggestive of the deadening of cultural life under communism.  In the 
immediate postwar period, Szinház és Mozi was an attractive, thick, four-color 
publication with many photographs and articles.  It gradually dwindled in size in the late 
1940s, and in early 1951 switched to black-and-white as well.  Thus, literally as well as 
figuratively cultural life literally became more monochrome under communism.  This 
drab official culture foundered on two well-established, preexisting modes of social and  
 
                                                 
459 “Visnyevski: Feledhetetlen [sic] 1919, Szinház és Mozi, 4 April 1952, “Film a “Fejlethetelen 1919”-
ről,” Szinház és Mozi, 16 May 1952. 
460 Mevius, Agents of Moscow, pp. 69-86.  
461 CUHRP Interview 102, Box 7, p. 56.  Although some sources also recalled some productions that 
covertly attacked the regime, especially after 1953, they are in the minority. 
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cultural interaction: Catholicism and the world of ‘decadent’ leisure centered on the jazz 
scene. 
Catholicism provided a persistent locus of resistance to the regime. In Hungary, 
the Catholic Church had long been a central element of the Hungarian national identity. 
The rapport between church and state had become especially close during the 
conservative Horthy regime.462  The “opiate of the masses” was, of course, antithetical to 
Communism, and the Bolshevik takeover in Russia had been accompanied by widespread 
destruction of churches and other measures intended to eradicate religious belief.463 In 
the immediate postwar period, the MKP held off on attacking the church directly.  In 
their quest to win over the support of the Hungarian populace, party activists even offered 
to help rebuild churches damaged in the war.464  This tentative truce lasted until 1948. 
The party signaled its attack on religion with the nationalization of religious schools, the 
silencing of the Catholic press, and the jailing of Cardinal József Mindszenty, Primate of 
Hungary, on trumped-up charges of black-marketeering.  The Vatican responded to these 
actions by excommunicating all Catholics who aided communism.465   Thereafter the 
regime promoted a “peace priest” movement, which ostensibly transcended the 
differences between communism and Catholicism in the greater service of world peace.  
Priests who were willing to go along with the regime were allowed to remain in their 
                                                 
462 Paul Hanebrink, In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 2, and Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty, p. 81.  
463 Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
464 Kenez, Hungary From the Nazis to the Soviets, p. 177.  This conciliatory spirit did not extend to the 
Catholic youth organization, KALOT, which was disbanded in 1946.  Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political 
Loyalty, p. 84. 
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posts, while those that resisted were arrested.466  In essence, church personnel were 
forced to choose between excommunication and incarceration.  Many defiantly opted for 
the latter, which led to the unlikely spectacle of nuns working alongside prostitutes in 
labor camps.467  Others signed on to the movement in order to serve their flock as best 
they could.  Enough priests chose the latter option, or eluded the administration’s gaze, 
that many churches remained open and religious observance persisted throughout the 
period.   
These forces of “clerical reaction” (klerikális reakció) persistently opposed the 
communist project.  The relatively simple expedient of attending church in a different 
neighborhood seems to have worked for many Magyars.468  In smaller towns, church 
services seem to have gone on with little or no interference from the state.469  As with 
theft from the state, popular perceptions of religious practice clearly articulate the 
deliberate oppositional intent behind these acts: 
 
There was a religious revival and many people went to church.  They were 
overcrowded so much that evening masses had to be instituted.  People 
went to church not only for religious reasons, but they saw in it a means of 
resistance to Communism.470 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
465 Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty, pp. 87-88, 91-92.  Mindszenty was no stranger to 
incarceration.  He had previously been jailed in 1919, for opposing the Hungarian Socialist republic, and 
again in 1944, for speaking out against the Arrow Cross.   
466 Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty, pp. 93-102.  For a detailed account of the crackdown on the 
churh, see István Sziklai, “A Magyar Katolikus Egyház Kriminalizálásának Főbb Vonásai (1950),” in 
Valóság, Volume XLV, Number 6 (June 2002).  
467 OSA/RFE Items 12950/52, mf 15. 
468 See also OSA/RFE Items 1393/53, mf 19 and CUHRP Interview 103, Box 7, p. 11.   
469 OSA/RFE Items 8851/54, mf 44, OSA/RFE Items 2394/55, mf 51. 
470 CUHRP Interview 121, Box 8, p. 26.  
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Attending church became a political deed and people usually went to 
different districts so they would not be observed in their own home 




According to one source, a covert mass was even celebrated deep in the shafts of the 
Tatabánya mines: communion wine and bread were smuggled in, and Catholic priests 
among the workers performed the service from memory—all while the workers were on 
the clock.472  Numerous official reports on workers’ attitudes revealed that clerical 
reaction remained a thorn in the regime’s side, especially in rural areas.473  Religion, like 
the various other social networks described in previous chapters, also provided a locus of 
anti-regime identity and persisted under the communist regime. 
Just as many Hungarians were predisposed to continue worshiping as they had 
previously, so did they also prefer to remain involved in the broader cultural sphere they 
had inhabited before 1948.  Hungary enjoyed a long history of interaction with 
mainstream European culture, and, especially since the early twentieth century, with 
Americanized global culture as well.  In reaction to the literature sanctioned by the 
regime, Hungarians continued to read western classics and popular western-style 
literature, primarily cowboy novels and whodunits.474  Although American films were 
not allowed, western European films (primarily from France and Italy) were periodically 
                                                 
471 CUHRP Interview 101, Box 7, pp. 9, 34. 
472 OSA/RFE Items 10040/55, mf 61.  
473 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 646 ő.e., p 1. 
474 On the popularity and availability of western literature and pulp fiction, see OSA/RFE Items 6687/53, 
mf 25, OSA/RFE Items 2089/54, mf 35, OSA/RFE Items 7824/55, mf 58, and OSA/RFE Items 3133/56, 
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at http://mek.oszk.hu/01000/01021/01021.htm (translated by Patricia Boszó; viewed 1 December 2007). On 
the popularity of cowboy novels in the DDR see Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels, pp 40-42.  
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shown on Hungarian screens. They were much more popular than their Soviet 
competitors: tickets to western movies had to be purchased well in advance, and may 
have even caused melees in some towns when tickets ran out.475  However, both of these 
vessels of western popular culture paled in comparison to the popularity of jazz in 
communist Hungary.  
Hungarian jazz antedates the advent of the Cold War by decades.  During the 
interwar period, American jazz bands toured Europe nonstop.  Often as not, they swung 
through Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw, and these semi-peripheral cultural sites acted in 
turn as conduits to the USSR, fuelling the vibrant world of 1920s Soviet jazz.476  
Recordings by Duke Ellington, the Dorsey Brothers, and the Andrews Sisters were 
snapped up by Hungarian listeners, and movies like The Jazz Singer (1927) and Show 
Boat (1929) provided further exposure to the hot new musical style.  By the late 1920s, 
American and western European traveling jazz orchestras like The Chocolate Kiddies and 
Eddie South and his Orchestra toured through Budapest and the larger provincial towns, 
providing the opportunity to hear the real thing live.  In their wake, Hungarian jazzmen 
like Orlay Jenő (who went by the nickname of “Chappy”) and Lajos Martiny (“Tiny 
Matton”) formed their own jazz orchestras and cut their chops in Budapest clubs before 
taking their shows on the road to Copenhagen, Paris, Berlin, and the other great European 
jazz centers.477  According to S. Frederick Starr, jazz in Hungary was politicized even 
before the Communists appeared on the scene: “The Hungarian ruler and Fascist 
                                                 
475 OSA/RFE Items 4872/53, mf 23, OSA/RFE Items 7081/54, mf 41, and OSA/RFE Items 8686/54, mf 
43.  
476 “From Moscow, however, the West begins in Lithuania and Estonia, and has as three of its principal 
centers Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague.”  Starr, Red and Hot, p. 123. 
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sympathizer Admiral Horthy adroitly exploited jazz in songs extolling his regime.”478 
The local recording industry seems to have suffered only a brief setback during World 
War II: László Kazal recorded a competent version of Glenn Miller’s “In the Mood” at 
the Pátria studio in early 1945, even as most of Budapest still lay in ruins and without 
electricity after the fierce siege of the previous winter.  During the brief period of postwar 
coalition rule (1945-48), jazz swiftly resumed its preeminence in the popular-cultural 
sphere, ushering in a “golden age of jazz” (“a jazz-aranykor”) in Hungary.479  Radio 
Budapest played jazz hits in an effort to lure younger listeners, the dance halls were 
packed with crowds, and hundreds of new jazz recordings were released on Odeon, 
Pátria, and other domestic labels.  
All this changed in 1949.  Taking its lead from Moscow, the Rákosi regime 
banned jazz from the airwaves.480  Thereafter the communist press regularly excoriated 
the subversive threat posed by the debased imperialist cultural form, and called for closer 
monitoring of dance halls.481  The regime did not stop at merely denouncing this so-
called cosmopolitanism in popular culture:  the sale of musical instruments (especially 
saxophones) was restricted, and musicians were required to register with the musician’s 
union.  Monitors from the union attended the performances in bars, cafes, and music 
halls; penalties for playing jazz ranged from a two-week to a two-month suspension for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
477 Simon, Fejezetek, pp.101, 105-145. 
478 Starr, Red and Hot, p. 95.  
479 László Kazal, “In the Mood,” with unknown studio band, Pátria studio, 1945. Simon, Fejezetek, pp. 268 
and 167-188. 
480 Pittaway, “The Education of Dissent,” p. 104.  See Starr, Red and Hot, pp. 210-217, on the jazz ban in 
the USSR.  
481 See, e.g., “Sok bába között elvész a gyerek,” Esti Budapest, 2 October 1952. 
 202
first offense, and more serious penalties for repeated offenses.482  Instead of jazz, class-
conscious musicians were expected to help the communist project along by serving up 
the classics (Beethoven, Brahms, etc.) and popularizing the efforts of new Soviet and 
Hungarian composers.  (One 18-year old amateur musician who escaped in 1952 told his 
RFE interviewer that the latter was music “even a dog couldn’t like.”483)  Not only was 
the Hungarian ear attuned to jazz, but the regime’s musical offerings were also tainted by 
its affiliation with the Soviets and the artificial nature of this imposed ‘popular’ culture. 
Although the state effectively crushed open political dissent, it failed to suppress 
this subversive cultural practice.  A composer of popular music who escaped in 1956 
recalled that jazz was played “all the time” in bars, “notwithstanding Communist 
propaganda and discriminatory measures,” throughout the 1950s.  By 1955, songs were 
even being sung in English.484  The musicians often knew who their monitors were, and 
could strike up jazz numbers as soon as he or she left for the night.485  Even when the 
monitors were still present, intrepid jazzmen could get away with playing regime-
sanctioned music with jazz-inflected tempo and phrasing.486  One polemic in Esti 
Budapest was particularly indignant on this point, singling out a Pest music club where 
the house band played not only Soviet and modern Hungarian music with an American 
                                                 
482 OSA/RFE Items  5462/55, mf 55, Interview with Géza Gábor Simon, Director, Jazz Oktatási és 
Kutatási Alapítvány [Jazz Instruction and Research Institute], October 2004. 
483 OSA/RFE Items 13388/52, mf 15. 
484 CUHRP Box 7, Interview 102, p. 21. 
485 Interview with Géza Gábor Simon, October 2004. 
486 OSA/RFE Items 13388/52, mf 15.  In this regard it seems that the jazz ban in Hungary was not policed 
as closely as its Soviet counterpart.  In the latter case, if Starr does not exaggerate, “Chords built on 
flattened fifths, vibrato by brass players, and the deliberate use of semi-tone ‘blue notes’” were all grounds 
for punishment.  Starr, Red and Hot, p. 215.   
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swing feel, but also Beethoven.487 Albeit probably more prevalent in the upscale bars 
frequented by foreign diplomats and businessmen (and party officials), jazz also 
flourished in the working-class districts.  According to one youth interviewed in early 
1953, from the way they danced the rhumba at a rough bar called the Vince-Vendeglő, 
“even Americans could learn a thing or two about dancing.”488  Jazz was also popular in 
the provinces.  One source recalled how at a firemen’s ball in the small town of 
Fertőszentmiklós, the attendees would only dance to jazz; an 18-year old unskilled 
laborer from Nagykáta (pop.17,000) who escaped in 1954 also declaimed the popularity 
of jazz concerts at the local youth club; and at the 1953 New Year’s Eve Party in 
Kapuvár, the band “played such a hot samba that the communists joined in as well.”489 
Communist cultural policy was singularly unsuccessful—and this, in turn, raised the 
specter that the regime’s successes might fall prey to cosmopolitan recidivism.  As one 
Esti Budapest writer lamented, “everything disfigured and loathsome in the capitalist 
morality” could be found in the jazz bars and music halls of Budapest.490  Western 
culture was contagious, and the communist regime’s immune system was sorely lacking 
the antibodies necessary to combat the western invasion. 
The social impact of jazz as a performative cultural practice in communist 
Hungary, as anywhere, is difficult to gauge. In the United States, the history of jazz is 
inextricably entwined with the history of race relations.  Ever since its invention by 
                                                 
487 “Tiszteséges műsort, mai életünkhöz méltó hangulatot vácnak a dolgozók a zenés szórakozóhelyektől,” 
Esti Budapest, 19 June 1952.  See also “Megegyszer a zenés szórakozóhelyek műsoráról,” Esti Budapest, 
19 August 1952. 
488 OSA/RFE Items 1896/53, mf 19. 
489 OSA/RFE Items 1896/53, mf 19, OSA/RFE Items 8853/54, mf 44, OSA/RFE Items 993/55, mf 49. 
490 “Amitől meg kell védeni a fiatalokat,” Esti Budapest, 21 October 1954.   
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African Americans in the early twentieth century, it has been commodified and 
appropriated by dominant white culture.  Subsequent innovations in jazz styles, 
formulated as deliberate revolt against the square mainstream, are themselves co-opted in 
turn.491  American jazz has served both revolutionary and hegemonic ends.  Against the 
indictments of American racism leveled by Louis Armstrong in the 1950s and Charles 
Mingus in the 1960s, we must balance the mobilization of big-band swing music during 
World War II and, for that matter, what Eric Hobsbawm labels “its current 
resuscitation…as the American classical music of the professional middle class and the 
dinner music of lower Manhattan Yuppie restaurants.”492 Jazz in the USSR is particularly 
instructive in this regard, as it illustrates how political shifts redounded in that preexisting 
communist popular-cultural sphere.  Jazz was subjected to Maksim Gorkii’s puritanical 
rants in the late 1920s, but rescued in the early 1930s by the ‘realization’ that it was the 
music of the oppressed African American underclass and therefore ideologically sound 
(and, incidentally, anathema to the Nazi foe). 493   As in the USA, big band swing music 
                                                 
491 David Meltzer puts it best: “imported African sacred/secular instrumental and vocal music that had 
disembarked in the exotic port of New Orleans, blended in that cosmopolitan city where European travelers 
and merchants infused Western martial and classical musics into the polyrhythmic African mix, 
transformed, recirculated into a propulsively dynamic form called Jazz.  A circular process where enslaved 
(or oppressed) peoples subvert and transform the master’s musics of definition (church, state) into one of 
defiance that, in turn, becomes a mystery to the master class who sets out to learn its secrets and, as with 
other property, own it, control its presence in ‘normative’ culture.”  Reading Jazz (San Francisco: Mercury 
House, 1993), p. 11. See also Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style, (London: Routledge, 1979), 
pp. 46-47.    
492 Eric Hobsbawm, Uncommon People: Resistance, Rebellion, and Jazz (London: Wiedenfield and 
Nicolson, 1998), p. 247.  On Louis Armstrong, see Penny M. Von Eschen, “‘Satchmo Blows Up the 
World:’ Jazz, Race, and Empire during the Cold War,” in Wagnleitner and May, editors, Here, There, and 
Everywhere; on Mingus, see [anything ever written about Mingus].  On the Soviet mobilization of jazz 
during WW2, see Starr, Red and Hot, Ch. 9. 
493 Starr, Red and Hot, Chs. 4-6.  Never one to understate his point, Gorkii (1868-1936) described his 
experience of jazz thus: “Listening for a few minutes to these wails, one involuntarily imagines an 
orchestra of sexually driven madmen conducted by a man-stallion brandishing a huge genital member.”  
Quoted in Starr, Red and Hot, p. 90. 
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provided the martial soundtrack for World War II.  Almost 2/3 of the 460,000 concerts 
performed for the Red Army and Navy during the conflict were jazz shows.  Despite this 
substantial contribution to the war effort, a persistent bias towards jazz denied Soviet 
jazzmen (and –women) the recognition awarded to symphonic composers and 
musicians.494  Thereafter it was banned in the late 1940s, but then rehabilitated again in 
the mid-1950s. Thus, in both open and closed cultural spheres ‘jazz’ is an unstable 
signifier, and its meaning and effects contingent on political, social, and cultural contexts.  
In stalinist Hungary, however, this context is clear.  Culturally, the music was coded as 
the barbaric yawp of western capital and debauchery; socially, its practice entailed groups 
of people gathering surreptitiously for activities banned by the state.   
This did not go unnoticed.  By mid-1955, the Budapest jazz scene surfaced as a 
major issue in a closed meeting of the Central Committee of the Budapest party: 
 
Comrade B.:  The trade unions and councils must drastically increase their  
supervision in the dancing and music clubs.  Last week in a music 
club I noted the musicians were playing imperialistic music in an 
inappropriate manner.  We have also received a report that the 
Duna hotel orchestra plays only English numbers.  Clearly, it’s 
very important that we step up our monitoring of these places. 
 
 
The other comrades chimed in with similar concerns, and the meeting closed with a slew  
of corrective resolutions:  there would be an extravaganza of ‘proper’ music performed 
free that summer, thousands of movie tickets would be sold to youths at discounted 
                                                 
494 Even Leonid Utesov, a well-connected, popular jazz performer and personal favorite of Stalin, was 
unable to get the 1944 Stalin Prize committee to consider any jazz musicians for the coveted prize.  Kiril 
Tomoff, “’Most Respected Comrade…’:  Patrons, Clients, Brokers, and Unofficial Networks in the 
Stalinist Music World,” in György Péteri, editor, Patronage, Personal Networks, and the Party-State: 
Everyday Life in the Cultural Sphere in Communist Russia and East Central Europe (Trondheim: 
Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies, 2004), pp. 39-41. 
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prices, and the behavior of youths in the hostels and factories would be closely 
monitored.495  This last point is central to our understanding of the regime’s perception of 
the jazz scene.  The gadfly persistence of jazz was annoying, but the regime’s major 
concern was its social effect on working-class youth.  American music, the “product of a 
sick world,”496 was the contagion vector responsible for the spread of a strange pandemic 
that seemed to strike only the young: the jampec, or hooligan.   
 
 
Hooligans, Sex, and Moral Panic 
 
 
As the following scene described to an RFE interviewer in 1954 indicates, 
perhaps the Central Committee was not overreacting.  The informant, an unskilled 
laborer, frequented the Tripoli, a dubious joint in a working-class neighborhood.  
Admission cost only five forints, and a live jazz band played five nights a week.  For 
these reasons it was popular among the younger generation:  “kids” (srácok), some as 
young as 14, started at about 5 or 6 pm and stayed up until dawn, drinking, dancing, and 
raising hell—and on school nights, no less. 
 
These young men always travel in packs, and if they see a woman alone 
with a man they make suggestive remarks and try to start something.  …   
They finish two glasses of beer and think they’re the strongest men in the 
world.  Fights break out on a regular basis.  They don’t respect their 
elders, they have no idea how to behave properly… 
 
                                                 
495 BFL XXXV. 95. a. / 124 ő.e., pp. 80, 100-101.  Perhaps not surprisingly, Comrade B. did not explain 
how he had found himself in a jazz club in the first place.  The Duna (Gellert) was singled out for its 
“American” tendencies in a complaint letter to Szabad Ifjuság as early as 1953—see MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 
/ 673 ő.e., p. 213. 
496 Esti Budapest, “a tánczene és a tömegzene kérdéseiről,” 16 September 1953. 
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When the band plays jazz, one of the kids stands at the door.  If a police 
car approaches, he signals and the band quickly switches to a Moscow-
style waltz.  The band always plays modern numbers, and the kids “dance 
as though they were in America.”  Where they learn those dances is 
impossible to say.  Nor can I explain where they get those drainpipe 
trousers, those patterned socks, or those gaudy neckties.   
 
The police are perpetually on the prowl for these hooligans. … when they 
stop one and ask for his papers, if he doesn’t answer properly they take 
him downtown and beat him up—“not exactly because of the drainpipe 
trousers, but because of them nonetheless.”497 
 
This Rabelaisian scene was probably not what one Radio Free Europe editor had in mind 
when he described the phenomenon in 1952:  
 
In [sic] can however, be assumed that many ‘jampec’-s are corageous [sic] 
‘die-hard’ youngsters who dare defy the Communists even risking the 




Finally, one of the jampec (less frequently ‘jampi;’ plural, ‘jampecek’ or ‘jampik’)—a 
youth who worked as a meatpacker in Debrecen and escaped in 1954—explained the 
lifestyle a bit differently:   
 
In his free time, he went to movies or out drinking somewhere.  (It was 
difficult to get movie tickets, as there were only three theaters in 
Debrecen.)  When there was good music coming out of some bar, he was 
unable to resist the temptation, and would be inside within moments.  By 
“good music” the source meant jazz, which reputedly was not policed too 
closely in Debrecen.  However, at the same time dancing in the American 
manner was not permitted.  One time a policeman told him: “don’t dance 
like that!” “Well, sir, perhaps you might show me how I must dance?”—
he answered, leaving the policeman speechless. … 
 
                                                 
497 OSA/RFE Items 8619/54, mf 43. 
498 OSA/RFE Items 12594/52, mf 14, “Evaluation Comments.”  
 208
Another time it didn’t go off quite as smoothly.  It seemed to a policeman 
that he was dressed in the jampec manner (He was wearing a checkered 
shirt with a zipper, grey trousers, and sandals).  When the policeman asked 
to see his identity card, he refused, as the policeman had not yet shown 
him his ID either… 
 
  
Not surprisingly, this second encounter went downhill from there.  It ended with the 
youth being taken to the station and roughed up by the police.  (He was eventually 
released without being charged.)499  To an outsider, they were rude hooligans; to the 
RFE, they epitomized a youthful rebellion against the communist system; to an insider, 
they were just out looking for a good time.  What, then, are we to make of the jampecek?  
Were they rebels with, or without, causes?  
Sándor Horváth has concluded that hooligans were primarily significant as 
scapegoats for the failures of the communist project.  “One important aim of the state was 
to control the socialization of the young.  Full control over society could not be exercised, 
of course, and it was much less costly and more spectacular to single out a few youth 
groups and punish them.”  Horváth also identifies a shift in the nature of the ‘moral 
panic’ built on the jampec by the communist media; he argues that their representation 
shifted from overeager consumers of western culture in the 1950s to sex fiends and 
outright criminals in the 1960s.500  Although Horváth focuses primarily on their later 
incarnation as a rock and roll subculture rather than its jazz-oriented antecedent, my 
reading of the pre-1956 phenomenon supports his conclusions for the most part.  
                                                 
499 OSA/RFE Items 5270/55, mf 55.  For other run-ins between jampecek and police, see OSA/RFE Items 
7041/51, mf 3, OSA/RFE Items 8439/54, mf 43, and OSA/RFE Items 11584/55, mf 62. 
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However, I find that the representational shift—from deviant consumers to oversexed 
criminals—occurs well before the 1960s: in fact, before the revolution.  The jampec 
made for good propaganda, as a jitterbugging reprobate who neatly illustrated the 
corrosive dangers of western culture—but this moral entrepreneurship resonated with the 
regime’s increasing preoccupation with juvenile crime, and thereby shaped the 
perceptions of the jampecek’s monitors as well.   In the records of the legal 
administration and the communist youth association (DISz), we find that as hooliganism 
became more prevalent the moral panic preached by the media was in turn taken 
seriously by at least some elements of the communist administration.   
The term jampec itself dates back to the interwar period.  It was coined in the late 
1920s, as a descriptor of effete upper-class youth; its prewar connotations were 
dandyism, rakishness, extravagance, and sloth.  However, “jampec in common parlance 
also meant a worldly, independent, extravagant lifestyle”—one that could be “an 
attractive pattern for young skilled workers earning good wages after the Second World 
War.”501  Such creatures existed in the 1950s, despite the regime’s deliberate 
pauperization of the working class, and they could afford the drinks, cover charges, and 
above all the clothing that defined the oppositional lifestyle.  As Stuart Hall and Tony 
Jefferson argue, youth subcultures are doubly articulated: that is, they coalesce in reaction 
                                                                                                                                                 
500 Sándor Horváth, “Hooligans, Spivs and Gangs:  Youth Subcultures in the 1960s,” in János M. Rainer 
and György Péteri, Muddling Through in the Long 1960s: Ideas and Everyday Life in High Politics and the 
Lower Classes of Communist Hungary (Budapest: 1956 Institute, 2005), pp. 200, 220.  See also Horváth, A 
kapu és a határ: mindennapi Sztálinváros [The Gate and the Border:  Everyday Stalintown] (Budapest: 
MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2004), pp. 172-185. 
501 Horváth, “Hooligans, Spivs, and Gangs,” pp. 204-205.  Note that Soviet hooligans in the 1920s also had 
bourgeois precursors—see Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture and Power in St. Petersburg, 
1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
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to both parent and dominant cultures502 (in this case, to both working-class norms and 
state-imposed socialist ideals).  In Hungary, the young male worker of the interwar 
period had endured an extended period of apprenticeship, first as an inas (‘servant’ or 
‘little serf’) and then as a segéd (‘apprentice,’ ‘helper’), before eventually joining the 
ranks of skilled workers.  This labor hierarchy was mapped onto the cultural sphere:  
László Kürti notes that “Once promoted to a segéd, the life of the younger worker was 
closer to that of older workers: he could go out at night, drink with friends, visit 
girlfriends and smoke cigars or cigarettes.”503  After 1948, the communist regime 
privileged young workers (as well as peasants and women) in an effort to break the 
prewar skilled labor hierarchy: the old inas/segéd system was abolished in favor of 
swifter training courses, and age- and gender-based quotas were introduced.  Although 
these ‘reforms’ were successful in breaking the “solidaristic wage policy” of the prewar 
unions, as Pittway notes, “the hectic demands of the centralized command economy 
forced management to rely heavily on the skilled elite of older male workers: these 
workers were therefore were able to exert some informal bargaining power, but this often 
occurred at the expense of their younger and female coworkers.”504  Albeit secondary to 
the overarching dynamic of worker-management conflict, generational tension between 
old and young workers also characterized shop floor relations in the early 1950s.  This 
was one of the two major socio-structural causes for the subculture’s formation.   
                                                 
502 Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, Resistance Through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Postwar Britain 
(London: Routledge, 1975). p. 15.   
503 László Kürti, Youth and the State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism and Class (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002), p. 60. 
504 Pittaway, “The Social Limits of State Control,” p. 287, and “Az állami ellenõrzés társadalmi korlátainak 
újraértékelése,” especially pp. 79-80. 
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The other had to do with demographics.  The combined “push” and “pull” factors 
of the high-modernist project—collectivization, which forced peasants off the land, and 
industrialization, which resulted in a labor shortage in factories—resulted in a mass 
influx of peasants, most of them young males, into the cities in search of work.  As noted 
in Chapter 1, the population of Budapest swelled to 1.9 million in 1956.  Four-fifths of 
the explosive population growth was due to inmigration rather than natural increase.505  
Although many of these young men retained ties to their homes (and of them, many 
illegally left their factory jobs in autumn to help bring in the harvest), the generational, 
gendered, and familial social controls that shaped village life were largely absent in the 
big city.  Alienated from the regime, their parents, and “the idiocy of rural life,” and 
unencumbered by the prohibitive costs of maintaining a household or family, young male 
workers sought autonomy and self-articulation in leisure and style. 
  Clothing was key. “The tyranny of overalls, loden coat, and cloth cap or beret”506 
was imposed by the regime, but it was also based on the clothing worn by the pre-war 
working class. As Stuart Hebdige notes, style in subculture “is pregnant with 
significance.  Its transformations go ‘against nature,’ interrupting the process of 
‘normalization.’  As such, they are gestures, movements towards a speech which offends 
the ‘silent majority,’ which challenges the principle of unity and cohesion, which 
contradicts the myth of consensus.”507  The jampec solution was anything plaid, 
                                                 
505 Kenez, p. 35, and László Varga, “The Devastation of Budapest in War and Its Role in the Revolution, 
1945-1956,” in András Gerő and János Poór, editors, Budapest: A History from its Beginnings to 1998 
(Boulder: Social Scince Monographs, 1997), p. 191.  
506 Tibor Valuch, “A Cultural and Social History of Hungary, 1948-1990,” in László Kósa, editor, A 
Cultural History of Hungary in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Budapest: Corvina, 2000), p. 280. 
507 Hebdige, Subculture, p. 18l. 
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checkered, striped, or otherwise eye-catching; thick-soled crepe shoes (“three-story 
shoes,” in one account); loud ‘American’ ties.508  Drainpipe trousers (csőnadrág) were 
definitely the norm, as were the crepe-soled shoes; above the waist, however, the 
descriptions vary wildly.  The lack of consensus among the descriptions suggests that 
there was no specific jampec clothing style: the subculture’s sartorial character was 
defined primarily by the presence of jarring or discordant elements—a tie that clashed 
with the coat, stripes on plaid, and so forth. By 1950 at the latest, these flashy patterns 
and odd combinations of them had been coded as distinctly ‘American.’  The play “Wild 
West” (“Vadnyugat”), which ran from March to June of that year at the Vidám theater, 
saw a veritable explosion of plaids and loud ties on stage.  Before “Wild West” was even 
off the stage it was followed by “Maypole” (“Májusfa”), a production put on at the 
Capital City Variety Peace Barge (a floating theater moored on the Danube) that featured 
Árpád Latabár as a plaid-clothed, “America-struck” (amerikaörűlt) hooligan.509   It seems 
likely that the jampec seized upon this flashy and distinctive style; that these 
appropriations were in turn labeled ‘American’ by the communist media; and, in turn, the 
jampec celebrated their ‘Americanness’ as a refusal of regime norms.       
These aliens from a cosmopolitan planet also spoke their own language, danced 
wildly, and talked back to policemen.510  In the jampi lexicon, Budapest was ‘the big 
                                                 
508 On ‘three-story shoes,’ see OSA/RFE Items 6797/56, mf 71.  Although a comparative analysis is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, it is interesting to note that jampec style is quite similar to that of the 
English ‘Ted’ or ‘Teddy Boy.’  Oddly enough, the jampecek seem to have emerged slightly earlier than 
their English counterparts, who were first noted by the English press only in 1953 (Hall and Jefferson, p. 
85). 
509 “Vadnyugat bemutató a Vidám Szinházban,” Szinház es Mozi, 3 April 1950, “Majusfa:  ‘Ki jól végzete 
dolgát, az vigan táncol polkát,’” Szinház es Mozi, 7 May 1950.    
510 See the 23-page slang dictionary appended to OSA/RFE Items 2619/55, mf 52; an article mocking their 
speech,  “A nyelvrontókról,” appears in Esti Budapest, 28 June 1955.  
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village’ (‘a nagyfalu’), and money, ‘lard’ (‘zsir’).  Some of their slang terms—such as 
‘massive’ (‘massziv’) denoting ‘good’—were drawn from the preexisting criminal argot, 
or  ‘csibésznyelv’.511  Others were parodic riffs on life under communism: Zoltan Vas 
was known as “the thief of Baghdad,” Jászai Mari square as “ÁVÓ Maria square.”512   
Women were objectified with abandon: while ‘krina’ (also ‘krinolin’—derived from 
‘crinoline’) denoted women in general, prostitutes were referred to as “female athletes,” 
and pregnant women, “melons.”513  Drinking, dancing, various criminal activities and the 
authorities each had three or four slang equivalents.  Not surprisingly, the hooligan argot 
was also known as jassznyelv, or “jazz-language.”  The remaining elements of jampec 
identity centered around dancing ‘in the American style,’ trying to pick up girls, and 
mouthing off to authority figures, all of which are apparent in the accounts cited above.     
These were young men the communist media loved to hate.  These shifty, foppish, 
criminal young louts provided a stark counterpoint to the fresh-faced young students, 
workers, and soldiers who served as the poster-boys for the communist future.   All these 
characteristics—not least the linkages between the jampec and ‘cosmopolitan,’ western 
culture—were repeatedly pilloried in the pages of Esti Budapest.  In one jampec 
caricature, he is depicted carrying a cowboy novel.514  In another the scalper of tickets to 
a popular movie was, predictably, “a young man in a corduroy coat and drainpipe 
trousers, swiftly turning to and fro in his thick-soled shoes.” (In the latter case, the author 
                                                 
511 A much less extensive dictionary of prison slang is appended to OSA/RFE Items 3032/54, mf 36. 
512 Zoltán Vas (1903-1983) was a Muscovite communist who served as general secretary of the economic 
council and then as the president of the National Planning Office.  Jaszai Mári square was briefly the home 
of the ÁVÓ before it moved to the famous building on Andrássy street: anyone taken to the building would, 
presumably, ‘sing’ (i.e. confess). 
513 ‘atletánő’ and ‘dinnyés,’ respectively. 
514 “Hát ilyen is van még?,” Esti Budapest, 4 August 1952. 
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goes on to aver that this young deviant was also acting as the lookout man for a gang of 
thieves preying on moviegoers.)515  The cinema also jumped on the jampec-bashing 
bandwagon.  The archetypal film jampec is “Swing Toni,” played by Imre Pongrácz 
(who, incidentally, had acted one of the hooligan roles in the aforementioned “Wild 
West” production) in Márton Keleti’s classic Dalolva Szép az Élet, or “Singing Makes 
Life Beautiful” (1950).  Swing Toni is arrogant, a slacker at work, a dandy in his spare 
time, and a petty thief.  He competes with the stalwart Feri Torma (Imre Sóos) for the 
attentions of the lovely Zsóka (Violetta Ferrari), a prim kindergarten teacher at the Vác 
factory crèche, and one of the younger workers, Pisti, follows him around and is 
obviously in danger of succumbing to the temptations of hooliganism.  At one point 
Zsóka seeks him out in a dancing school (tánziskola): inside, Toni and a disheveled 
crowd of youngsters are dancing like mad to a trio blowing hot jazz.  Of course, in the 
end Zsóka chooses Feri Torma, and Pisti abandons Swing Toni when his thievery is 
revealed: neither crime nor jitterbugging paid in communist Hungary.   
 These popularized accounts of hooliganism reveal just how closely cultural life in 
communist Hungary was monitored, and the significance of this deviant youth stereotype 
as a means of social control.  In high schools, the behavior and dress of both male and 
female students were closely monitored for hooliganistic tendencies.516 Youths with 
jampec hairstyles or clothing were not allowed in the more class-conscious tánziskolak 
feted in Esti Budapest.  In these schools, trying to sneak in one or two swing steps or 
                                                 
515 “Hány jegyet parancsolnak?,” Esti Budapest, 26 September 1953.    
516 MOL M-KS-276. 88. / 849 ő.e., “Feljegyzés az MTH I. számu intézetének nevelő munkájáról,” 5 
November 1952, n.p. 
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other risqué moves were adequate grounds for getting kicked off the dance floor.517  
Factories, workers’ hostels, bars and dancehalls were also under regular and intrusive 
surveillance, and this intimate policing of the social and cultural sphere extended to 
noting even the faintest transgressions in clothing, hairstyle, or comportment.  One 21-
year old farmboy from Tiszapolgar who escaped in 1953 recalled how the local DISz 
secretary would level the charge of ‘hooliganism’ or ‘cosmopolitanism’ against anyone 
who “danced elegantly or made some new steps while dancing.”518  A young 1956 
émigré concurred on the possible penalties of misbehaving in this manner: 
 
[T]hey persecuted the hooligans and attacked western dances and 
cosmopolitanism.…  Some young people were expelled from DISZ 
because they danced the so-called hooligan or jampec dances.  Young 
workers didn’t care about this because they could always find a job 
somewhere else.519 
 
Note, also, the clothing actually worn by the Debrecen hooligan cited above: his sandals, 
checkered shirt, and regular trousers bear very little resemblance to jampi style.  As 
Horváth argues, the jampec stereotype was used by the regime to keep the majority of 
Hungarian youths in line: even the slightest transgression could be seized upon as 
evidence of hooliganism.  The irony here is that just as there was some truth to the 
stereotype—some jampec were indeed also thugs and thieves—so was there some 
justifiable cause for alarm.  Even as the communist press lampooned the jampec 
phenomenon, the spectre of juvenile crime was haunting Hungary.  
                                                 
517 “Egy táncsiskolában,” Esti Budapest, 6 September 1954; “felbecsülhetetlen érdemek,” Esti Budapest, 
10 May 1955. 
518 OSA.RFE Items 1258/54, mf 34 (In English). 
519 CUHRP Interview 213, Box 11, pp. 52-53. 
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The close monitoring of youthful deviance is clearly apparent in the courts’ 
treatment of juvenile crime.   Although juvenile crime remains roughly constant at about 
5% of the total throughout the period (peaking at 11,700 cases in 1952), its disposition in 
the courts was significantly different. Once investigated, juveniles were both more likely 
to be brought to trial and much more likely to be convicted.  Whereas after 1952 
conviction rates remain below 60% for the general population, for juveniles they return to  
                                                 
520 Regrettably, juvenile crimes were not counted separately until 1951.  Source data:  1949-55, 1957, and 
1960 Statisztikai Évkönyv, pp. 355-358, 343-346, and 357-363, respectively.  For more detailed statistics on 
crime, see MOL M-KS-276. f. 96(F) / 70 ő.e., passim.   
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90%—and stay at that high level even after 1956.  Although the penalties were not as 
severe for juveniles as for adults (roughly 40% of the guilty were let off with an 
admonition or probation), the courts proceeded more industriously against juveniles than 
against the population as a whole. 
Thus for the big picture.  A summer 1954 report from the Budapest Public 
Prosecutor’s office to the DISz leadership described youth crime in the capital city in 
greater detail. Of the 1324 juveniles convicted in the first half of 1954, the majority 
(70%) were guilty of economic crimes:  481 were guilty of theft and other direct 
economic crimes against the regime, while 440 had stolen from other people instead of 
the state.   (Theft was also the most common crime in the population at large.)  The next 
largest category (115) were guilty of közveszélyü munkakerülés, or “work-shirking in a 
manner dangerous to the public:” a broad category, in this case meaning primarily 
vagrancy and prostitution.  The remaining 20% were guilty of assault, speculation, and 
other crimes. 12 youths had been caught carrying a weapon (fegyverrejtegetés).521  The 
13th district led Budapest in the number of youth crimes, followed by the 4th and 10th.  
The public prosecutor went on to note that the 13th was also the leader in incidences of 
teen prostitution, with almost three times as many cases as any other district.  He acidly 
suggested the district DISz organization look into the matter.522       
The DISz was already aware of the problem.  The 13th district (historically called 
Angyalföld, or “Angel’s Field”), directly north of the city center, had been a working-
                                                 
521 Literally “weapons-hoarding”—but this seldom meant an actual cache of weapons.  Penalties for this 
crime were strict: in one 1951 Szeged case, a market vendor caught with a loaded revolver was sentenced 
to 2 ½ years in jail.  MOL M-KS 276. f. 96 (Iü) / 8 ő.e., p. 72a.   
522 BFL XXXV. 95. e / 103 ő.e., memo dated 9 August 1954. 
 218
class suburb since the middle of the 19th century.  Angyalföld was one of the epicenters 
of the industrializing project: it boasted the large Láng turbine factory as well as a 
number of mechanical and chemical plants, and the large United Electrical (Egyesült 
Izzó) works in neighboring Újpest employed thousands more.  As these hordes converged 
on the 13th district, it was DISz’s responsibility to educate the young workers; naturally, 
this task included monitoring their behavior in the factories and workers’ hostels.  By 
March 1954, something was obviously rotten in Angel’s Field.      
Every one of the confidential factory and hostel reports decried the jampec threat.  
According to a DISz report on the Láng factory, the young workers acted rudely to their 
elders, and generational strife in the workforce was apparent.   However, this paled in 
comparison to how they spent their spare time: 
 
After work most of the youths pass their time with their circle of friends.  
What are these circles like?  Many of the Angyalföld youth are in gangs. 
… many of the youth complain that they can’t really have a good time at 
the factory culture club.  Lots of jampi go there, and their fights often put 
a stop to the fun. …523 
 
A DISz report from the Gheorghiu-Dei shipyard (in another district) noted the steady 
encroachment of hooliganism there as well.  According to this report, the young workers 
at this factory regularly went around to places jampecek were known to hang out—
including the Tripoli, the bar described in detail above.  Young workers freshly arrived 
from the countryside, not knowing what to do in their spare time, were constantly falling 
in with this bad crowd.  According to this report, the numbers of vagrants and hooligans 
                                                 
523 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 849 ő.e., “Jelentés a Láng-gyárban végzett munkánk tapasztalatairól,” 2 March 
1954, n.p. 
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among the young workers was increasing despite the best efforts of the youth 
organization and factory committee. (Incidentally, this report also remarks on the high 
degree of animosity apparent between the older and younger workers.)524  The jampecek 
were also portrayed as a threat to the virtue of their female companions.  Another DISz 
report, this one on an Angyalföld girls’ hostel, stressed that a number of the girls had 
recently arrived there from a reformatory, where they had been doing time for vagrancy.  
Not surprisingly, these deviant girls were judged by the company they kept: 
  
In the sphere of moral instruction there is a serious problem, as several of 
these morally debauched girls provide a bad example for the virtuous 
ones.  These girls are acquainted with quite a large number of jampec; 
they meet them in the evenings in front of the hostel, and are often 
disorderly in the street.… a regular police watch should be posted in front 
of the hostel.525   
 
These are much more menacing jampec than those pilloried in the pages of Esti Budapest 
earlier in the 1950s, and they now surface in the administrative transcript—as the reason 
for DISz’s failure to convert the youth to the communist cause.    As Corey Ross argues 
for the jampec’s East German counterparts, “instead of recognizing this fascination with 
western culture … as an expression of youthful rebelliousness or an iconoclastic 
disaffection with constant calls to ‘work, learn, and struggle’ for the glory of socialism, 
officials rather regarded it as the source of these problems.”526  It is an open question  
                                                 
524 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 849 ő.e., “Feljegyzés a Gheorghiu Dej Hajógyár DISz szervezetenek 
munkájáról,” 10 June 1954, n.p.  The Gheorgiu-Dej shipyard had previously come to DISz’s attention 
because of high workforce turnover among its younger workers—see MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 849 ő.e., 
“Feljegyzés a Gheorghiu Dej Hajógyár DISz szervezetenek munkájáról,” 21 November 1953, n.p. 
525 MOL M-KS-276. f. 88 / 849 ő.e., “Jelentés a Huba utcai és Vag utcai MTH intézetekben folyo nevelő 
munkáról,” 2 March 1954, n.p. 
526 Ross, Constructing Socialism at the Grass Roots, p. 140. 
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what steps the regime could have taken to reduce the social tensions resulting from its 
high-modernist scheme; that youthful deviance and juvenile crime were simply blamed 
on hooligans and the West ensured that no such measures were even conceptualized.  
Perhaps the only success the regime enjoyed in combating hooliganism was that its anti-
hooligan propaganda did not fall entirely only on deaf ears.  In addition to the real 
economic threat the young generation coming of age under communism posed its elders, 
there seems to have been a widespread notion that it was morally corrupt.  As a result, to 
some extent the regime succeeded in linking the supposed moral decay of the youth with 
this form of subcultural deviance.     
 As with women’s reproduction in the previous chapter, the regime’s policy jibed 
with an underlying social division—a generational one, in this case.  Long before 
communism reached Hungary, its deracinated sexuality and retro-Victorian morality had 
been codified in its Soviet context.  In a famous polemic, Lenin squared off against 
Alexandra Kollontai (1873-1952), one of the main (and only) women thinkers of the 
Bolshevik party, on the issue of “proper” sexuality in a socialist system.  Kollontai 
argued that in a socialist society, men and women should free themselves of their 
bourgeois notions of sin and instead engage in (hetero-)sexual relations as they desired.  
She saw sexual desire as a natural and healthy function of the human organism, no more 
remarkable than hunger or thirst.   Lenin’s crude response—“would a normal person lie 
down in the gutter and drink from a puddle?”—carried the day, and set the tone for the 
relationship between communism and sexuality in the USSR in the decades to come. 
Although Soviet women acquired many legal rights denied them under the tsarist 
regime—primarily divorce, alimony, and abortion—they were not allowed the same 
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degree of sexual freedom that men practiced as a matter of course: Kollontai’s “winged 
eros” of socialized sexuality remained unrealized in the USSR.527 The family remained 
the basic unit of social organization, while free love retained its pejorative connotation of 
promiscuity instead of acquiring a new ideological rectitude.   
In this regard the stubborn persistence of Catholicism in Hungary was 
multivalent.  Although Catholicism did serve as a locus of resistance to the regime in a 
broader social sense, it also condemned premarital sex, as it does to this day.  Although 
the theoretical basis of this prudery was vastly different, these two ideological systems—
ardently opposed on practically every other issue (abortion policy being the other notable 
exception)—concurred on this point.  Thus, much as the success of the pronatalist drive 
hinged upon the underlying patriarchal (and Catholic) norm, so did the success of anti-
hooligan propaganda draw on a sympathetic indigenous morality as well as the 
aforementioned generation gap. 
Morals did indeed become looser in communist Hungary.  Many of the factors 
that contributed to the erosion of sexual morality in communist Hungary were due the 
regime’s own actions; however, this did not stop the older generation from blaming its 
wayward youth for their immoral tendencies.  In the first place, the strict moral code of 
the village did not follow its emigrants to the cities.  There, the hordes of young workers 
lived in workers’ hostels—like the one described above—in which their sexual behavior 
was poorly monitored.  As suggested in Chapter 3, the mobilization of women in the 
                                                 
527 László Kürti, “The Wingless Eros of Socialism: Nationalism and Sexuality in Hungary,” in Hermine G. 
DeSoto and David G. Anderson, editors, The Curtain Rises: Rethinking Culture, Ideology, and the State in 
Eastern Europe (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1993), pp. 266-289.  On the USSR, 
see Goldman, pp. 1-58.  
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workforce led to increased opportunities for casual sexual liaisons with co-workers.  
While the regime was only indirectly responsible for increased immorality in these 
regards, its pronatalist campaign almost certainly resulted in an increase in sexual 
behavior among youths. As we also saw in Chapter 3, regime propaganda proclaimed that 
“For girls it is an honor to have children,” thus directly encouraging underage (and 
unmarried) sexual behavior.  While some adult Magyars blamed the regime for this 
decrease in morality—and some even asserted that it was a deliberate goal of the 
communists, enacted in order to sever familial bonds—most held the youths responsible 
for their increased sexual activity.    Hooligans became associated with this debauchery 
not only in regime propaganda but also in the popular imagination. 
 
I had a friend in Budapest who was a big hooligan, a bus driver who made 
2,000 to 3,000 [forints] a month.   He said that if one appeared with a car 
one could choose between four and five terrific girls.  They did it just for 
the entertainment, not for money. 
 
Elsewhere this same respondent suggests the linkage between these loose women and 
prostitution: “The girls started out doing it just for fun and for gifts and as they got used 
to it they did it for money.  I heard from friends that you could get a girl for 80 
forints.”528 It seems likely that girls who went out with hooligans would appear in the 
official transcript—and in the eyes of their elders—as prostitutes regardless of whatever 
they might have been doing with them.  Finally, the loose morality of the Magyar youth 
was apparent in how casually young men and women interacted and spoke to each other.  
As one middle-aged 1956 émigré recalled,   
                                                 
528 CUHRP Interview 229, Box 12, pp. 32, 30. 
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I felt like putting cotton in my little Ildiko’s and Elvirka’s ears when going 
on the street we would hear the following conversation: “Szevasz (hi!)” 
followed by a big slap on the shoulder, this slap coming from a boy 
toward a girl, mind you.  “Gyerünk csörögeni” (“Let’s go out dancing”).  
“Tudok egy klassz filmet” (‘I know a swell movie”).  And then the young 
“gentleman” would start going with the young “lady” in a way that I could 
never figure out how they managed to walk, so much were they leaning on 
each other [sic].529 
 
Csörögeni  and klassz both appear in the jampec lexicon.   
In light of these cultural, social, and sexual concerns, it is not surprising that the 
hooligans in a later film are much more sinister than Swing Toni.   In Félix Máriássy’s 
Egy Pikoló Világos (“A Glass of Beer,” 1955), hooliganism symbolizes not only the 
degenerative effects of cosmopolitanism but sexual danger as well.   The plot runs as 
follows: Juli (Éva Ruttkai) and Marci (Tibor Bitskey) are a young couple in love.  They 
are separated when Marci goes off to the army.  In his absence, Juli works in a factory but 
spends her evenings drinking and dancing with her promiscuous friend Gizus (Éva 
Schubert).  Their favorite dancehall is also frequented by a trio of pouting and posturing 
jampecek, who regularly ask her to dance.530  When Marci returns on leave, he finds out 
what Juli has been up to and forces her to take him to the dancehall, where everybody 
seems to know her name.  He berates her for her behavior and, when one of the shifty 
young hooligans asks her to dance, ignores her entreaties to step in and claim her as his 
partner. What ensues is one of the more disturbing scenes in socialist realist cinema.  The 
                                                 
529 CUHRP Interview 411, Box 13, p. 14.  Herein I have taken the liberty of correcting the rough 
translations in the original text, which read “Let’s go and rattle our old bones!” and “I know a classy, 
topping movie.” 
530 Those viewers who recalled Imre Pongracz’s turn as Swing Toni in Dalolva Szép az Élet would have 
noted his minor role in this film: he appears intermittently as an aging rake who also makes advances to 
Juli.  
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other jampecek crowd around the dancing couple and, when she tries to stop dancing, 
force her to continue.  In what is nothing less than a stylized gang rape on the dance floor, 
the young toughs pass her back and forth, forcing her to dance faster all the while.  Juli is 
helpless, and swoons.  Marci finally rescues Juli, the jampecek are detained by the police, 
and the movie ends ‘happily:’ after briefly considering suicide, Juli decides to mend her 
ways and Marci takes her back.   Despite its ideological bombast, the movie’s narrative 
neatly frames the sexualized threat posed by cosmopolitan culture:  the site of this 
debauchery is the dancehall, the vector of perversion dancing to western music, the actual 
instrument thereof the jampec. Whereas hooliganism was initially mobilized by the 
communist regime for comedic effect, these later manifestations were distinctly more 
threatening—on film as well as in the factories, streets, and bars. 
By early 1956, political tensions in Hungary were steadily mounting.  Rákosi’s 
return to hardline communism in the wake of Nagy’s New Course News of Khrushchev’s 
Secret Speech at the 20th Party Congress in February reached Hungary in March.  Soon 
after, the Petőfi circle—initially a small gathering of students and intellectuals—began its 
discussions on literature and other topics that soon snowballed into not-so-thinly-veiled 
critiques of the Rákosi regime.531   It was closed down, but not before its last meetings 
had drawn crowds numbering in the thousands. By summer tensions had reached the 
breaking-point: Rákosi himself was ousted in favor of the slightly-less-hated Erno Gerő 
as the party scrambled to maintain its authority.    
                                                 
531 György Litván, editor, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, pp. 37, 39-41. 
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This retrenchment manifested immediately on the popular-cultural front.   In June, 
dance teachers were allowed to teach western dances as well.  In August, the DISz 
newspaper ran a front-page story entitled “Waltz, Rumba, Mambo, Without 
Hooliganism,” explaining that these dances are acceptable as long as they are danced 
with reserve and taste.   Ten days later, Kossuth Radio (one of the regime mouthpieces) 
broadcast a three-hour program of the latest western dance and jazz music.532  However, 
even as the proscriptions on youthful activities were relaxed, the demonization of the 
jampec subculture continued apace.  In mid-August, a gang of four hooligans who went 
by the nicknames “Kiri,” “Guca,” “Csicsa,” and “Boci” were tried for their criminal 
activities at the Harkányfürdő spa.  The jampecek had lured a 15-year old girl into their 
room, where one of them raped her while the others stood guard; a few days later the 
rapist stabbed a man over the girl.533  “Kiri,” the rapist, got eight years in prison; the 
others, a year and a half or less.  On the eve of the revolution, the jampec had 
transformed from a useful propaganda stereotype into a real folk devil. 
 
* * * 
 
Communism never managed to kill jazz in Hungary, but rock and roll 
accomplished what the party ideologues could not.  By the time the dust had settled after 
1956, jazz was already old hat.  The first rock and roll recording in Hungary, a cover of 
Bill Haley’s “Rock around the Clock,” was recorded in March 1957—less than three 
                                                 
532 Cited in OSA/RFE 6084/56, mf 70. 
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years after its release in the USA—by none other than Lajos Martiny.  Tiny Matton had 
weathered stalinism in Hungary better than many musicians.  Although his performing 
career was put on hold, 88 albums recorded during the period 1951-1956 bear his imprint 
as a composer, studio musician, or director.  Chappy likewise persevered, playing a 
steady gig throughout the 1950s at the Budapest club in Nagymezző street (formerly, and 
now once more, known as the “Moulin Rouge”)534 and resuming his jazz career in the 
relaxed era of the 1960s.  After 1956, the character of the jampec likewise modulated, 
taking on rock and roll as the musical idiom of their youthful dissent.  Juvenile crime 
continued to be closely monitored, and Angyalföld continued to be a thorn in the 
regime’s side, as evinced by its preeminence in a citywide sweep of youth gangs in 1960-
61.535 
By this time, however, the Hungarian regime had learned its lesson.  Although it 
still demonized juvenile criminals as hooligans, it allowed a remarkable degree of 
independence and creativity to flourish in youth culture.  In this less oppressive 
environment, jeans and Western-style rock and roll did not draw the same opprobrium 
that drainpipe trousers and the boogie-woogie had in the 1950s.  As a result, youthful 
dissent remained for the most part muted until the late 1970s.  At that time, punk rock 
finally crossed the Iron Curtain into the Eastern Bloc.  As in the West, punk rock 
                                                                                                                                                 
533 Dunantuli Naplo, 16 August 1956. 
534 Nemes, “Martiny Lajos,” Fejezetek, pp. 172, 188.  On Chappy at the Budapest club, see “Idegen nevek 
útvesztőjében,” Esti Budapest, 14 October 1952. 
535 Horváth, “Hooligans, Spivs, and Gangs,” pp. 209-210.  
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articulated a rabid and foulmouthed attack on the establishment.536  Recorded in 1981, 
CPg’s “Anarchy” exhibits a clear debt to the Sex Pistols’ “Anarchy in the U.K.” even as 
it delivers a scathing attack on the administration:  
 
I am the antichrist 
I already know what you don’t 
Anarchy is coming now 
 
Anarchy, oi oi! 
 
To be free is what I want 
Not governed by an imbecilic beast 
This is proper I’m sure of it 
 
Anarchy, oi oi!537  
 
 
For this and other songs like it, the members of CPg were jailed, fined, and put 
under surveillance.538 Other punk bands such as Kontroll Csoport, ETA, and Európa 
Kiadó also explicitly attacked the communist regime, its Soviet allies, the excessive 
regimentation of work and leisure, and everything else wrong with communist Hungary.  
This unique form of resistance outlasted the regime it railed against.  However, the 
regime was not the only target of these angry young men: 
                                                 
536 Greil Marcus, Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1990).  On the Hungarian punk rock scene, see Ádam Pozsonyi, A Lenin-Szobor Helyén 
Bombatölcsér Tátong: A Magyar Punk Története, 1978-1990 (Budapest: Mucsa Könyvék, 2003). 
537 CPg, “Anarchia,” Embör Vigyázz! (1982). 
538 Kürti, “Culture, Youth, and Musical Opposition in Hungary,” in Rocking the State, edited by Ramet, p. 
89.   
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The flamethrower is the only weapon I need to win 
All the Gypsy adults and children we’ll exterminate 
But we can kill all of them at once in unison 
When it’s done we can advertise: Gypsy-free zone.539  
  
The neo-Nazi group Mos-oi and others like it articulated not only anti-establishment 
angst, but also the anti-Roma sentiment that percolated throughout the communist period.  
The fall of communism also led to an increase in skinhead attacks on Roma, which 
peaked sharply in 1991-92 and have since remained a major problem for post-communist 
Hungary.540  Like jazz, the punk rock scene in Hungary was a subculture generated by 
underlying social tensions that adopted a Western idiom for their expression.  However, it 
provides a cautionary tale about interpreting a subcultural formation in an authoritarian 
context as a straightforward instance of resistance.  Although the punk scene opened up a 
discursive space for criticizing the regime, this newfound freedom of expression was also 
used to rearticulate existing ethnicized biases.  In this case, one of the freedoms wrestled 
from the state was the freedom to indulge in hate speech.   
To return to the 1950s, the jampecek pose a similar interpretive problem.  In the 
context of hooliganism’s relationship to resistance, we must note that a few of the 
Columbia interviewees suggested that ‘hooligans’ were among the most fearless of street 
fighters of 1956.541  Bill Lomax argues that 
 
                                                 
539 Cited in Kürti, “Culture, Youth, and Musical Opposition in Hungary,” in Rocking the State, edited by 
Ramet, p. 85. 
540 Human Rights Watch, Rights Denied: The Roma of Hungary (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 
p. 12.  
541 See, e.g., CUHRP Interview 100, Box 7, p. 29. 
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More prominent [than the students] amongst those who took up the fight 
against the Russian tanks were the rough, working-class youths of the 
Budapest slums, the tough-guys, leather-jacketed “yobos” and hooligans 
from Angyalfold and Ferencvaros.  Uncultivated, rude, often anti-semitic, 
many of them joined for the adventure and sport of the fight.542 
 
 
However, subsequent research into the social backgrounds of the 1956 revolutionaries—
most of them young, urban, working-class males—does not indicate a disproportionately 
higher degree of criminality.543  What seems more likely is that signifier ‘hooligan’ 
became destabilized during the revolution, framing both acts of bravery and whatever 
isolated instances of anti-Semitism may have occurred: whereas prior to the revolution it 
was a strictly pejorative label, it came to signify good as well in the revolutionary hurly-
burly of late October and early November 1956.  The post-1956 regime responded by 
blaming hooligans, along with other “counterrevolutionary” elements, for the revolution. 
Already coded as sexual predators and deviant consumers of western culture, hooligans 
were now recast by regime propaganda as a directly political threat.    
The actual intentions of these hooligans, how they perceived their actions, and the 
effects of their activities are indeterminate.  Some might have indulged in this 
                                                 
542 Bill Lomax. Hungary 1956, p. 111.  Although one émigré concurs that hooligans exhibited anti-Semitic 
tendencies (CUHRP Interview 107, Box 7, p. 14), most accounts do not support this charge of anti-
Semitism.  To date only David Irving, the infamous Holocaust denier, has argued this case.   His 
tendentious Uprising! (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981) stresses the Jewish background of many 
party members, and asserts that much revolutionary violence took on an anti-Semitic cast as a result.   His 
argument therein suffers from his ideological bias, his lack of knowledge of Hungarian history (or 
language, for that matter), and by his lack of scholarly objectivity.  In 1994, András Mink discovered that 
Irving had essentially sold out to the Communist regime in order to gain preferential treatment and access 
to interviewees, promising not only to incorporate the regime’s version of events but also to turn over 
classified documents from American, English, and West German archives.  Mink, “David Irving and the 
1956 Revolution,” Hungarian Quarterly, Volume XLI, Number 160 (Winter 2000), available online at 
http://hungarianquarterly.com/no160/117.html (viewed 1 December 2007). 
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cosmopolitan form of deviance as a form of rebellion against the state; some were merely 
rebelling against their parents; most were probably just out looking for a good time.  
Initially, they seem to have served the regime well as propaganda whipping-boys.  Their 
elders, although they shared their cosmopolitan taste in music, saw in them a threat to 
public morality.  However, as time went on the hooligan problem got worse, as evinced 
by the spread of the moral panic to the administrative transcript.  It seems likely that the 
bad press hooligans received actually encouraged more youthful deviance throughout the 
early 1950s.  As with magzatelhajtás, to the extent hooliganism constituted resistance it 









                                                                                                                                                 
543 On this point see Gati, Failed Illusions, p. 157, and László Eőrsi, Corvinistak 1956 (Budapest: 1956 
Institute, 2001), p. 13. 
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CONCLUSION: 1956  
 
It is the tragic irony of terror that by the expansion of regulation, less 
becomes enough for breaking the rule.  Acts that do not have any political 
significance under more democratic conditions are labeled and treated as 
serious political actions in a centralized system.  In this sense, the 
expansion of coercion creates more room for resistance.544 
 
In this minimalist sense, everyday crime was popular resistance.  Although the 
communist regime in Hungary was not ‘totalitarian,’ its aspirations certainly were.  The 
party-state was bent on transforming Hungary in accordance with its high-modernist 
scheme.  To this end, it drastically altered the legal system in accordance with its stalinist 
precepts of “socialist legality.”  In the context of communist criminology and the ongoing 
transformation of society, workplace theft and dissimulation, black-marketeering, arson, 
wood theft, pig-killing, prostitution, abortion, and hooliganism became something more 
than mere nuisances.    If we are willing to accept Scott’s dictum that “each of the forms 
of disguised resistance, of infrapolitics, is the silent partner of a loud form of public 
resistance,”545 then each of these modes of deviant behavior was indeed a surreptitious 
attack on the party-state’s authority.  The problem with this borderline-tautological 
formulation is threefold: it reduces resistance to only those acts recognized by the state as 
crimes, it assumes oppositional intent on the part of resistors, and the causal relationship 
between infrapolitics and revolutionary politics is based entirely on inference.  What are 
we to make of cases in which resistance went unnoticed (as was probably the case with  
                                                 
544 István Rév, “The Advantages of being Atomized,” p. 347. 
545 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, p. 199. 
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much workplace theft) or cases in which resistance may not have been the primary, or 
possibly even a significant, motive (as with black-marketeering and pig-killing)?  In any 
case, what is the linkage between these subtle arts of resistance and the brief episode of 
outright armed rebellion in 1956?   
As I have demonstrated herein, criminal and deviant behavior in communist 
Hungary were responses to regime oppression, but also to deeper social forces at work.  
Resentment against the communist regime was a major ingredient in the criminal mix, 
but the underlying social, cultural, and economic dislocation resulting from the 
modernization of Hungary was also a significant factor.  The dissolution of the 
conservative Horthy regime and the postwar consensus on the necessity for change made 
possible the transformation of the country along high-modernist lines.  Modernization 
was the order of the day well before the Party seized control: the postwar coalition 
government was already proceeding in this direction, with broad popular support, well 
before the 1948 coup.  Peasants left their farms in search of wage labor in factories even 
as women and youths entered the workforce in much greater numbers than ever before.  
The vast majority of Magyars found themselves working longer hours for less money 
than they had before the war.  Some degree of societal tension and dislocation was bound 
to happen in the course of this project, and any postwar government would have had to 
deal with these issues.  The stalinist variant of high modernity imposed on Hungary both 
exacerbated these modernizing tensions and directed popular dissatisfaction with them 
directly back at the state. 
The state’s ability to deal with these various transgressions and force its project 
through was constrained by two main factors: the nature of communist authority itself, 
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and its tension-fraught relationship with its subjects.  On the former count, serious 
problems surfaced with both the planning and the personnel involved in the stalinization 
of Hungary.  Even if it had not been altered on a daily basis, the Five-Year Plan was an 
overly ambitious scheme.  It would have required accurate information reported at all 
levels of the economy to even track its progress, much less intervene in a constructive 
manner.  As the case of the collective farm manager M.T. showed, penalties for failure to 
live up to these impossible standards could be severe.  For workers at all levels of the 
administrative hierarchy, dissimulation and falsifying data were the safest options.  They 
were widely practiced, and in collusion with fellow workers, on a daily basis.  In some 
cases, the impact of these sub rosa practices were negligible: as the electrical engineer in 
Chapter 1 recalled, none of the construction plans he generated were ever used anyway.  
In others—as with the managers of collective farms sending their machines on mad 
jaunts across the countryside in the interest of falsifying their inventories rather than 
agricultural development—this preoccupation with quotas and production data actually 
militated directly against the plan.  Perhaps most importantly, the members of the legal 
administration were not immune to these personal and infrapolitical motives: policemen 
and judges, like engineers and tractor-station managers, were far from reliable executors 
of the regime’s intentions.  As its grandiose scheme was characterized by poor planning, 
unreliable cadres, and poor communication between its offices, the system itself bred the 
behaviors it then interpreted as resistance. 
In addition to this intrinsic tendency towards entropy, the communist system was 
often confounded by preexisting modes of social, cultural, and economic organization.    
For the Soviet case, Lynne Viola has recently argued that “The great irony of 
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resistance—or what the state chose to see as resistance—is that its identification as such 
in combination with the state’s repression led to the strengthening of older cultural 
formations, identities, and loyalties.”546  The same irony is apparent in stalinist Hungary.  
Perhaps the best example of this stubborn persistence of the past was the state’s attempt 
to regulate pig-killing: the widespread, traditional, and previously-legal cultural activity 
provided a locus of anti-regime activity.  Traditional peasant practices of resistance such 
as wood theft and withholding grain also continued largely unabated in the communist 
period, as did working-class organization, Catholicism, and the consumption of 
“cosmopolitan” culture.  The shadow economy flourished under communism, 
encouraging a hypercapitalist mindset among the subjects of this ostensibly-centralized 
economy.  For the most part, these underlying forms of social, cultural, and economic 
organization hampered the successful realization of the party-state’s plans.   
This was not always the case.  A necessary clarification of Viola’s point is that 
these submerged social and cultural norms could also aid some aspects of the communist 
project.  This is most clearly evident in the nominal success of the pronatalist campaign.  
Although women were still able to control their reproduction to some degree throughout 
the entire period, the recrudescence of patriarchy was a key element in the ‘success’ of 
the administration’s population policy.  Likewise, the moral panic preached against 
hooliganism successfully drew upon the perceived immorality of the younger generation.  
The persistence of Catholic religious practice is especially interesting in this regard, as it 
lent itself to both resistance and complicity: on the issues of abortion and abstinence, at 
least, a good Catholic could also be a good communist.  Women who sought to control 
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their reproduction resisted against both the law and patriarchal social norms, just as 
hooligans found themselves rebelling against not only regime-sanctioned notions of 
proper leisure activities but also the strict morality of their parent generation. 
Gender and generational conflicts aside, however, most Hungarians identified 
communism as an unwelcome regulating body of foreign origin, and reacted accordingly.  
The net effect of this widespread resistance in the longer term was a qualified victory.  
The crackdown after the 1956 revolution lasted into the early 1960s.  During this time 
collectivization was finally completed, and the state crushed all open challenges to its 
authority, albeit in a more selective manner (see Chart 1.1). However, after 1963 the 
party-state gradually ushered in significant changes.  Small-scale private production and 
retail trade became legal once more, privately-owned household plots were allowed, the 
cultural sphere was policed more leniently.  By 1968, the Hungarian economy was a 
mongrel mix of centralized planning and certain elements of a free market.  This is the 
point at which Hungary’s history significantly diverges from that of its Eastern European 
neighbors, as the reforms ushered in an era of relative prosperity.  Hungary became “the 
happiest barracks in the Bloc” even as the other states of Eastern Europe remained 
wedded to a more doctrinaire communism.    
In this regard, the parallels with the other Eastern European communist regimes 
are instructive.  In each, the communist leadership sought to transform society and 
regulate the labor, reproduction, and leisure of their subjects.  In each, similar and even 
identical modes of criminal behavior emerged as responses to the intrusive party-state.  
The few differences were primarily matters of timing and degree.  In the field of labor 
relations, subtle shop floor machinations appear to have been endemic throughout the 
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Bloc.  Although outright strikes were rare occurrences everywhere in communist Eastern 
Europe, slowdowns and factory theft—and even a limited and hidden form of working-
class solidarity—were commonplace.  For Poland, Kenney has found that “the state’s 
apparent victory” was “subtly altered by the ways in which workers resisted or 
accommodated to change.” The same holds true for the DDR, where, according to Ross, 
“the cumulative effect of decades of small-scale acts of refusal, especially concerning the 
regime’s demands in the work sphere, nonetheless [i.e., despite the absence of open 
rebellion between 1953 and 1989] appear highly significant over the long term.”547  
Peasant resistance was also common throughout Eastern Europe:  in the cases of Poland 
and Yugoslavia, it was so widespread and effective that collectivization was abandoned 
in the 1950s.548  Overall, the later history of communism in Eastern Europe seems to 
support Scott’s argument on the infrapolitical impact of shop floor and peasant resistance.  
As Rév asserts, “From a closer look, all the important and long-lasting economic and 
social reforms in all the Central European countries appear as nothing but the legalization 
of already existing illegal or semilegal practices.”549 As they manipulated the system on a 
daily basis, workers and peasants alike were able to gradually and incrementally over 
time redress their grievances and advance their interests.  
Hungary’s tumultuous history of reproductive rights was likewise mirrored in the 
other states of Eastern Europe.  As the demographic effects of the double burden became 
apparent, almost every one of the Eastern European states opted for the same carrot-and-
                                                 
547 Kenney, Rebuilding Poland, pp. 343-344; Ross, The East German Dictatorship, p. 124. Italics in the 
original. 
548 For Yugoslavia, see Bokovoy, Peasants and Comunists, p. 157.    
549 Rév, “The Advantages of being Atomized,” p. 324. 
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stick approach—of providing rewards for having children, and imposing stringent 
penalties for abortion—that determined reproductive policy in stalinist Hungary.  (We 
should note also that abortion was illegal prior to communist rule in almost every one of 
these countries; as in Hungary, the limitation of reproductive freedom was a return to 
patriarchy rather than a communist innovation.)  In most Bloc countries this was a short-
lived experiment that lasted no later than the 1950s.  The exception to this norm, and the 
most intrusive policing of women’s bodies in Eastern Europe, occurred in Romania: 
abortion was banned from 1948 to 1957, legal until 1966, and, as the birthrate continued 
to dwindle, banned again in 1966.  It remained illegal until 1989, by which time most 
Romanian women had undergone between five and seven abortions regardless.  As in any 
society, banning abortion did not abolish it but merely drove it underground, with 
predictable results for the health of the women trying to control their reproduction: 
maternal deaths skyrocketed to 204 per 100,000 in 1988.550  In one of the many ironies 
attendant on the fall of communism, the anti-politics of anti-feminism have generated a 
backlash against abortion rights in many of these newly-democratic states. Writing in 
1993, Laszlo Kürti observed that “If the current freely elected conservative Hungarian, 
Romanian, Croatian, and Polish governments have their way, the eastern half of the New 
European Home will be built of a myriad of crèches and kitchens.”551  It remains to be 
seen how the politics of reproduction will play out in the post-communist societies of 
Eastern Europe.  
                                                 
550 The rate for the USSR at the time was “only’ 10:100,000.  Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity, pp. 208, 
213. 
551 Kürti, “Wingless Eros,” p. 281. 
 238
Finally, culture and leisure were also hotly-contested battlegrounds in each of the 
Eastern European states.  The jazz scene and its subcultural hangers-on were not unique 
to Hungary.  In the early 1950s, jazz reigned supreme in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
even the USSR and Bulgaria as well—and in each country colorfully-named and unruly 
youth subcultures (stiliagi in the USSR, bikiniarzy in Poland, etc.) also danced in the 
American style, incurred the wrath of the authorities, and seized the public 
imagination.552  In all these countries, regime control measures were counterproductive: 
“the continual efforts to increase organization and control as a solution to the problems of 
youth socialization … in effect only added to the political significance and iconoclastic 
attraction of Western popular culture, and in the process set an unpromising precedent for 
efforts to steer young people’s interests and free-time activities in the decades to 
come.”553  In short, similarities between Hungary and the other Eastern European states 
are apparent in all these categories, in the 1950s as well as thereafter.  The question then 
becomes: if these arts of resistance were common across the Bloc, how and why did they 
translate into open political rebellion in Hungary in 1956?    
Everyday crime in communist Hungary had two subtle but important effects:  its 
prosecution eroded regime legitimacy, and its practice normalized anti-regime activity.  
As Kenney notes, “Legitimacy’s requirements are minimal: some kind of acceptance of 
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the system and the benefits it offers, and resignation from conflict as a means to political 
change.”554   Whatever fragile legitimacy the Rákosi regime enjoyed disappeared as 
ordinary Magyars found themselves in jail for acts labeled criminal by the regime, but 
which they did not perceive as transgressions.  Workers, peasants, women, and youths all 
flaunted the regime’s proscriptions on a daily basis—not with intent to overthrow the 
state, but simply in the course of their daily lives.  When they were arrested and jailed, 
their resentment increased; when they successfully eluded the unwelcome attention of the 
state’s regulatory gaze, the bar was lowered for further deviant behavior.  Alone, this 
undercurrent of popular resentment probably would not have sufficed to bring about the 
revolution.  However, when coupled with the articulation of an oppositional politics by 
the intelligentsia and the shift in the international context, popular resistance in Hungary 
coalesced into a revolutionary drive for sweeping social change.  Although it is not my 
intention to entirely rewrite the history of 1956, it is worthwhile to briefly reexamine it in 
this light. 
Popular discontent with the regime began in 1948, but the intelligentsia arrived 
late to the show. In the period up to mid-1953, the intelligentsia was largely silent even as 
popular dissatisfaction with the regime reached fever point.  This early phase of 
communism came to an end with Stalin’s death.  A power struggle in the Kremlin 
ensued, and the governing elites of the Eastern European party-states were thrown into 
confusion as the New Course was announced in Moscow.  Nikolai Bulganin spelled out 
the reason for this intervention for Rákosi in no uncertain terms:   
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[A] catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation.  The whole 
situation might be different if the Red Army were not there.  It is a fact 
that elements of power abuse exist; the population’s living standard has 
declined.  This is not the road to socialism, but the road to a 
catastrophe.555   
 
Bulganin’s fear of widespread social unrest was not unfounded.  Destalinization ushered 
in a series of strikes and demonstrations throughout Eastern Europe: most notably in 
Eastern Germany, where over 400,000 rioters took to the streets in more than 370 urban 
areas during the week of 17 June, but also at Plovdiv in Bulgaria, Plzeň, Prague, and 
Strakonice in Czechoslovakia, and Csepel, Odz, and Diósgyőr in Hungary.556  This 
widespread (if disorganized) resistance suggests a region-wide disenchantment with 
stalinism; in this regard Hungary was the norm rather than the exception, and not even 
the most rebellious of the Bloc countries at that time.   
Rebellion in Hungary was temporarily headed off by the New Course, which 
successfully defused popular animosities with a raft of economic reforms.  However, the 
New Course was also perceived as a concession by Hungarian workers:  as Pittaway 
asserts, “Whilst the events in the GDR did not lead to open mass protest in Hungary, they 
had an electrifying effect in workplaces. The notion that a population could express its 
discontent openly in a socialist state began, albeit slowly, to lift the lid on a well of 
discontent.”557  At the same time the New Course provided the diathesis for the revolt of 
the intelligentsia.  The general amnesty resulted in the release of thousands of prisoners, 
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who began telling tales of their torture and mistreatment in captivity.  At the same time, 
loosened press restrictions encouraged writers to take more openly defiant stances against 
the regime.  Even as the masses were temporarily bought off by economic reform, the 
intelligentsia became ever more intransigent towards the communist system.   
Rákosi’s return to power in 1955 marked a return to repression.  This fueled 
resistance from all levels of society.  A second change in the Kremlin weather, this one 
occurring in February 1956 as Khrushchev revealed Stalin’s sins to the Twentieth Party 
Congress, ushered in a second grudging wave of reform.  As we have seen in Chapter 4, 
this took the form of increased liberalization on the cultural front.  It was also coupled 
with a liberalization of the public sphere, most notably in the formation of the Petőfi 
debating circle.  These halfhearted reforms only whetted the popular appetite for 
change.558  Concession followed concession:  Rákosi resigned in July, Laszlo Rajk—the 
key figure in the 1949 show trial—was properly reburied on 6 October.  Prior to 1956, 
the ebb and flow of popular resistance and articulate dissent had not coincided.  This 
changed in 1955.  Thereafter a showdown was all but inevitable, and the presence of the 
Red Army no longer an adequate deterrent. 
The goal of the revolution was clear.  As Bill Lomax argues, 1956 “was a social 
revolution aimed not at restoring a previous régime but at creating a radically new social 
order, one that would be both more democratic than the capitalist West and more socialist 
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than the communist East.”559  The origin of this revolutionary ideal is somewhat more 
opaque.  Imre Nagy, György Lukács, and the other revolutionary thinkers of 1956 all 
argued for a reform socialism that would redress the ills of the current system without 
jettisoning it entirely.  They framed their critique in the idiom of Marxist philosophy, in 
essence arguing that Stalin had hijacked the revolution.  As Nagy put it, “the economic 
policy of the New Course is … the proper application of the teachings of Marxism-
Leninism to the specific Hungarian conditions, on the basis of specific traits in the 
transitional period and the objective needs of building socialism in the field of socialist 
transformation and development of the people’s economy.”560  Although most Magyars 
shared the goal of changing the political system in Hungary, the origin of their political 
ambition was probably not based in an elite, revisionist stance of the unpopular 
Communist ideology.   
In marked contrast to their nominal revolutionary leaders, ordinary Magyars 
expressed their ambitions in much simpler terms of which elements of communism they 
sought to retain and which they sought to jettison.  One 1956 émigré told her interviewer 
that  
As far as the relationships between equals and subordinates and superiors 
went, I must emphatically say that the Communists have brought some 
good to Hungary.  They have abolished the tremendous class distinctions 
that existed before the war.  They have abolished the stiffness of relations 
that one experienced whenever approaching superiors.561 
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A young factory worker who escaped in 1955 singled out the work-training system 
introduced by the Communists as a particular benefit to Hungarian youths.562  Another 
respondent, a worker and ex-colonel in the army, found that the expansion of public 
libraries under the communists was a benefit to cultural life, as “people become used to 
reading and do not stop at the books selected by the party. …The works of Jokai, Eötvös, 
Mikszath, 563 Balzac, Maupassant, Zola, and Shakespeare can be seen in the hands of real 
workers and not only those who became unskilled workers under the present regime.” He 
also spoke highly of the various programs geared towards educating and training the 
youth.  Finally, he averred that the bulk of the Hungarian working class felt that  
A planned economy is better than free competition because the latter 
serves only the interests of the capitalists.  This means that they only 
produce profitable goods instead of what the community needs.564      
 
Significantly, many of the post-1956 respondents—interviewed in mid-1957, with the 
memory of the Soviets’ bloody crackdown still fresh—echoed these critical and 
evenhanded perspectives.565  These assessments were based on their experience of life 
under communism, not drawn from reform communist ideology.   
All things considered, it seems more likely that the popular revolutionary 
sentiment in 1956 was based on their preexisting political preferences rather than the 
intelligentsia’s revisionist tendencies.  The eradication of social hierarchy, egalitarian 
access to education and opportunity, a profound wariness of unfettered capitalism: these 
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were indeed the objectives of Nagy and his reforming cohort—but they were also the 
goals of the Hungarian public in the immediate postwar period.  Although it is possible 
that ordinary Magyars indeed bought into the intelligentsia’s reform program, it seems 
more likely that they were simply trying to pick up where the ill-starred postwar 
democratic experiment had left off in 1948.  These political beliefs did not evaporate 
when the Rákosi clique seized power; rather, they went underground.  Silenced for 
almost a decade, in October 1956 the vox populi finally got the opportunity to talk back. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Államvédelmi Osztály /   State Security Department /  
Államvédelmi Hatóság (ÁVO / ÁVH) State Security Authority566 
 
Dolgozó Ifjúság Szövetsége (DISz)  Association of Young Workers 
 
feketevágás     illegal slaughter 
 
jampec      hooligan 
 
Magyar Kommunista Párt /   Hungarian Communist Party / 
Magyar Dolgozók Pártja  (MKP / MDP) Hungarian Workers’ Party567 
 
Magyar Nök Demokratikus Szövetsége Democratic Association of  
(MNDSz)     Hungarian Women 
 
magzatelhajtás    illegal abortion 
 
népnevelő     people’s educator 
 


















Note:  The plural in Hungarian is denoted by a – k suffix; for nouns that do not end in a 
vowel, a fill vowel is also added.  Thus népnevelő – népnevelők, or  jampec – jampecek.  
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